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ABSmACT
Tbc CunlCtbationof Ncwfotmdfand withCanada in 1949 was a mixedblessing. On the
plus side, Canada's array of social programs and its strongc:eooomy gave nu::h-rlo=ded
securi ty to Newfoundland aod its people. On the minusside however, Ne-.'lfoundland
became,ovanight.,pertof theCanadian common market. Thisnewrelationshipmeant the
end for many local manufacturers and the loss of a substantial nwnber of jobs. In
addition.Coofeder.ttion brought downimmigration barriers between Newfoundlandand
Canada, thereby providing a borderless escape route for Newfoundlanders intent on
finding improvedeconomicconditions. Stepped-upout-migrationwasviewedasa serious
problemby the newprovince's first government.
This thesis traces rheSmallwocd government's first major response to the challenges
posedby Confed...cratlon. Out of it cameanindustrializationpolicy that wouldleadto the
establishmentofsixteen-sponsoredindustriesandtheexpenditurc oftwo-thirds of thecash
surplusaccumulated dwing theCommission of Goverrunent period.
'lhe industrialization programwaspoorly planned, bothin termsof thebusinesspartners
it sought andthe industries it funded. In the end. most of the new industries failed,
withouthavingreturneda penny inprincipal01' interestto theNewfomdlandgovanmcnt
whichbankrolled theprogram with loan guarantees.
Otapter Oneoutlinestheenvironmentin which Smallwoodcreated the industriaIizatim
P'~ and inlroduces his economic C2Dl' andcoofidant,~. AlfredValdmanis.
Ompter Twoattemptsto capture thedeal-making andthepolhical rhetocic throughv.hich
,he program developed II reveals the firs signsofduplicityonthepan of the_
in its public ondpr ivare rrusingi about the program
Chapter ThreegetSto theheartof thecrisisthe industries foundthemselves in. anddetails
lhe intemal management of the crisis both from inside the companies and inside
govenunent
ChapterFourprovidesa broader perspectiveof the development dilemmafaced by smaIl
ec onomies,by focusing on the case of Nova Scotia and its experience with Industrial
Estates Limited.
Chapter Fiveplacesthe failure of the Smallwoodprogram in thecontextof live distinct
economicdevelopment effortsin the post-Confederation em. The mostrecenteffort was
unveiled in late 1994 by the Liberal government of Clyde Wells.
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Introduction
The February9. 1950 memo fromRichardson w oods, aChicago consultant. toeconomist
Stacey May of Nelson Rockerfeller's International Basic Economy Commission's
Technical Services Group, provided a snapshot of an lmputient Joseph Smallwood
Newfoundland's first premier. Woods' memo notedSmallwood's "great senseot'urgency
abouteconomic development" and reported "he grudgeseveryweek that passeswithout
constructive action".I
In the following months, Smallwood hadthe IBEC Technical ServicesGroopundertake
a "survey" of the province's economic prospects. A pressrelease fromthe!BEe Group
describedthe surveyas "a broodinvestigation of theeconomicresources of the Province.
withspecial attentionto worldmarket analysis.,,2 Smallwoodthough, wasalreadylooking
beyond the IBEe report, telling Newfoundlanders,
A mere hundred million dollars invested in the development of our
resources would absorb everylastbit of our man-power (sic) and create
a man-powershortage.'
But it was manufacturing, not naturalresource development, to whichSmallwood would
first commit himself. In the 22 monthsbetweenJWlC 1950 andMarch1952, Smallwood's
"great sense of urgency" wouldtranslate itself into theestablishment of, orcomrnitrncnt
to, 16 new manufacturing industries, including a cement plant,and chocolate, leather ,
gloveand textilefactories.
The Newfoundland Government launched these industries through its Economic
DevelopmentDepartment and theDepartment's DirectorGeneral, Dr. AlfredValdmanis.
valdmanis,a fonnerLatvianfinanceminister, wasrecruitedby Smalwoodin Ottawa.A1i
Newfoundland'seconomic czar, Valdmanis' role wasto travel, (mostly to EW'Ope) make
contact and reach tentative agreements with companies or individuals interested in
establishingenterprises in Newtoundland
I Memo, Richardson Woods to Stacey May of International Basic Economy
Conunission's Technical Services Group, February9. 1950. J.R.SmallwoodCollection,
Centre for Newtoundland Studies, Memorial University. File 3.08.336 {Insubsequent
citations,this collectionof material willbe referredto as JRSCollection.]
2 Ibid
, J.R. SmalwoodSpeech,1950 (undatedj.Pile 7.02.00J. iRS Collection
The agreements weresubject to cabinet approval, a near automatic assumption in those
days.
Smallwood's public commentsexudednearmissionary zealwhen it came to promoting
economic development in Newfoundland In the 1950legislaturedebateon establishing
the Department of Economic Development, Smallwood utteredhis famous "develop or
perish" statement, and he related a story he told a Toronto newspaper reporter in 1948,
while negotiatingthe Tennsof Union in Ottawa
I used to tellhim I'd be Premier of Newtoundland and that there'dbeno
difficulty of that. And he usedto laugh, and I usedto say, 'don'tlaugh'. I
said 'whoever is Premier of Newfoundland has to doone thing,hehas to
develop Nt.."WfOlUldlandor be bootedout.'
Smallwoodpromisedthatgovernment policy towardindustrialization wouldbecalculated
and orderly. Harold Horwood, a Liberal backbencher in the first Assembly after
Confcderntion,anda close ally ofSmallwood in theConfederation campaign. wroteyears
laterthe planwas to develop theindustriesone at a time, sellthemto theprivatesector,
and use the proceeds to startother industries.'
appeared to be only for public
movingquickly. This was borne out in a
n May 11, 1951, on the eve of Valdmanis'
departurefor Europe to negotiate six new industries."
The industries themselves were capitalized with 5WIa government financing throughan
attractiveloonguarantee program. The termsdid not require cash investment on the part
of the investors as a prerequisite to qualifYfor the guarantees . The phrase in the loan
regulations that allowed this was the "in at..:.: or kind"clause. "In kind" wasintendedto
includeeverything from"know-how, machinery, oranymeterial,engineering supervision,
4 PeterNew]'. ThePolitical Economy ofNewfQundland J92Q..t m . (Toronto: Copp
Clark)1973.pp. 194-195
, Harold Horwood.ll!l:)!. (Toronto: McClellandandStewart)1990. p. 171
6 Memo, Alfred Valdmanis to JR Smallwood, Departmenl. of Economic
Development. File 3.08.002. JRS Collection
...erection, building.etc." and would bematch...-d dollar for dollar by the Newfoundland
Government in the formof guaranteedbankloans.'
Soonaftergettingstarted most ofthe industriesbecamemooeylosers In the early going.
most of the money losersweresustained with additional government loans andgrants. In
1957, a govcrruncnt-eommissioned consultant's report recommended some of the
industriesbeclosedundproposed changesin the wayothersWL'J'C managed. 'lhe gypswn
and cement plants, basedon locally available resources and geared toward the loud
constructionmarket,remainedgoingconcerns.Thoseindustries however. have long since
passedfrom government to private control. Indeed,a fewshort yearsafterthe program
started, the government itself WlIS de-emphasizing the industrialization scheme and
focusing instead on fisheries development!
This thesis is not a study on regional development, ruther it is un examination or a
specific initiative undertaken by the Newfoundland government during its early years us
a province of Canada.Thispolicy.whichentailedsignificant publicinvestment, happened
in the climate of post-wareconomicthinking, whichbothin Britain andCanada. implied
a vital role for governmentin the area. of economic planning.During this period, Britain
developeda largenationalizedindustrial sector andhad implemented majorsocial welfare
reform with the National Health Service," In Canada, the 1945 While PDJX-"!' on
Employment and Income promoted the maintenance of "high and stable levels of
employmentand income" to be "a primary aim of government policy in the postwar
period.':" This focus on generating high levels of employment was seen as being
influenced by developments in Britain,andby the povertyexperienced in Canadaduring
the depression. Thesedevelopments ledinCanadato thestrengthening ofthc Department
of Financeas an instrument of financial control and of the Department of Healthand
Welfare in the ereaof social policy."
7 Ibid,Fite 3.08.002
3 Memo, GordonPushieto 1.R. Smallwood,1957. File 3.08.033. JRSCollection
9 Shonfield, Andrew. Modem CapjlaHsm [The Changing Balanceof Public and
PrivatePower] NewYork: Oxford University Press.1976. pp,88-89
10Phidd,RichardW. andG. BruceDoem. The Politicsand MaaaperuQfCnnadian
Economic Policy. Toronto:Macmillan. 1978. p.159
II Ibid
'Ibc lkvelopments alsoserved10 legitimize a largerrole fOT!heSlate in the planning of
the l'COOOIlly. While tbee is littledirect evidenceSmallwood was influenced by these
'-"'ICI'lIS, he had to look no fartbe-thanNe\foundland's high unemplO)t1lerJt andlarge:
outmi~ion~ to eppreciere the need for some type of intervention by his
govcmmcm. Smallwood wasphilosphically inclined toengagelhe treasury in the p&SUit
of industry to ameliorate suchconditions. lie underlined his resolve ina speechto the
legislaturein thefall of 1949.
...we mighttake someof the surplus andput it behindsome movement
for the development of this province That is theonly permanent solution
to the age-old problem thatbeganofficially in 1832 andhasneverceased
exceptdwing theFirst Great Warandduringthe Second GreatWar.12
This thesis will focus on the industrialization program with a view to detailing the
activities of theindustriesand providing ananalysisof the wayin which it wasmanaged.
Asa preliminary point, theprogram, despitean expenditure thatamountedto two-thirds
0 1"the pre-Confederotionsurplusll , has beensllbjectedto limited study. One possible
l'I:<lSOI\is that key documentsfromthaterahaveonly recently becomeavailable. This is
especially so with respectto the SmalwoodCollectionin Memorial University's Centre
forNewfoundlandStudies.
The industrialization progrem, though enthusiastically supported by Smallwood and
o<has. waspoorly planned and toohastilyenberked upon.There appeared to be noset
of goalsand objectives to guidedevelopment: apart from Smalwood's credoof -develop
or perish", \\1Jile the fIrSt three indu.strie; \\UC basedon local resoercesandgeared
towardthe localmarket,Smallwood did notoffera fumexpl<nltion Mty Nem"oundland
shouldbecomeinvolvedi-t indmtries basedon the importof raw eet eials and geared
toward alreadycompetitiveexpert markets, especiallythoseinNorth AmericaThe main
weakness in theprogram however, was theloan guarantee pogram that providedand
12 Proceedings, October17, 1949. pAI3
IJ Proceedings,November30,1949. pp.846-848.Thepre-Confedearionsurplusrefers
to the balance booksfor the Newfoundland government at thetimt it joined Canada.
ThL'Teare variousreferences inprintto a surplusrangingfromS40millionto $49million.
This thesisusesthe figure$40,283,147.This numberis takenfrom the firstbudgetspeech
of theSmallwood government on November30, 1949. In recounting for the House: the
details of the new province's financial standing, theMinister of Finance, R W. Quinton
notedthatthesurplus at Confederntion was$47,676,482., minusliabilitiee> of$ 7,393,335.
Theseliabilities includedaccounts payable, trustee stock, saving'! certificates, andboth
public debt nndsavings: cernflcare interest.
deliveredsubstantial financial helpto industries, basednor: onrigorousstudyandanalysis.
but on the blessing and recommendation of the new Province's economic czar. Alfred
Valdmanis. '[his cannotmerelybeseen 35 a technical weakness.but ruther. as a political
mistake whichin six short years,consumed $26million."
ThisthesiswillplacetheNewfoundland industrialization planin the contextof whatW3S
happening in NovaScotia at around the same time.Thedecision to include the Nova
Scotia case centresaround someof thesimilarities it has with Newfoundland. Like
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia has lagged behind the nation in Important indicators of
economic growth; it wasprimarilya resource-basedeconomy; itwasoutside theindustrial
centre of Canada and North America. though not as far removed fromthe centre as
Newfoundland; and Nova Scotia and Ne\\1oundland, as provinces of Canada. have
identical constitutional powers. These similaritiesshould notbetaken to meanthat any
givenbusinesswould have an equal chanceof surviving in bothprovinces. Indeed. an
argument could be madethatNovaScotiawould havea major locationaladvantage over
Newfoundland in termsof gettingmanufacturedgoodsto market. However, it should be
notedthe Nova Scotia case alsoservesto illustrate that Newfoundland was not the onty
provinceengaged in directingindustrial development.
To take the discussion a step further, the Canadian experience is consistent with the
global experience wherecountries and regionson the peripheryof largertrading partners,
have adopted similar measures to jump-start development, often with catastrophic
consequences for their treasuries.
This thesis will rely on an assortment of primary and secondary materials. The chief
primary materials are contained in the Smallwood Collection in the Centre for
Newfoundland Studiesat Memorial University.Theseinclude Department of Economic
Developmentdocwnents, including memorandato cabinet insupport of lheestablishment
of the various industries. The departmental documents also contain correspondence
betweenAlfred VaJdmanis andthe bankinghouses, correspondencebetweenVaidmanis
and J.R Smallwood, and internalmemoranda on the operation and status of theVwlOUS
industries established under thegovernment plan.
The Smallwood Collection also containsannual reportsof the IndustrialDevelopment
Loan Board, and reportsand memoranda involving the International Basic Economy
Commission
Proceedingsof the House of Assembly comprise an important record of the 'cut and
thrust'of debate on industrialization andotherpublic policy issues.
14This represents in excessof $200million 1995 dollars.
There wassubstantial coverageof the Ncwfowtdland development program in the
newspapers andjournalsof theday: The local papers. The EveningTelegram andThe
Daily Newsgave extensive coverage of thenew industries. TheBoard of TradeJownal
provideda business perspective onthe increased competition at thetimeofConfederation,
with much of the space devoted to the transition period for Newfoundland-based
manufacturers. This coverage WDSinsharpcontrast tothatprovidedbytheToronto-based
Financial Post. ThePostdetailedthe opportunitiesConfederation presented forCanadian
business. and later. as the industrialization program got underway, the paper gave
considerable spaceto detailing the prospects of thenewindustries. (ThePost's coverage
appeared to bebasedon Smallwood's accounts of how thenew industries were doing,
however. ratherthan on any independentassessment of the newfirms.)
The international experience is amply documented in studiesthat are a combination of
theoretical andanecdotal approaches to development. Dependency theoryandtheoriesof
underdevelopment are important for understanding the rationaleeven for whatmaybe
considered misguidedeconomic development inplacessuch as Newfoundland.
Confederntion:TheBeginnings of an Industrialization
Policy
In Newfoundland, the strokeof midnight,March 31, 1949is bestknownas the moment
Britain's oldest colony becameCanada's tenthandyoungest province. Theunion brought
Cunada's array of social programs ~ old age pensions, war veterans pensions, family
allowances and unemployment insurance ~ to the350,000peopleof NcMoundland and
Labrador. UnionwithCanadameantsomething elseas well. It brokedown the customs
and immigration barrierbetween Newfoundland and Canada Soon after, Canadian
manufacturers wouldbe successfully competingwith Newfoundlandmanufacturers who
hadpreviou.sly enjoyedtariff protection. For Newfoundlanders generally, unionwith
Canadaremoved immigration barriersand easedmigration. Indeed,migrationto Canada
wasa well-wornpathfor Newfoundlanders looking forbetterfortunes. In 1947 and1948,
4900Newfoundlanders migrated to Canada,' The migration factorwas an ingredient in
several speeches given in the early 1950's by the newPremier. JosephSmallwood, and
itappearedto giveimpetustohis searchfornewindustry, Returning froma six-weektrip
to Europeto attractbusinessto Newfoundland, Smallwoodtold a Newfoundlandradio
audience,
Wemustdevelop or perish. We must developorour peoplewill go in the
thousands to other parts of Canada. We must create new jobs, or our
young menespecially will gooff to other placesto get thejobs they can't
gethere.Develop, develop, develop - that'sbeen my sloganandthat will
remainmyslogan.2
In a 1951 speech to the House, Smallwood againdetailed his fearaboutout-migration,
end how"confederation withCanada contained the dire threatofaccelerating vastly end
spectacularly that outwardflowof people.'In the samespeech, he outlinedthe need for
the industrializationprogramhis government hadalreadyinitiated.
Something hadto bedone,anddone quickly. 0Jr peoplehadto bepersuaded that
Newfoundland itself, as a result of Confederation, wasembarked upon a new
, Neary,p. 185
'Speech by JosephR. Smallwood, October12, 1952. File 7.02.003. IRS Collection
1 File7.02.004. IRS Collection. [Undated]
course...Newfoundland would go ahead. Opportunities would springup in this
province.'
Smallwood mayhave been merely echoing what businessleadersand the newspapers
werereporting.TheNewfoundlandBoard of Tradewasreportedto besoconcernedabout
"almost wholesale migration from Newfoundland", that it asked the governmentin May
1950 to checkon the matter.' The Evening Telegram wrotein the autumn. ofl 9S0, that
"manyhundreds of Newfoundlandershave moved out of the Province,if reports from
railwaymcnand othersare to bebelieved","
Yet otherswerepromoting theideathat Newfoundlandwasoverpopulated. H.B. Mayo,
a fonner Ncv.foundlanderthenteaching political scienceat the Universityof Alberta,
suggested in 1951 that 100,000peopleleave Newfoundland - that "it is betterto have in
Newfoundland 250,000 healthy and prosperous people than twice that number at
near-subsistence level." Mayorecommendedconverting most of the island to aNational
Park,and he was critical of people mistaking post-Ccnfederatioc advances for real
progress.
Ontheone hand. somepeople seethe provincegrowing in population and
prosperity, withall the improvements inhealth,education andother public
services, thatprosperity can bring. It is a pleasant androsypicture - but
painted from a one-sided view. From anotherviewpoint maybe seen a
futurein whichthe population is growing faster thanjobs can00 found;
with thousands of fishermen under-employed and earning less than a
decent livelihood,B
4 Ibid
S Bassler, GerhardP, "Develop or Perish: JosephR. SmallwoodandNewfoundland's
QuestforGerman Industry, 1949-1953", Acadiensis. Volwne XV, No,2, Spring1986,92-
Il l . p.99
' Ibid, p. 98
, H.B. Mayo. "The Future of Newfoundland" Is the IslandOverpopulated?", in
Atlantic Guardian, Vol, VIII, No,3, 14-19.~ 1951, p. 19
~ Ibid,p, 14
Mayds essaywas rebutteda month later in the AtlanticUu:Jrdbn by none otherthan
Alfred Valdmanis. Valdmanis suggested a five-year nationalplan of concessions and
freight rate reductionsto allow Newfoondland 10 "catch up- , He argued mder su:h
circumstances. Ne\\foundlandcould~y developits f:nning indu<;try on the west
coast; a I'Ie\V pcper millbased00 timberfrom l...abradcK; hyd'o projeclS could be started;
andnew mines opened9 So coofident wasValdmanis of his plOO, thathe predi cted "cs
from thespringof 1952 on, therewon't be fi.uther~O)m:rt in Newfoundland.-"
Many thousands of Ne\\foundI3l\ders had discovered for themselves the lock of
opportunity atheme. While "thedrainwas temporarilyslopped" hetween 1951 and1956,
an average ofJ,300 Ne\\foundlanders leftthe provinceyearly betveen1956and1961."
The Royal Commissionon theEconomic State andProspectslamen ted in 1967,
...those leaving the Provincein thepast appearto have been mostly the
highestskilled and most dynamic, very people, in fact, who have the
training and enterprise to generate additional employment for others.
Furthamore, those leaving theProvincehavetendedto be theYOWlgtT
membas of the workforce, which adlh to the proportionate numberof
young andold ....ito have to becaredfor bytheremaining laboorforce.12
Unemploymen1 wasnot a new phenomenon to Newfoundland. The situation in 1949
howeverwas exacerbated by a numberof factors. There were layoffs in the logging
indusny broughtabout by • dcwnrumin the I"lp andpopet sector , ondlayolTs 00 the
American basesas the UnitedSlatescutback its defense spending in Ne\\foundland.Tbe
fisherywasa nearfailure in 1949; thedevaluation ofthr. British poundin the summerof
that yearhurtexportsof Belllsiand irooore to theUnited KingdomI) As if that \v.:JSnot
enough to '1pSCl the Newfoondland ecooomy, loco! monufaetUring firms faced stilT
competition from Canadian manufadl.led goods that oow entered Newfoundlnnd
tariff-free.
9 AlfredValdmanis inAtlantic Guardian, April 1951. VoI.VIIl. No.4, I l~17. p.l6
10Ibid, pp.I6-17
II Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic State and Prospects of
Newfoundlandand Labrador, 51.lobo's. 1967. p.l l
12 Ibid, p. 22
I) Bassler, p. 49
10
The Newfoundland Journalof Commerce - the newspaperof theNewfoundland Boardof
Trade ~ describedthe stiffcompctition rumswerefacing frommainlandcompanies in the
post-Confederation eta TheBoard reported "one manufacturer told The Journalthat the
joining of Newfoundland with the mainland has greatly increased competition for the
clothing manufacturershere from Montreal end Torontofirms." The report continued,
Since unionNewfoundland has beenoverrunat timesby clothingagents
who visited all or most of the large settlements seekingbusiness and
offering goods at a little less thanthe local prevailing price."
Mainland finns broughtcompetition to other sectorsas well. A month later, TheJournal
n..portedon the Drug and Toilet Sector trade.
Theyhave been solicitedby travelling agentsfromvarious comparntively
unknownmainland firms. Likeotherbusinessmen, shortlybeforeunionand
since.theyhavebeenthetarget of intensified selling campaignsorganized
by mainland firmswhichhave no conception of the limited scopeof the
Newfoundland market.'!
Increased competition beganto take a toll on Newfoundland manufac..turers. Whilesome
bravelyvowed to "not desist in their effortsto improve their plants andthereby keep
abreast of eventhe keenest competition fromthe mainland", therewas acknowledgement
thatat least in !he footwear trade,some companies were havinga tough time.
One localmanufacturer closed his operations a few weeks beforeunion
wasconsummated.Theother, theNeo.vfoundland Boot andShoeCompany,
Ltd., in HarbourGrace, is continuing production."
Huge mainland firmsput on a push in the manufacture of foodstuffs such as biscuits,
candy and margarine. "Confederation gavethe localbiscuit industrya severewound", the
Journal reported in August1955, adding"one plant, manufacturing Englishbiscuits,
I ~ NewfoundlandJournalof Commerce, Vol. XVI, NO.9.September 1949.p. 19
" J"m wl.Vol. XVI,No. 10. October 1949. p. 17
16Ibid, p. 19
\I
closeddown." Ii Thelocalcandy trade\V<iS described as being virtualy "extinct"l. and
mainlandmargarine firms"nrcadvertising their productquite:extensively here,"'"
Theavailability of Canadian goods gaveNewfoundl3Od COIlSllrTleIS something they had
rax previously experienced - choke. According to theJournal. lhe availabilityof new
products was exerting a chnnge on consumes, who were now "shopping iflUld".]JJ
Ircrecsed competition from themainlerd firmsaffected manufacturers too. TheJounot
reported in August 1955. "the biscuit manuf:lctlJras realizehow important it is to 'dress
up' their prodec; 'Dressing up' was CIt a minimumbeforeConfederation."2.
The mainland firms the Newfoundland Board of Trade reported on were filling the
](llIr118,I's pages with advertisements. Many mainland companies had engaged
Newfoundland agents- 10 sell enddistributetheirproducts, butmany moreappeared to be
operatingout of headoffice. FromMontreal companies selling windows to a Hamilton
finn marketing water pumps to the GreatWest Felt Co. in Elmira, Ontariowith its
eye-catchingmessage- "it is ourresponsibility andbusinessto warmy OW" feetwithGreat
WestAll WoolFelt FOOlWe:a:",Newtoundlcnd V«lSvirginterritory forpeoplewhowanted
to makea dollar.
It was evident th.at Canadian businessesviewedNewfoundlandas a substantial market in
which to do additiona.l business.The Financial Post published several articles detailing
the size of theNe\\fowdlandmarketandits potentialfernewbusiness. "We CanDouble
Sales10 Island" numpcterl thoPo>t in thedays beforeMardI31, 1949, noting theendof
tariffsin NewfCllotdiand would neen an additiooal $30-$45 million worthof business to
Clnadian firms,chieflyes a result of displacing"onehalfto onethirdof the purchac;ei
whichNewfCJloJOOland nowmakesin United States.....zzThePost's reeders werebeing told
that many of Newfoundland's 7S manufacturing firmsandtheir3.500workers "maynow
flrd themselves at: a disadvantage against Canadian competition" given that the
NewfOtDldland firms were small and were required to use lrrpcrted 'high-cost raw
17 Ibid,p. 7
" Journal, Vol. XVI, No.5. May 1950. p.21
19 (bid, p. 8
• Journal, Vol.XV, No.9. September 1949, p. 19
" Journal, Vol.XXVI, No. 8. August 1955 p. 7
n Financial Post.Mud>23, 1949. p. 13
12
materials"," Newfoundland would bean important market for "foods, clothing, radios.
machinery, automobiles, washingmachines" onceConfederation removeddutiesthat were
as highas 60%."2~
Butv.hat of the impact on Newfoundland firms? Howwouldtheyadjustin theaftermath
of the dismantlingof the tariffwalls?
Newfoundland firms were promised special assistance to help in the transition to
provincehood. Aftermuchwrangling, the federal government agreed to a preferential
premium of IS-percent on contracts tenderedby Newfoundland firms. This woill J ·be
reducedto IO-pcrcent by March31, 1951 and eliminated by March31, 1952.~ Some
local firmsdid get federal government business,but thePost reported"it will take more
than that to aid thefirma whichare badlyhurt by mainland competition.,,26
The Conservative Opposition in the legislature attempted to exploitthe concernsome
Newfoundlanders showedabout competitionfrommainland Canadianfirms, Speakingon
the unemployment issuein October 1949, Conservative leaderJohnG. Higginsreferred
to the competition Newfoundland firms were getting from Canadian mail order
companies.
Thereareclerksandshop-keepers. Willthe mailorderbusiness put these
men out of work? We know well enoughthat the mail order business
contributesvery littleto this country;...17
In the same speech, Higgins attacked the practice of ~ing produce from Prince
EdwardIsland.
Nowat thepresentmoment, the markets are floodedwith Prince Edward
Island produce, and Ibisproduce undersells our local farmers...for years,
PrinceEdwardIslandhas been sendingstuff intothiscountryand has not
13 Ibid, p. 16
24 Ibid, p. 16
II Raymond B. Blake. Canadjans at I ast· Canada Intept§ NewrQlIDdland as a
f1:m:1m:e. (Toronto: University of TorontoPress)1994. pp.l06-108
16 Financial Post.July 1949
11 Houseof Assembly Proceedings, October 27, 1949. P. 533
IJ
boughta single thingfromus.As far 3S weare concernedPrince Edward
Island is uselessto llS••••!S
Smallwoodwas accustomed10 haulingout the train of benefits is describing how
Confederation hadmadeNewfoundland betteroff. Speaking in the legislature on II bill
to establishthe Departmentof Economic Development, he talkedabout "thegreatsystem
of socialsecuritydeveloped in Canada". including"familyallowances, old agesecurity,
pensionsfor theblind,uoemploymem insurance, improved andincreased benefits for \V'Jt
veterans,nationalhousing..."29
An arrayof socialprograms thoughwasseen as a supplementto, not as a substitutelor
jobs. In the samedebate, Smallwood said the social programs "at most..could blWltthe
sharpedgeof extreme poverty in certainclassesof our population" andwhatwas needed
was development of Newfoundland'snaturalresources "10yield the basicconditionsof
a higherstandardof living for ourpeople."JO
Despite that long-leongoal, Smallwoodwas well awareof the immediate role social
programsplayedin augmenting people'sincome.A reporthisgovernment commissioned
in preparationfor its arguments on changingthe financial termsof unionwith Canada,
showed Newfoundlanders consistently earning less per capita than other AtltUltic
Canadiansandonly slightly morethanhalf of theCanadian average."Thesame report
showednearly twice as manyNewfoundland families in the lowestincome categories
U Ibid, p. 533
" Proceedings, July 18, 1949. p. 49
~ Ibid, pp.49-50
31 Ii Karl Goldenberg. Interim Reporton Capacity to Pay and Comparative Tax;
Burden in Newfmmd1aod and the Maritime Provinces. Presented to theNewfoundland
Commission Revision of Financial Terms. 81. John's. January 1956. pp. 10-13.
[Goldenberg, an. economist and labourlawyer,waseconomic advisorto theGovernment
of Newfoundland during the work of this Commission and duringSmallw<xxl's own
Commission setup threeyearsearlier in 1953. In his book I Pose Canada Smallwood
stated the Newfoundland Commissionwasreally an effortto prepare theprovince'scase
for continuing the trnnsitionalgrant, intendedat Confederntion to allow Newfoundland
to provide publicservices at reasonable levels of taxation. Thisisnowreferred to as the
Term29award]
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compared to theCanadianaverage."Newfoundlanders laggedfarbehind otherCanadians
too in lL'OTlS or educational attainment.and creature comforts, such as furnace-heated
homes . hot andcoid water; flush toilets, bathsor showersandtelephones,'»
That standard of living, and moreparticularly, the employment situation, came sharply
into focusin thelirst autumn afterConfederation. Speaking in theLegislature. Smallwood
said "...unemployment,and indeed destitution,have begunto showthemselves again in
Newfoundland,"Citing a near failurein thefishery and problems in the pulp andpaper
industry that wouldincrease unemploymentamongloggers,Smalwoodpredictedit would
cost
.i.somewaere between a million anda millionand a half dollarsto pay
welfare to able-bodied NewfoWldlandersfromOctoberto f\tfarch.J4
By the time thenumberswere tallied in the next spring. able-bodied relief had cost
$3.4-million, morethandouble Smallwood's estimate.
The plight of Newfoundland'sjobless and the prospectsfor better times,increasingly
became the centrepiece of Smallwood's speeches. Addressing the legislature on the
necessityof spending some of the S4O-millionCommission of Government surplus to
survey Newfoundland's resource po'eraial, Smallwood implored the Opposition to
understand whatwas at stake forNewibundlanders.
Ayear ortwo from now, theOpposition maybeholding this Government
up to ridicule, andwe will have to hang our headsfor havingflungaway
end wasted $200,000of the Public's money, but weare goingto takea
chcnce if the House is willing.•..People are not goingto wait foreverfor
this development; if wedon't giveit to themtomorrow, theygetmoreand
more out of jobsand pull up their stakes;youcan't blamethem,andthey
beg or borrowmoney to getoutofNewfolHldland andgowherejobs are,
you cantblame them. Ourjob is to back them;go right out, boots andall,
make or break. Here,",hatI meanby "makeor break". here is gamble.35
.12Ibid, p. 14
ll ibid, p. 22
34 Proceedings, October19, 1949. p. 411
" Proceedings, Mu1:h 30, 1950. p. 489
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TheOppositionaccused Smallwoodofacting in baste as he 1Mthroughlegislation to
create theDepartment o f Ea:mm.i c Deve1opn~. Ca~ative leaderHiggins cccned
the lack of information aboutthesete of thenew (XUVince's fumccs.
I do 001 thinkwe can lindrot wbere we an: ;n:J whither we '" tending
unless we know exactly the financial positionof this country....l quite
agree with MajorCashin thatno furtherdiscussions should becarried on
in conned.ion with Bills already brought beforethe Hoose. <nI that no
further Bills should bebrought hereunlesswe knowexactly m..t the
financial position is..16
Smallwood actually appeared 10 be pursuing development \Vilh somecaution. This was
in sharp contrast to how he would proceed later. In announcing legislation in the: fall of
1949to establish a provincial lending agencycalled the lndtOOini DevelopmentLoon
Boord to dealwithapplicationsfor"twenty or thirty or filly thousand dollars, or maybe
more", the government attempted to comforttheoppositionandthepublicby stipulating
"that these loans would of coursebeproperly secured.H It wasclearas wellthough that
the government envisaged somerisk. as the loons would "deal with a typeof eraerpeise
\\hicl1the ordinarycherteed bonkdoesnoL.""
At thesametime, thegovernment wasgrapplingwith howbestto use thesurplushanded
to it by the Commissionof Govemment at Confederntion.Sm.1Il\\QOli told thelegislature
the govemmen1 wasleaning tcwcrd subdividing two-thirds of the8l'tXIlrt (he estimated
obout S25-million) for ..d....'Vclopmenral purposes". 3mOIlg various 3rCI5 of govanrnent,
including schoolandbospital conslr\lCliOO, "somuchfor fishery dev1:1opmen~ so much,
pahaps for agriculturnl dc:velopment.." (Term 24 of the Tenns of Unioo between
Newfoundland and Canada required two-thirds of the: surplus be used for "the
development of resources and for theestablishment€X'extension of publicservices"; the
other one third was required 10 be placed on deposit " the ibIk of Canada to bespent
oncum:nt account so as to "facilitate themaintenanceand irnpovemmt of Newfoundland
public sevices.y" Smallwood saw it necessary to [I.11ot the fiJncb "sothai: the surplus
would not be frittered away...")9 In time however. much of the surplus would be
~ Proceedings,July 18, 1954. p. 54
J7 Proceedings.October23, 1949. p. 451
» Proceedings,Mareh 31, 1952. p. 24
~ Proceedings,October 23, 1949.p. 450
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exhausted, not on school and hospital construction, or fisheries and agricultural
development, but ona highly questionable industrial development plan.
The government's first vehicle to fund local industrial development, the lndustrial
DevelopmentLoan Board(lDLB) never achieved its objectives to provide fundingfor
"hath the big and the little man". Nearly a year after it Vi8S established. the Board
reported it had not disbursed any loans. It seemedmost applicants wantedloansto pay
otf debts or purchasepersonal itemssuch as motor cars. Adding to theproblems, many
applicants did not have legaltitle to theproperty theyofferedas collateral. The Board
discoveredthat many of the applicantsdid nothave equity capital, andasa result,those
eppticants were deniedassistance."
Subsequent reports from theBoardrevealed fewpeopleapplyingfor assistance at all -
just six applicationsin 1952-53, compared to 52 in the first twoyearsof theprogram.41
The Boardreportedon"the successionofapproaches forassistance pertaining to purposes
outside the Board's operations...."42 Five years into the program, just 20 loam totalling
$147.550 dollarshadbeendisbursed.The Board noted thatduring 1955, lendingactivity
' was again restricted" because of "the relatively limited number of sound approaches
which qualified..,,(j
Furfrom meetingSmallwood'searlyobjectivesofprovidingfunding "fortllebig andlittle
man". the IOLBserved to underlinea lackof coounitmenton thepart ofthegovernment
toencouraging NewfoundllUlders to beginbusinesses or expandexistingones. This can
bethe only conclusion given the repetition of the factors whichbarredlocalapplicants
from securingassistance, and the comparative ease with v.hich Europeans obtained
government loans underthegovernment's industrialization progrnm.
., SecondAnnualReport, Industrial Developmentlean Board,Man:h31, 1952. p.
" Thin!AnnualReport, Industrial DevelopmentLoonBoard. Marcl13!, 1953
42 1bid
" Thin!AnnualReport, March31, 1950. p. 5.
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Smallwood wac;determinedto ect against thiseady post-Ccnfedeaion 00ddr0p of the
slowp3CCof developmc:nt.
In the spring of 1950, he rrode one of the most s igtilicanl moves of his yOlllg
government Smalwood hired Alfred Valdmanis to be his Director of Economic
Development A formerLatvi:.l FinanceMinister. VllldmJnischarmed Snulh...cod with
both his mannerand hisvisici for an industriaJill:dNewfoundland. Prior to his arriwl
in Newfoundland. Valdmanis had worked for the Nova Scotia Research Fooodalion.
assessingthe feasibilityof est:Jblishinggypsum andcemenlinduslries in lh:Jt province.401
While those projects didnot goahead in NovaScotia, theybecene the firstinitiatives
Vatdmanis pursued in Newfoundland.Thegovernment approved diecement JXOject first
and thenthe gypsum proposal. both at ComerBrook.
Valdmanis charmed Smallwoodwith hisdriveandhis contaets,leadingSmallwood10say
he lovedValdmanis ashe could never love a brotheror sister.
Valdmanis was not impressed with theworkNelsonRockerfeller'sIBEC haddone 10..
Smallwood. He put his feelings on paper to Smallwood in December 1950. just six
rnooths after being named Director General. Valdmanis claimed IDEe s calculations lOr
~~~~~~I:r daypaper mill for BayD'Espoir would I<SlJIt ;n ".
Vllidnmnis appeared10be setting the IiJOU'IdworI< for establishing with Smallwood bls
oml credentials astheeconomic czarofNe-wfoundland.ElaborolingontheI:fOPOSCd third
mi ll,muchwouldcoosume wood loggedin Lllir.ldor, VlIidmaIUs";d,
I maybe able to bringintoNewfoundland sucha mill at, say. 45 millioo dollcrs,
andsucha mill should proveatremendous success."
Valdmanis poured00: his impt:ssions of his perceived substantialabilities in thesame
noteto Smallwood.
It is somethingmorewhich leadsmeto thesealmostincredible contracts we have
already signed or may have in preparation, and this "something- isevenhardto
...Bassler.p. 107
.s Note, contained in letterfrom AlliedVatdmanis to lR. Smallwood,December 12.
1950. Note #1. File 6.00.005. lRS Collection
"' Ibid
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define.Thatis the knowledge, the skilledbrain,theskill to masterthe subjectplus
U commanding impressionpluswideconnectionswith thebest finns in theworld.
I think I have all this."
!I. yearafterthat, Smallwoodassuredthe legislaturehe wouldtakea prudent approach to
dealingwiththe province's surplus. thegovernmentwasstillundecided about how to fund
the industrialization drive to which it had become committed. Notwithstanding this
indecision, the government had fully financed the cement, gypsum and hardwood
industries to the tuneof several milliondollars.
It is evident fromtheValdmanis papers.thatsomecabinetministers werecool to the idea
of govcmment linancingfor industry. In somecases, Valdmanis felt therewasoutright
hostility. Ina letter from NewYork,he relatedto Smallwood a conversation withcabinet
minister H.W. Quinton in a corridor at Colonial Building following Valdmanis'
submission of a report promoting the development of a 100,000 ton cementmill. He
quotedQuinton as saying "I am going to objectto any kindof government enterprise.
Surelyyoucanbuildthe plant, buthowareyougoingto get rid of it'l"48 Valdmanis noted
that Smalwoodhad done everything he couldto helpwith economicdevelopment, but
the cabinet did not seem to beas helpful.
"Promyou,yourself, my Premier, I havethe highest regard...theremaybe
a fewmoreCabinetMinisterswhomay bementioned in the samebreath.
Butthe Cabinet as such?? 1 do not dareto guess,I think indirectly, but
clearly, ananswer hasbeen givento me.""
These were the early days of the SmallwoodlValdmanis partnership, and while
Valdmaniswasunsureof thekind of supporthe would get fromcabinet.he wascounting
on Smallwoodto persuadethose same cabinetministers to vote him a substantial
increasein salary.In a seriesoffour notes undercoverof theDecember 12, 1950letter,
Valdmanis detailed his plans for the cement mill, the third paper mill project, "our
proposed big development corporation" and other industries that w- ud come after.
Valdmanisconcluded his plan was the "minimwnneeded" for the future development
of the province. Included in the same note was a salary request that would increase
Valdmanis' payfrom a "try-out" level of "714 dollarspermonth" to $2,080per month.
~1lbid
48 Ibid. Note #1, p. 1
.w Ibid. Letter
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Furthetmore. Valdmanis madea move to consolidate his controlover the'wvemmenl.'s
economic developmentoffice. He proposedhaving authority 10 select. hire :md lire
employees: putting all employeeson controct. therefore taking tbcmoutsideCivil Service
Regulerioos: to have their salaries del:ermined by Valdmunis:. and to return to the
~~:~~~rlit generated bythe industries. thel,.'OSt ofrnnninglhc
To pushhispointfor a substantialsal.-y increaseand fortotal control oflt'cdcvcloprn.llI
office, Valdmanis related being "almost heart-broken", since "my personal Ol'\.U"
combinedwitha veryadvantageousAmerican offer to me ($50.000a year uccceding to
Valdmanis) make my remaining with you in Newfoundland almost impossibtc,'?'.
Valdmanis noted he wouldbehappyto stay with the NewfoWldland government forhalf
that amount.He hada positive response fromSmallwoodwithin a week and it improved
his spirits considerably, as was evident in a subsequent lener to thePremier. v aldrnanis
~t~~n~~~~6~ ~!~~~:~ :~~;~~t ~=tis~~ ::;~:~\~~~~
he hada new fouryear contract carrying an annual salary of $25.000.
Muchof theintemalgcvemmemdebate during this periodwas devoted to how the new
industries would be funded. While the flrst three industries (cement, gypsum 3Ild
hardwoods) were funded directly out of thesurplus.thegovernment was attempting to
findanotherway of fmancing the balanceof its industrialiuuion scheme. As ccrtyas In.:
s enrrer of 1951, Valdmaniswaswritingfmanciers andfloating the ideaof raisingprivate
capital to fund the new industries.D He similarlysuggested to a Swiss financiera few
nxmths later• •...1would not rejectwithoutcarefulconsideration,evena directklan10 the
Province (some20 million dollars)...· SoIValdmanis continued this lineof inquiryinto the
next year. In a letterto a Germanbanker in Man:h1952, he noted it was necessary10
"coesolidare the Province's fmancial position, and fiod some good intematiooal benk
'll ibid, Note #1, p. 4
" Ibid, Letter
s21bid
S3 Letter. AlfredValdmanis to WarburgandCompany Limited,
August 17, 1951, File 6.00.012. JRS Collection
" Letter, A1fr1:dValdmanis to Dr. Paul Hagenbach, December 1, 1951, File6.00.012.
JRS Collection
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throughwhichournewindustries....willbelinanced...."5 S Valdmaniswrotefurther he was
contemplating financing the European industries "on the strength of a Newfoundland
guarantee and not through a direct cash advance from the NewfoWldland treasury".S6
These inquiries may have underlined a basic conflict in the Cabinet,promptedperhaps
by a dwindling surplus as the financial commitment to new industries grew.Valdmanis
acknowledgedas much in one of his letters, noting "Premier Smallwood..insists...the
19,000,000 dollars, [surplus as of August 17. 1951] except, perheps, for some smal
reserve, should be used for buildingroads, schools and hospitalsimproving thegeneral
social welfare of the people,':"
NAW RAL RESOURCE PlANNING
While muchofSmallwood's energyduringthis periodwasdevotedto theindustrialization
program, me government did not neglectthe potentialof naturalresourcedevelopment
Labrador wasespeciallyseenas a promising source of resource wealth. Smallwood had
long viewed resource developmentas a key to becoming "a self-supporting Province.
independent and proud"sa Recounting to the legislature the potential of mineral
development in theprovincein the early days of Confederation, Smallwood remarked,
Whenyou lookat the ironminesof Bell Island.the fluorspar[sic) mines
at 51.Lawrence, andaboveall, at the fantastic ironmines in Labrador, you
cannothelp wondering if theseare all, andwhetherindeed,the mineral
wealth of Newtoundlend, including Labrador, may not yet beenoughto
make LL<;knownas thenewAlaskaof North America.S9
In late 1950, Valdmanis recalledin a note to Smallwoodhow they hadearlierproposed
creating a resource development corporation funded 95% by the Newfoundland
govcmment and 5% by private interests inNew York. Thatschemecontemplated giving
$S Letter, AJfred Valdmnnis to Dr. W. Hinneberg, MarchS, 1952, File6.00.022.JRS
Collection
56 Ibid
'7 Letter, Valdmanis to WarburgandCompany, August17, 1951
~ Proceedings, July 19. 1949. p. 50
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"50010 or even more, of the coropanys profits" 10 the NewYorkconcern." The planhad
been worked outby Smallwood andValdmnnis on a trainride fromSt.John's toCorm.,.
Brook. Valdmanisclaimed in late 1950 theplanhadnowbeen "improved". andthat"the
discrepancy between investment andthe rightto profits is wipedOUt." M Under thenew
plan, he stated. the government and the New York people would "participate on equal
terms",meaning theywould"sharethe prolits, if any, inproportionto theshoresowned
andthat in any event, the Newfoundland government would own 51% of the shares,f>2
Tied in 'With the development corporation envisaged in the New Yorkdlscussiors were
negotiations on financing the cementmill,whichwould later bebuilt at.Corner Brook.
TheNewYorknegotiations, whichhadkeptValdmanis in the UnitedStatesforat least
a month, were to have been concluded with a signingby Smallwood and Attorney
General LesCurtis aroundJanuary8, 1951, It wasclearhoweverfroma letter Valdmanis
wrote to a mend at the MIAG company in Germany later in Januarythat negotiations
werenotgoing asexpectedThesigning was delayeduntilthe weekofFebruary6 in 51.
John's.That in tum, delayeda trip Valdmanis had planned to make to Germany. The
investorsin the proposed Newfoundland and LabradorCorporation wouldbe "Wallstreet
bankers, Canadian investment bankersandtheNewfoundland Government itself.6J
W Letter, Valdmanis to Smallwood, December 12,1950. Nole#2, p. I
61 Ibid,p. 2
62 Ibid
6J letter, Valdmanis to Smallwood, January 27, 1951, File6.00.022. JRSCollection
ThePolicy Takes Shape
Whilepresenting a cautiousandprudent faceto thepublic,the Smallwood cabinetmoved
quickly to approve new industries for Newfoundland The March 10, 1952 cabinet
meetingexemplifies this.In thatmeeting, RudolfHanhart andGustavCarlWeispresented
theirproposal for a new pressboard industry in Newfoundland. Immediately aftertheir
presentation, the two industrialists, along with Edward Wyss. a directorof the Swiss
People's Bank andNewfoundland's Director General of Economic Development, Alfred
valdmanis, left the cabinetmeeting. Cabinetaccepted the proposal and instructed the
Artomey-General, LesCurtisto draftan agreement. Thiswas followed in shortorderby
a decisionto enablethePremier and Minister of Economic Development to completean
agreement with Hanhart andAssociates "involving assistance byway of a government
loonand/orguarantee of bonds, to a valueof $575,000...."1
Later that meeting, a draft agreement was prepared for Smallwood's signatureand
Newfoundland hadanotherindustry. Thiswastypicalofthe break-neck speedwith which
Smallwood and Valdmanis wereindustrializing Newfoundland.
Harold Horwood (Liberal MHA for Labrador, 1949-51) writes in his biog aphy of
Smallwood. that while "many of Joey's friends and closest associates disliked and
distrusted Dr. Valdmanis fromthe momenttheyfirst metrum", Smallwood himselfwas
unaffected by theiropinion.'According to Horwood. within monthsofValdmanis'hiring
in 1950. Smallwood and Valdmanis hadbecome "the real rulersof Newfoundland."
Smallwoodand Valdmanis were a dynamic pair, settingoff with either the Finance
MinisterGregPower orAttorney General LesCurtis in tow.Thetripswerenearlyalways
to Europe, whereSmallwoodwas fondof saying, he was"fishingin troubled waters".
Smallwood explained his strategyin a [951 speechto a Boston audiencethat he was
courtingforcapitalinorderto developthe province's mineral wealth.timberstandsand
water power.
'CertifiedCabinetMinutes., March10, 1952. Minutes 251-'52;252-'52;and 253-'52.
File2.03.004. JRSCollection
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You need only see once the fantastic devastation of Hamburg. Cologne.
Dusseldorf: Frnnkfurt and Munich and a hundred other industrial cities Ill'
Germany to understand whyso manyindustrialists on the continent of Europe arc
anxiousto pull out and establish themselveson thisside of the water. They have
no dollars.it's true. but the Newfoundland Government happens to have some
millions of sparedollars , so I have visitedronny of these industrialists with my
personal invitation to acceptloansfromthe Newfoundland Govcmment if they
will bringindustrial plantsto Newfoundland,'
Whileit may be true thatSmallwoodhada vision forthe development of'Ncwloundlend,
he appearedto be withoutany kind of planor comprehensive strategy. Apart from the
obviousgoalof creatingjobs, therewas no underlying philosophy. This was evidentin
Smallwood's remarks whenheannounced a machinery plant for Octagon, nearSt.John's
in July 1951.10 whatappeared to bea simplistic rationale. hetoldthecrowd "developed
countriesmanufacture machinery" and "any countrywho [sic) docsthis is industrial."
Priorto establishing the firstindustries. Smallwoodreportedto thepress on a trip to the
industrial section of West Germany in which he covered2200 miles by C:lI'. "We arc
workingenergeticallyon fivenewindustriesthat willgive about4,000 full-timeand pert-
time jobs" he said, addinghis target was 10,000newjobs in the coming two or three
years,"
A more ambitious undertaking was outlined a year later in October 1951, allcr
Smallwood,Curtis and Valdmanis returned to Newfoundland froma six-weektrip to
Europe. In a province-wide broadcast, Smallwooddescribedhis commitment to economic
development and then disclosedhe had just committed the government to fillccn t1C.'W
industriesfor Newfoundland.
The 15 new industries will give at least 3,000 new full-timejcbs before
the end of next year, andanother2,000beforethe endof two years from
now. Thosefifteennewindustries,along with the eight new industrieswe
4 Speech, given at Boston,Massachusetts, October 15, 1951. rile 7.02.004. JRS
Collection
S EveningTelegram,July 14, 1951
{; EveningTelegram,October 28, 1950
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had upto six weeks ago, will givenearly 6.000new full-timejobs by the
end of next year, and about 15,000 jobs before the end of two years,"
'these 15 industries would continuethe prognunSmallwood had announcedthe year
before,withtheestablishment of the cementandgypswnplantsat ComerBrookandthe
hardwoodsplantat Donovan's, nearSt. John's.
The cement plant at Comer Brook was designedto produce 100,000 Ions a year and
expectedbythegovernment to createmorethanone milliondollarsa year in profit' The
plant at Comer Brookhad a natural advantageover finns attemptingto importcement -
it had available,abundant local suppliesof limestone andshale, necessary ingredients in
the manufacture of portlandcement. In addition,Comer Brookhada rail link withthe
rest of the island, an important consideration given the problems associated with
transporting a commodity as heavyas cement.Thegovernment andthe plant'smanagers
were also counting on beinginfonned about federal housing tenders in the Maritime
Region, so theycouldbidon Central MortgageandHousing contracts.' It was evident
earlyon however, thatthe cost estimatesforconstructingthecement plantwerebadlyout
of line. Cabinet was asked by the German construction company, MIAG, to add an
additional $523,180 (US) to the contractto coverincreased labour andmaterial costs
"which had increased in the period between the estimates and the delivery of the
equipment for theCement Mill."mCabinet haditsownofficials undertake an investigation
of MlAG's claim and was advised 10 settle it for half the amount, wbich it did on
December 3, 1951.11 Twelve days later, a fulleraccount of the underestimationof the
cement plant costs was revealed, when cabinet approved a supplementary cost of
7 SmallwoodSpeech broadcast onOctober12, 1951.File 7.02.004. JRSCollection.
M Letter. AlfredValdmanis to Warburg and Company. London. August17, 1951.
Valdmanis Memoranda, "Banking Houses" File6.00.012.JRSCollection
q Memo, AL Graudins, Nfld. Economic Development Department to Alfred
Valdmanis, Director GeneralofEconomieDevelopment, October10, 1952. File6.00.023.
JRSCollection.
III Minutein Counci l. December 3, 1951. CertifiedCabinetMinutes. File 2.03.003.
JRS Collection.
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S820,000. bringing the fmal bill to $3.7oo.(0) .u That the finalCOSl " ';)5signifiCMIly
higher thenthe original estimate,should not havecome as a surprise. at least not 10
Smallwood. Vakbronis hed written the Premier from Germany six. months caiic.T
informing him"MlAG willsuffer a net loss of at least 112 milliondoIlars..1}
tn the sameletter, Valdmanis reported hehadmc:l wijh Iknno Scbilde, the contmetor rex-
thegypsumplantat Caner Brook. They too wererunningoveron their costs. VaJdmanis
conveyedtoSmallwood"thoi:[BennoSdtilde's]grc;>lworries..."ben: theyoreafraid they
are goingto lose a considerableamount ofmoney." ~ (Threeyears later. Valdmaniswould
bechargedandconvicted ofextortingbribes of$270,OOO fromMlAG and$200.000 from
BennoSchilde. A bribe of that magnitude fromMlAGmaypartly explain their !:lrse
claim against the governmentfor increased costs associated with construction of the
cement plantat Comer Brook.)
like the cementplant, the gypsum plant at Comer Brook was also intended10 take
advantageof localnatural resources (gypsumfromtheFlat Bayarea)forthe manufocture
of plasterboardfor the local housing andbuilding industry. Theplantwooto be financed
outright bythe goverrunent andsold onceit wasin operation. Thecementandhardwoods
plantswere alsofinancedin thisway. andwerepartof thegovernment'sstrategy"to build
the plants using Newfoundland's surplus, sell them, and thenbuild others with the
proceedsof the previous sales,andso 00 ad infinitum1015 Valdmanis Wi5 of the viewthat
the cement plantmightconstitute an exception to thegeneral policy.
As thecementmill is vitalto every future indLsrial development plan of
~k. Srrallwoods~ hemaymakeanexcqxioninthiscase,and,
in deviation fromhis strictgenenl policyof stickingto private enterprise,
he may decide to establish a crown company to keep andoperatethe
mill: '
11 MinuteinCouncil,1072-'51, Departmentof EconomicDevelopment 31-'51and34--
'51, December IS, 19SI. File 2.03.003. iRS Collection.
13 Letter,Valdmais to Smallwood, May 16, 1951.File 6.00.006. JRS Collection.
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Thecemenr <lI'Id gypswn planlS wouldsupplemmr. jobs in thewest coastpulpandpaper
industry. Smallwood predicted lhc: cement pll»1t would creeie 200jobs "rule thegypsum
plant would provideemployment for 300 people.
Jobs were alsoa signiflC3f\l. f:x:tor in the third irxtuslry that waslaunched in 1951• the
hardwood'> (X" birch veneerandplywood plant at Donovan's. Theplant, expectedto cost
$1.300.000.endedI4lcosting thegovanment S2 million. 250 people were expectedto
be employedat theplant andhundreds more in thewoods.
Theplan' wasdesigned'0produceproducts fromNcwfoondlondbirchondfromIrrq>orted
woods. suchas mahogany from theIvoryCoast Us mainproducts would be birchveneer,
doors. flooring andplywood." Thebuild-up to the openingof themillwnstypical of the
approach withall theindustries Smalwoodstartedunder the industrialization program.
The program boasted jobs. implied a fixed cost, foresaw no problem; and predicted
protits from operation NewfOlmdland Hardwoods was handed over to businessman
Chester Daweto operate. To securea woodssupply, thecompany wasgivencontrol over
all the birchstandson CrownLardsandwas extendedpermission to cut birchon lands
owned by the two paper companies. The moodsurrounding the establishment of the
companywaseuphoric. TheFinancial Post concluded inJune 1951:
No difficulty is anticipated in selling the product. rather the expected
troubleis keeping up with orders.l•
Vnldmanis predictedthe company \\W Id return a halfmillion dollars a year in profit to
the govemrnerx.. l •
Despiteall the<:ISSl.IUnCtSof success for Newfoundlnnd Hardwoo&., therewassufficient
concern3bout theC'.Of'l1JXUlY &ominsidegovernment in the firstyear of operation, for the
establishmentof a sub-committee of cabinet (consisting of the Premier, the Attorney-
General,ondthe MinistersofPublic Wori<s, Healtb,s.wtyendFInanco) "toexamine Into
the administration of Newfoundland Hardwoods Limitedand report to the Executive
Council as to what, if any measun:s should be taken to~e the efficiency and
17 Financial Post, June2, 1951. Volwne45, p. 49
IR Ibid
" Lett". Valdmanis '0Wart.rg andCompany. August17. 1951
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economy of its opcr.uions: :nTheplantgot off to an inauspicious start, experiencing a
strike in its first )1:'aT andthe rcplccerrentof its technical mar1a!;U.: l
In late l'w1ay 1952. three months after the cabinet sub-conunitta: was furmt.'d tl-.:
government again took II special interest in Nc\\fomd!:Jnd Hardwoods. The cabirll.'1.
authorized the actingMinister of Economic I:A.-velopment (the Minister of Public Wtds)
"to implementanydecisionwith regard 10 t~ fin:mcingrequin:dby Newfomdland
I-furdwoods Ltd ..22
During the period when cabinet appeared to be preoccupied with !he problems at
Newfoundland Hardwoods. it authorizeda $575,000 loan for a related company to
manufacture pressboard.Atlantic Hardboard Industries Lir.: ·:::d would be built odjact.-nt
to the Newtoundland Hardwoods Plant at Donovan's, using wastewood fromthe birch
plant. Atlantic Hardboard contemplated 100 jobs in the manufacture of a wall and
underlay pressboardcomprised of woodshaving; and glue.
From its earliestdayshowever, theplant hadproblemswith the highmoisturecontent of
its wood supply, compelling the Boardof Directors in early 1955 to consider asking
govenunentformoremoneyso itcouldstockpile woodTheonlyotheroptionwas to add
more drying capacity to the plant Either decision would require capital Atlantic
Hardboard did not have.D
Atlantic Hardboard is illusrat ive of the speed with much the new induslries were
consideredandcommittedto by thegovernment In on August1951 letterto a London
bonkinghouse, Valdmanis outlined indetailthegovernment's plans[or futureindusIriaI
developmc:nl Therewasnomc:ntiooofthc pressboard planl.yd fev.a th:Jn sevenmoolhs
later, cabinethadgivenapproval to ftnance theplatt.
It is alsoapparentfromValdmanis' letter 00 thatoccasion, that thegovernment remained
wcertain abouthowto mise fink for the new industries. Valdman.is pointedout th:d:
while government would (XJl up SOOIoof the capital requiredfor industries after the fll'St
three (cement, gypsum andhardwoods plants), there was no decision on whether this
20 Minutein Council 175·'52, February2, 1952. File 2.03.004. JRSCollection.
21 Memo, Graudins to Valdmanis, October 10, 1952
n Minutein Council 541.'52, May 31, 1952. File 2.03.004. JRS Collection.
2J Minutes, Boardof Directors Meetings, AtlanticHardboanh lndustril:S Limited,
February9, 1955. File 3.08.139. IRSCollection.
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should be in the form of a guarantee or a direct cash loan franthe governmcnt.1ol
Valdmanis wenton 10chart several otherindustries thatwouldbe~ in placeO\'C.T the
nextyear, including a leather tJnnery,a fineleathergoods corrpeny, a furdressing and
dyeing plonlaod00l1<J0 mills.Thefur dressing onddyeingfactay <lid not get built,but
theothers did.at aninitial. costofabout $5million to thegovanmert. Between them,the
newplants were expectedto result inmore than 1000dinxtjobs.lI
The construdion of these indLL<itrics and theAtltlnr.ic Hardboard plant represented a
departure in policyfrom thenmner in which thefirst three industries were fananced.
Insteadof financing industries outright, thegovernment's policynowwas to flnancchalf
thecapital requireme-ns of new industry. \Vhile thegovernment'shalf wouldbe incash,
private investmentcould be inthe formof "know-how, machinery, any other material,
engineering supervision, erection, building. etC."26
Oneof the first plcntsto bebuilt under thenew financing scheme was a tamery at
Corboncar. The privcte investor involved in this project was Wilhelm Dom, a
Czcchoslovkien-born, German citizen. whosefamily wentback three generations in the
tannery business. Theinitialpromise was for ISO jobswithan increase to 200.However,
n=ly fouryearsafterthe pi"" opened, only21 peoplewereemployed The plcnt was
tanning only 100hides a day, f~ short of its objectiveof ISO. Animportant signalof the
problems focal by thecompany wasevidentina reportDomgavetheBoanI in February
1956. Hereported anorder forMaxine Footwear Limited (the govmuncnt had provided
II S58.,<:OO loaneight months earlier to acquire raw materials to fill the order) was
cancelled "dueto delays indelivery of both raw rroteriaJs andthefinished product,.....v
Thesummer of 1951 brought oneof thebiggest commitm:nts yetof government capita!
10 the industrial d=I_ program, In July, Smalwood"""""""l a $5 millim
moc!line factory 10bekncwn esCanallianMdtinery ondIndustJy CoostnJction limited
Thepion!wasconstructed at<Xtagon byMlAG,thesamelinnti1atbuilt thecement plant
al Comer Brook.. TheEvening Telegram gave anaceounc of theannounc:cment.
24 Letter, Valdmanis to Warburg and Company
as letter, Gordon Pushie, Department of Economic Development, to Canadian
Machinery ondMlunufaeturingNews,November 18, 1952. File 6.110.023.JRSColiection.
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They will manufacture all kindsof machinery,..Plans are 10 proceed by
several stages. Theywill startwith the construction of a verysizeable
manufacturingplant10 be enlarged in severalsteps in a short periodof
time...Milling. grinding, crushing anddrilling machines willbemade. As
the factory expands, biggermachines will be included in the produce of
the factory."
The paper reported"initial employment for the factory will be 500 men", with the
promiseof moreto beaddedas the fectory wasenlarged.Thegovernment wasevenmore
boastful in the Speech fromthe Throne in October1951, a month beforeSmallwood
called a snapelection. Thespeech bragged the machinery plent"seemslikely 10become
perhapsthe biggest labour-givingenterprise inNewfoundland,apartfromthe flsherics.'?"
Thepromisein July 1951of lotsof jobs fromthe machinery plantwasfollowed a month
laterby an announcement thata textile plant - United Cotton ~fi lls - would bebuilt ut St.
John's. Predictingwork for 800people, Smallwood said the government wouldputupa
$2 million, to-year loantowardthe $4 milliondollarcost of theproject. The planscalled
for raw materialto be imported fromTurkey, Iron,Haitiandthe United States,woven
into colton clothandthenmade intoproducts suchas "skirts, dresses, tablecloths, service
uniformsand such.,,)O Six years later,the promiseof 800jobs seemedlike a crueljoke,
us fewer than 100people wereemployedat the textile plant."
The government's investmentin the new industries was now over$13 million. greater
thanhalfof the pre-Confederation surplus thatwasavailable foreconomic development,
including school endroadconstruction. Despite Smallwood's public statements fromas
early as March1951,thatthe govcmment would no longerhelp finance newindastrics,"
the$4.5 million invested in themachinery plant andthe two textile mills, wasproofthe
government-sponsored industrialization program was still in high gear.
28Evening Telegram, July 14, 1951 p.3
~ SpeechfromtheThrone,October 25. 1951.1'roc<eding; oftheHouseofAssembly.
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Thereappears 10 havebeen someconfusionduring this periodabout thepotential forjobs
as a result of the new industries. Smallwood was predicting in late 1951 the entire
industrial development programwould bring "15.000 newjobs beforetheendof two
yean; from now.?" A senior civil servant was writing a year later, "the goal with this
program is 10,000 new jobs.'?' (The difference may be explained by Smallwood's
inclusion of the promiseof5,OOO jobsat the machineryplantat Octagon.)Clearly, neither
thejobestimatesnorthe talked-aboutembargoongovernment fmancingof newindustries
was particularly relevant.
Smallwood and Valdmanis were an impressiverag-teem, travellingthroughout Europe in
an effortto diversify 3J1 economy that wasover-reliant on the resource sector. They were
neither deterred by criticism from the floor of the House of Assembly nor by
cdmonishmenrs fromthe editorialpageof The Evening Telegram, which remindedthe
government "the finances of Newfoundland are by no meansinexhaustible" and"apart
:~:h~~~~~c~::iftr:;~:~~e~~=~t~;~~a~I=~:
considering that many of the industries were premisedon strong export sales. But
Smallwood was unconccmcd about criticism and his march toward industrialization
see med unstoppable.
The late fall of 1951 broughta generaJelection and the first test for Smallwood andhis
government's policies. The EveningTelegram's editor mighthave found fault,but voters
apparently found little to reprimand thegovernment about, returning Smallwoodwith
twenty-threescats to five for the Conservatives.
During 1952, the government continuedto supportnew manufactwing ventures. It put
$325,000toward theconstruction of theHanning Electric Limitedbatteryplantat Topsail,
promising 100jobs in the bargain. By mid--1954, withsix monthsproduction under its
belt, the battery pllll1l employed only 17 people.Although the company expected the
payrollto soon climb to 30, it anticipatedproblemsreachingpeak. production of 60,000
automobile batteries, given thatNewfoundlandused only 12,000 batteriesa year.J6 The
companyappearedto believe the problemreaching peakbattery production was a long-
n EveningTelegram, October 13, 1951, p. 3
:u letter. Gordon Pushie, Economic Development Department to Kent Strong,
CanadianDowJones limited. File6.00.023, JRS Collection.
J1 Evening TelegramEditorial, "Give NewfOW1dland theFacts",October 16, 1951
J6 Financial Post, July 3, 1954.Vol. 48. pp.20-26
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term roe. indicming it pl:un.od to use someof its capcciry 10 turn out plasticproducts
such it'; drinking cups andbrushcs.)7.
On theday the govenunent concludedthe agreement to build thebcnery pin itput up
$1 millioo for construction of a robberp-oduL1s rrancfacneing plJOl nt Hotyrocd
Premised on what was be:;('VClj to be a readyrrorkct forrubberclothesandboots in the
Newfoundland fishing industry, the plant was expected 10 erploy 400 people.
Underccpitalized,andoperating with machinery that someclaimedwas part of United
Stales aid to Germany underthe Marshall Plan,SuperiorRubber. as thecompany was
known,lurchedfrom crisis to crisis. In anobviousclampdoY.n on theGcrmln managers
of the firm,thecompany's Boord decided in late September 1954that"...no monies were
to beadvanced forpayment of salariesto~ not resident in Ne\vfoundlnndand not
actively engagedin the operation of theplant.":lIA further clampdown wasimposed in
May 1955, when the Boardorderedthat noonein the plant hadauthority to hirestnll'or
sign documents withoutprior boardapproval," In the same meeting, all theGerman
employees at the pleat, includingthe manager, were fired.
Threeyearsafter St. John's got its first textile plantunderthe industrialization program,
it got a second one, TermNovaTextiles.Theannouncement was rnaUt: vol July 19.1954.
This plnntwas to producemainly workclothes,especially coveralls. Expected toemploy
aboull20 people. the company wasoneof thefewbegununder thegovmm.nr. planto
comeclose to meeting its employment target.
More induslries were soon to make an appearance. centred on the north :.hare of
ConceptimBay. Atlantic Gloves Limited wasbuilt at Carbonc::ta' with theassistanceof
a S35O,OOO govenur<nl loan andGold Sail LcolherGoods wasestablished at Hart>ou-
Grace, Bothplantswen:examples of doonstream processing, IfilizingI""""" fXOduc<d
at the Cerbooecr tnmay operated by Wilhelm Dom.
AtlanticGloves represented a departure from the ~t's standard policy of
providing halfthestart-upcapitalforthenewindustries in theformofa gu;:rantcaJ loon.
In~ caseof AtlanticGloves, the govemnent put up nearly 6S-percent. Smalwoodsaid
that decision came after theowner could not come up with half the start-upcost.and
rather thanlose the industry,the govenunent "cameto the conclusion thal lhisindll"try
J~ Ibid
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wa.. so sound in ilSprospects. so promising in itsJI"ClSPO=lS........e oughl: to stre:tdl our
formula to the alent shown in the agreeoeranowbefore theHouse... Tbe company
peodcced \ \ rnt wasdescribed as an excellentquality ballet s lipper, as well as glovesmade
or both gazelleskin on<! sheepskin. The compaoy was hampered, though, by higil
rnxJuctioocosts andstiff axnpetitioo fromexternal producers.
Gold Soil Lectber Goods produ=I women's handbags, wallets ond other leather
accessories. Like manyof theindcsries,Gold Sairs market potential in Newfoundland
waslimited, forcing the company to export if it was10even have a chance at making
money. "lhis constituted a problemhowever, giventhestiff competition in thosemarkets
andthefactthat itsproductswereconsidered to be"high-priced"," GoldSail though, like
Atlantic Gloves, came00 the highest recommendationfromSmalwood. On one of his
eeriicsteffortsto explainto theHousewhy the government hadguaranteed extra capital
10 the new industries (including Gold Sail), Smalwood said "they are making leather
goods beyond comparison in NorthAmerica':" Smallwoodexplainedhowon a visit to
a trade fair in Germany he met the man he hadchosen to headup Gold Sail • Anton
Schaefers.Smallwood told theHouse "therewasnoquestion about whowasbossofthat
fair. It wasthesamemanSchaefers."Despitebeing impressed withSchaefers, Smalwood
gave theimpression the government haddriven a hard bargain,saying"it was not until
lest year that they wereable to meet our conditions....4J
The oorthem part of ConceptiooBay wasa favouredlocation fer'threemoreof thenew
inOOsUies - KochShoes Limited, esreblisbedin May 1954 at Harbour Gracewilh a
S75O,000 gov<rTUT<fll guarnntcc;A. AdI" Company at Bay Robens in 1956 wilh a
$550,00:>~o:; and Edchardr: Knitting Mills Limited at Brigus in 1957 with a .
$)87,400guarnntec.
Smallwood produ=I glowing reports of !he puducts \hal emerged from !he new
indwtries. AbouI: KochShoes,he toldthe legisleree"they<R nming cd footWear over
therethat is going to be a good seller....- . Smallwoodpredicted Eckhardt Millswould
sell its lower-priced products"in everynookandcranny or Newfoundland", while "I
~ Proceedings, March 19, 1953, p.80
41 Financial Post, July 3, 1954. Vol.48, p. 26
42 Proceedings, June7, 1954, p. 1471
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prophesy thattheirhigh-class productswillsellall acrossC3I'I3da andtheUnitedStetes.?"
ThePremierwasequallyproudof the facthehadpersuaded the Englishchocolatemaker,
A. Adler, to disassembleitschocolatefactoryin Britainand ship it to Newfoundlend. In
a 1956 debate on Conservative WilliamBrowne'smotion for a Royal Commission into
the government's industrial policy,Smallwoodhad thepage deliver an Adler's bar to
opposition leader Malcolm Hollettandinvitedhimto sample "theflavourand goodness"
ofa bar "madeby oneof England's greatestfirms, now in BayRoberts."-lI>
Yet. all those glowing reportsfromSmallwood couldnotsolvea basicproblem faced by
thethreeplants. Theyall haddifficultycompetingoutsideNewfoundland While koch
Shoeswas assisted by severalcontracts to supplyfootwear to the Canadian military, the
chocolateand knitwearcompanieswere left to fend for themselvesin a crowdedand
distantNorthAmericanmarketplace.
Theindustrieswere encouragedthrougha government loanguaranteeprogramthatwas
flexible, generous andforgiving. Thesecharacteristicsof theloanguarantee programwere
obvious in thecabinet decision to extendbetterthan50-50 terms "in exceptional cases,
where circumstances justify a departure from established practice.''"This flexibility
accommodated the establishment of AtlanticGloves in Carbonear. The generous and
forgiving nature of the program would be proven many times over, as will be
demonstrated in the next chapter.
There is no evidenceduringhis tenureas Director Generalof EconomicDevelopment
from1950-1953, thatanyoneotherthanValdmanis andhis cadreof employees, hada role
inoverseeingthe new industries. Typically, Valdmanis studiedproposalsand negotiated
general termsfor the new industries, to be followed bya visit with the principals from
Smallwood andoneor two seniorministers. Subsequent to theseencounters, the investors
were typicallyinvited back to Newfoundland to maketheir pitch to the entire cabinet.
Shortlyafter, sometimes in the same cabinet meeting, approvaland financial support
would be given to a new industry. The available evidence is mute OIl what, if any
independent studies were undertaken to support these decisions. Indeed, the only
referencesto studies come in mid-1956. With many of the industriesin trouble, the
govenunent contracted theArthurD. Little Company fromBostonto assess13 of the 16
industries, in Smallwood's words, to "take stockof these new industries". He told the
Housesome were in "8 very healthyposition", whileothers "neednothingmore thanan
4$ Ibid,p. 1473
46 Proceedings, March28. 1955.p. 97
47 Minutein Council 117-'52, February2, 1952. File 2.03.004. JRS Collection
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improvement in management" andstill others"whosepositionandprospectsuponcareful
analysis may prove 10be discouraging.,,48
Prior to this time, the government shed little light on the new industries. Smallwood
generallydid the talkingand that was usually reserved for the annualtrip to theHouse
to approveloansand loanguarantees approvedby thecabinet in the previous year. Any
doubtSmallwoodraisedabout thenew industries was irnrredietely followedby a story
of a miraculous recovery. Speaking aboutthe tannery at Carboncar ina 1956speech,the
Premier said for theprevious twoor threeyears, it was the industry"I thoughthadthe
leastchance ofsucceeding. .." Thenhe continued, "...out of the clearsky, not one,but
severalmiracles occurred" Thosemiracles, Smallwood told theHouse,werefromhockey
skate makers and "great boot and shoe manufacturers" for morethanonemillionsquare
feetof .carher, Heconcluded WilhelmDom"has hitpaydirt,gold","
Smallwooddid thesamekindof rhetorical danceabout AtlanticHardboard. much.while
"formed..•withtypicalGermanthoroughness" was"shot to pieceswithone littlefactor
whichthey hadnever takenintoaccount, namely thatwoodin Newfoundland,.contained
a highdegreeof'moisture.v" Smalwoodmadethe casefor a loanto cover thecostofan
additional wood dryer for the plant, as well as theneed for a warehouse and some
chipping machines. When asked a stickyquestion by the Opposition if anyof the
$300,000 loanswouldcoverrunning expenses for the plant, Smallwoodreplied"not at
all" andmovedon to talkaboutthecementplant,saying "wehave no concerns withthe
runningexpensesof NorthStar Cement "SI
Only rarely did Smallwood lapse into anything resembling an admissionof failureor
near-failure withrespectto thenewindustries. One suchoccasionwasa speech inthe late
winterof 1953 when Smallwood said in relation to the estimate of 150jobs at Atlantic
Gloves: "I havehadenough experience with these new industries to suggestthat the
nwnber to be employed hadbetterbe givenwith somerestraint."n
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By the mid-1950's, fouryearsafter the indusrialization program began,questions were
being asked in manyquartersaboutthe status of me newindustries. Theannual request
to the House to approve supplementary funding tor the industries made it increasingly
difficultto hide the real goings-onundthe reasonstor the loans. William Brownewrote
in his book;"In 195 . vastherthepolicy wasa failure.'?'
YetSmallwoodwas notworking. In rejecting Browne's
request fora Royal reeson..." andconcluded aboutthe
industries, "most of them aredoingverywell indeed"Sol
Smallwood'scomments wereset againstnewspaperreports thatpainteda gloomy picture
forseveralof the industries (the Financial Postinparticularwrote several articlesspelling
out problems the industries faced)andagainst allegations that someof theplantswere
poorly run. Available infonnation suggests the government withheld thetrue status of
manyof the industries for severalyears, arguing in publiceverything wasfine, while in
private, there was outright acknowledgement that many of the industries were
encountering seriousproblems.
A Financial Post surveyof the industriesin July 1954 revealedthe firmsfaceda bevy of
serious problems. Its findings ran counter to Smalwood's earlierrhetoricthat "...these
industries...{will] manufacture thing> for salein Newfmmdland,andall partsof Canada,
intheUnitedStates, andin all partsoftheworld."sSBy 1954, thenewfirmswere facing
the reality of competing with companiesalready well establishedin Canada and the
United States. The newspaperoutlinedseveral problems: high transportation costs; the
cost of importing raw materials; and a shortage of skilled labour. The Canadian
Machineryand Industry .Construction Limited(CMIe)at Octagon wasto have become
a majorCanadian producer of heavy industrial machinery, but it discovered "bringing in
raw materia ls and shippingout finishedproducts to distant pointsisa cost ly procedure.n56
The companywas also finding that even in the localNewfoundland 1TIll.ritef., "mainland
finns with large-scale productioncouldundersell a localproducerin manylines,':"The
SJ William J. Browne, Pieht-Four vears a NewfoyndJander(St Jam's : Dicksand
Company, Limited) 1981 p.130
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paper reportedthe samekindsof problemswere beingexperienced at thecement,gypsum
undrubber plaras.
'The rubber productsplantin particularcamein fora lotof critical attention. Conservative
MHAWilliamBrowne reported being toldthe product manufactured by the plantwas
"inferior". Browne hada copy of an affidavit fromFrankPronold, a seniormember of
Superior's management,whomadeseveral allegations. Pronold claimed the company was
steadily losing money; thatthe robber footwear produced by theplantwasdefective; that
the plant wasbadlyconstructed; and thatit wasusing second-handmachinery, someof
it stamped"Marshall Plan". Pronold's recipefor righting theplant's problems wastoclose
the plant"at once fora period of fourweeks fora complete re-organization fromthe top
down.?" Browne wrote thatSmallwood's response to theallegationswas"it is notworth
the paper it iswrittenon." HeconcludedSmalwoodwasgoing"to brazen it OUl"S9Three
monthsaftertheseevents, the Board of Superior Rubber hadobviously decidedtherewas
enoughconcernabouttheoperationof thecompany lhat it firedtheGerman management
team
The Conservativeleader, John Higgins, likenedthe government's spendingon the new
industries to the pied piper: "Our pied pipers did not pipe away the childrenof
Newfoundland, but in excellentorder, theyhave managedto pipemanydollarsdownthe
drainina goodmany instances.,,6\) Threeyearslater, ConservativeleaderMalcolm Hollett
indebate on moreloansfor the newindustries, toldthe government the opposition was
"a bit concerned aboutbringing in a loonbill everyyear practically forthe last four or
live years" and that withthe pre-Confederation surplusgone, "we mustknowthat there
is a limit to lhe borrowingcapacity of thisProvince."!
Whilethe government carriedon bravely in publicabout the industries, privately, there
were signsof trouble. A memofromSmallwood to the DeputyMinister of Economic
Development just before Christmas 1953 had a tone of desperation. Upset that
government agencies were not buying enough products fromthe new industries, the
Premiermote bluntly thatwillingness to buy "shal be regarded as co-operation withthe
~8 Browne, p. 128
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government" andfailure: todo sowould beseenas "non-coopcrmion." Smallwoodturned
the existingsituation "inexcusable" and "is not to be toleraled.-eo!
This generalsta e of concern was set againsta backdrop where events were not turning
out as planned.While thepublic statementsproclaimed theCMlCplantat Octagonwould
rumout heavymachinery, mc::mxanda fromthecompany to the ccbinet indicatedit was
not heavy machinery at all thaiwould carty the plant in its earlyyears,but substantial
orders from the Defense Department for the manufacture of shells. When the Defence
Department rejected that suggestion and the orders failed to materialize, CMIC found
itself unable to payeither theprincipal or interest on its $2.5 million govcnunent loan
guarantee.6J
By late 1953, lhe job of Director General had passed to Gordon Pushie, a
Newfoundlander. Valdmanis had moved to Montreal to become chainnan of
Newfoundland and LabradorCorporation. Pushie not only inherited Vnldnwnis' old job;
healso inherited the problemsthe industrialization program wasbeginning to hatch. l ie
cabledSmallwood on the Premier'sChristmasvacationin Jamaica in January 1954about
tithedesperatefinancial situation of NewfOlll'lClland Hardwoods",M A monthlater, Pushie
was writing that he was"concerned" nb:>ut the flJtlOCial positionof Superior Rubber
Company Lim ited65
Enoughseedsof doubt hodbeenplantedinthepubl i~,mindabout the newindustries to
tempe!" Small"""", exaggerated claims abouttheir impact00 Newfomdland.
" Letter, Smallwood'0Norman Short, December 17, 1953. File 3.08.004. iRS
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Problems Aplenty: TheIrxbbies Rim Into Trouble
The March 31, 1953 leter fromthe National Gypsum Company in Buffalo, New York,
must haveputa chill inSmallwood's bones. Herewasa company thatelevendaysearlier
had givenevery indication it would make one of Smallwood's mostferventwishescome
true- National hadset outa tentativeoffer to buythegypsumplant at ComerBrook.A
sale would have givencredibility to the government's strategy of selling the first three
industries. Insteadof finalizing tile deal though, National waswritingto say it had
changedits mind.Thereasons. arrived at during"careful study"by NationalGypswn's
management, amounted to a politebutfirm indictment of theComerBrookplant.While
Lhe company considered theplantto be "of gooddesignand construction", it underlined
several weaknesses, including the mill's low operating speed- "45 feet per minute" -
which "iscustomary inEurope", butfarbelowspeedsobtained in the UnitedStateswhere
"our machines averagethreetimesthatspeed"; The lowoperating speedwasjust oneof
the reasonsNationalGypsum enumerated in the letter to Smalwood. It sawadditionaJ
weaknessesin thelimitedyear-round marketinNewfoundland,whichnecessitated selling
into the mainland market. National viewedthisas fraught withproblemsbecause of high
transportation and warehousing costs.Although it did not mention the Newfoundland
government's asking price for the mill, National Gypsumconcluded "ourpeopledo not
feel that it is advisable.... at the originalpricethatyou havesuggested for the plant". It
said the Comer Brook millwould produce at 40010ofwhatthecompany couldgetoutof
a new $6 millionplant.2
Rejected by National Gypsum, the government continued to look for a "satisfactory
purchase ".' But Atlantic Gypsum looked anything like a prime candidate for
pr ivatization, a point that was madeclear when the company's boardof directorswas
informed of Atlantic's operations. Dependent on the mainland market for close to 90-
percent of its sales, the board wastold of the"almostcomplete collapseof our saleson
, Letter,National GypsumCompany, Buffalo, NYto JosephSmallwood,Man:h 31,
1953. File 3.08.285. JRS Collection
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the mainland" resulting"inunreasonably high'frozen in' stocks inourwarehouses andin
financial losses amounting to hundredsof thousandsof dollars."
AtlanticGypsum'sproblemsontheCanadianmainlandbegan inmid-1954 when mainland
competitors increased their production.The competitionbuilt newcapacity, endas a
result, the battle formerketsherebecame "increasinglyfierce" . Atlantic'ssole salesageznt
on themainland - International Building Products (lBP)of Montreal - advisedComer
Brook that despite the increased competition,it didnotexpecta reduction in the pricefor
gypsumwallboard. Atlantic's executives were therefore takenby surprise on August 13
when mainland gypsum makers dropped their pricesby $5 a thousand square fect.$
Atlantic's salesplungedimmediately, leadingto "analltimehigh" stockpile of 12 million
squarefeet. worthabout$450,000. AtlanticGypsum placedtheblamefor the mainshare
of itsproblemat thefeetof lBPwhichit complained"haveonlyonemanasa salesforce
in the tieldand eventhatone 1TlW1•••is servingnotAtlanticGypsum Limited only...", but
also had to sell otherlines"whichlBP cerries"." Theproblem'> in the mainland market
forcedAtlantictocloseits ComerBrookplant forthreeweeksat theendof August 1954.
Whenit reopened,operations were reducedfromtwo shiftsto one.
The importance of the Canadian marketcould not beoverstated. Atlantic Gypswn had
arrived at the conclusion it was the only logical exportmarket a~cr a survey of the
United Statesa year-end-a-halfearlier.TheFebruary1953 surveyconcluded"thereis no
chanceof sellingourboards in the United Statesat a pricesatisfactory to us.,,1
Thecrisis causedby thepricedropin the mainlandmarket left Atlanticin a cash crunch.
Without the workingcapital to meet its losses, Atlanticturnedto its 1000/0 owner, the
Newfoundland govenunent. Cabinetgaveapproval inearlyDecember 1954 for S135,000
"as prepayment..in respect of aggregate lossesof $250.000 for thecurrentyear,"
4 Atlantic Gypsum Limited. "Report on the Statusof Our PresentMainland Sales
Representation", November IS, 1954. File 3.08.024. JRSCollection
S Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Letter,ErnstLeja,Managing Directorof AtlanticGypsum Company Limited, to
Gordon Pushie, Director General of Economic Development. January 26, 1954. File
3.08.024. JRS Collection.
• Minute-in-Council, December3, 1954. P.25-'54. File 2.03.006. JRSCollection.
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The position in whichAtlanticGypsum founditself - withcosts exceedingincome-
\....01.11<1 become a familiar refrain for most of the companies financed under the
governments industrialization program. The picture painted in "official" documents
howev er, differs considerably fromthe publicstatementsof the govenunent dwing this
period. The stated immediate goalof the industrialization program was jobs, with the
added advantage of a diversified economy where "cement, gypsum, plasterboard,
flbreboard....thesearethe newcommodities thatmustnowbe added to the fishandthe
newsprintpaper and the minerals that have consnnaedthe mainstay of Newfoundland's
industrialproduction," Whilethe government, andespeciallySmallwood proclaimed the
new programwas working, by virtueof thejobs it createdandthe wagesit paid, the
industriesweredestructing one by one.
1HE CEMFNT PlANT
Thecement plantwasloutedby Valdmanis as a certain profit-maker. evenbeforeit had
beenbuilt.Thisbelief. alongwith the government's stated intention to 8<:11 the first three
plants as ecrly as possible, led to a flurry of activity during the early years of the
program. The lirst set of negotiations took placewith theso-called"New York Group".
Valdmanis spent six weeks inNewYork tryingto put togethera dealthat wouldnet the
government $1.5 million (US) and an additional$1.2 to SI.5 million Canadian. The
negotlctions were to buildon a memorandum of agreement signedJuly 19, 1950.10 That
deal fell throughhowever, and for the next severalyears.Utegovernment triedto play
matchmakerfor a plantthat becamemiredin red ink.
NorthStar Cement wentintoproduction inthespring of 1952withthegovenunentas its
sole shareholder, In itsfirstsevenmonthsofopemtion, it ranupa lossof$326,536.11The
loss was substantially less in the nextyear, butby 1954,losseswere up again, to more
• Proceedings, May31, 1954. p. 1149
10 Memorondwn of Agreement between Alfred Valdmanis, Director General of
Economic Development and "The New York Group", dated July 19, 1950. This
memorandum set out the price and terms with respectto the cementplant and was
intendednot to bea contractbut the basis on whicha contractwouldbe negotiated File
3.08.250.JRSCollection
II NorthStar CementFinancial Statements1952, File 3.08.266. JRS Collection
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than $433,000. North Starhadalso nul up interestchargesof $422.000 on its $4,74
million.a-percentgovernment loan.lZ
Undeterred by the failureof their firstattemptto sellthe cement plant10 theNew York
Group, the buyers. including a Texasoil millionaire and a
Belgian Kronacherbegan on theheels of thefailure of
~~y . tpl~
Canadian
cabinetministerC.D. Howe, and wasa member of the Belgian Senate. TheBaron was
offeredthe Comer Brookmill for $3 million cash in Canadian dollarsup front and
another$6()(),OOO to bepaidoverfiveyears.WhiletheBaronconductednegotiations with
the Newfoundland government, Valdmanis wasapproached by a Newark., New Jersey
attorneyon behalfof a Texasoil millionaire. identified as Mr. Rogers. In a memo 10
Smalwood,Valdmanis appeared ready to determine how much the American waswilling
to pay, noting he hadtoldtheAmericans "...theGovernment would notconsiderselling
the mill at anything less thanFourmilliondollars(U.S. currency)".u
The real negotiating was takingplacewith the Baron however, with the government
apparently believingthe deal wasnearlydone.Thereis evidence of this in a letter from
Valdmanisto the lawyer for theTexasfum in early July 1951. VaJdmanis saidhe could
sell the plant to the Baronandas a result, couldnot "preserve the mill for you any
longer."!" TheBaron, it seemed, knew howto preserve the optionon themill forhimself
without making a commitment to purchase the company. He did this by carrying out
extensive drilling to determine the purityof limestone depositsat the ComerBrooksite.
TheTexas company meanwhile, nowidentifiedas the LoneStarCementComp;my was
not put off by the earlierrejection letter from Valdmanisandaskedthat"...this deal be
held for a fewmonths"sincethere was"reluctanceon the partof theBoardto increase
its currentborrowings.v" LoneStaraddeda sweetener to itsrequest,sayingit would be
worththe government's mule to wait as "I am surethat they [the government}would be
amply compensated by an increase in the price threeor fourmonthshence." 16
12Ibid
1) Memo, Valdmanis to Smallwood, May 10, 1951.File 3.0K250.1RS Collection
14 Letter, Valdmanis to Arthur Slavitt,Newark, N.J., July4, 1951.File 3.08.250. JRS
Collection
I' Letter, Slavitt to Valdrnanis, August3. 1951. File 3.08.250. JRSCollection
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What the Newfoundland government did not know was that while the Baron was
negotiating with valdrnanls, he hadbeentrying to entice Lone Star to help fmance the
1kJ.1 lor the cementplant. This WlIS revealedin a letterfromLoneStar to Valdmanis in
August 1951. LoneSlllrlet the government know that it WllS felt It •••K.onachcr did not
havethe moneyto swingthe deal alone.?"A month later, theBaron,apparently unaware
of'thecommunication between Lone Starandthe government.notifiedSmallwoodhe was
bailingout of talks to landthecement mill as thereweretoomany risksassociated with
takingon the project. lone Star meanwhile, did not re-enter the picture. Fornow. the
govcmment hedgivenupon sellingtheplant andhadbegunlooking fora companyto
operatethe facility. In June1952,itbanded over technical andcommercial management
10 Canadian Machinery HoldingTMt.
Duringthis semepcrlod,the government attemptedtosell thesecondof theoriginalthree
industries - AtlanticGypsum Limited, but that bid failed 100. It made no effort to put
Ncwtoundland Hardwoods on the market, choosing instead to lease the plant to
Newfoundhmd businessman Chester Dawe.
'me ordeal with the first three industries proved to be an tmpromising debut for the
strategyof buildingthe plants oneat a time.sellingthem, andusingtheproceedsto start
otherindustries. Ther stateof affairshowever, did notstop Smalwoodfromtrumpeting
the new industries' "distinguished and valuable contribution" to the Newfoundland
economy. But no level of optimism could counter the disastrous results that started
showing on thebalancesheetsof mostof thecompanies. A look insidetheoperations of
thevariousindustries raisesseriousquestionsaboutwhat, if anycontribution, they were
making to Newfoundland
mE RUBB ERPlANT
Therubber products plantbuilt at Holyroodwasa caseinpoint.Smalwoodpromotedthe
plant 1lS an import substinnion industry. He foresaw workers at Holyrood producing
rubberclothesandbootsthat wouldtakea significant part ofwhatheestimated was a $2
milliondollar-a-year Newfoundland market.IS And notonlythat,anexuberant Smallwood
toldthe Houseoneearlyspringday in 1953, but he believed"...with the latestmachinery,
withlots of skilledmanagement behind it. .wesee noreason, asa Government, why such
17 Letter. Slavinto Valdmanis. August8. 1951.File 3.08.250.JRSCollection
" Proceedings, Mm:h27, 1953. p. 272
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11 plantshould not succeed.__Iq By succeed. Smallwoodexp lalred he meant tbe pl:lnl
would pay beck to thegovcnunent all the principal andinterest 00 its kxJn. as \ \ \.0(' as a
profit for the owners of the COOlpQll)'.2Il
The fum was giventhe nameSuperior RubbcrCOI1lJXlOY li mited, a namelhaI would
proveto be a touch ironic givensomeof the later complaints aIxu its products. Sup:rior
ron into trouble soon after it opened. One of its fust problems w:JS with the long
cstabIished St. John's shoeITlC:f'Ckln!s - Parker and Mxlroe. At issuewas the sale to
ParkerandMonroeofsome oCthecompany's test-runrubbersIII a price Supcrior's lawyer
laterclaimed was $1.40 a pair. Thecompany accusedParker andMonroe of errp loying
thetest-run rubbers as a poorcomparison to its regular lines. Thelawyerclaimed .....we
can only assume that your comparison was carried out with the malicious intent of
keeping our client's products off the market..."2 1 The shoe storeconceded one of its
::~~:b:~~fu~U:~~~~iliean~;;an7;j::=~~ ~~=~P:
and Monroeclaimed it bought therobbers for $7.40 a pair. morethan live times the
amount claimedby Superior.
lhe ParkerendMooroe incident wasinsignif icant apinst v.tlaI was happening inearly
1954 at the futuristic-looking plant aI Holyrood. The Germanmanaging directorof the
pla.1t- MaxBm~Wogau · hadbeenill andaway fromtheplantforseveral months. The
president,KorI Grube, hadbeendetained inGemany becauseorproblem< withanmcy
control authorities. "A veryaiti ca1situation exists...• wac; howPushiesummedit up in
a memoto Smallwoed2J Smallwood was infooned that the plant."'<IS withoutactive
ccrsrcl for four months· , was producing ooIy 60 pairsof rubber footwear a thy and
needed anotherS4OO,ooo or governmcnllOOOCY."
19 Ibid
2l) Ibid
21 Letter,Donald Dawe[Lawyer, SuperiorRubber Company Limited] to Parker and
Monroe. August 3, 1954. File 3.08.ln. JRSCollection
22Letter. Parker and Monroe to Donald Dawe, August t I, 1954. File 3.08.1n . JRS
Collection
D Memo,Gordon Pushie to Smallwood, May 7, 1954. File 2.08.085. JRSCollection
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"he Gt.'J111Ull management placed muchof the blame for theplant's production problems
on the local female workers. On one occasion, Braun-wogau wrote this unflattering
assessment :
The unrcliai..:lity and lack of initiative and interest on the part of the
female labourersare a great handicap. Thegirls employed in the Plant
come undgo continuously. We hadto trail throughthe plant950 persons
in orderto buildup a teamof 80 persons.15
In thatsame memo, Braun-WOI,W revealedthe pictureof a company that was bleeding
redinkfast, addingthai theiroperationswere"hampered by theshortage of funds.,,26 In
orderto add to its workingcapital, Superior was diverting the $10,000 thegovernment
had loaned lbr a railway siding connection with the CNR track and it was taking
$32,149.44 from its capital account (money intended to be the last instalment on a
$70,000machine to beusedin the manufacture of non-slipbath mats, insoles and other
:t:a~; i:n~~:Jed~o=~O~f~r~t~c;~~pa~~J raw
Superior W DS sinking deeper into trouble fromwhichit wouldbedifficult to recover. A
German architect who was engaged early on to help design thefactory wrote to the
government to say thathe resignedfrom the position "...ratherthanbe blamedwith the
architectonic responsibility forwhatwasbeingplannedagainstmyownconvictions..."29
Concernabout the designand condition of the buildingwasat thecentre of a complaint
froma Canadian worker at theplant, who wrote Smallwood to explainwhy he was
quittingand headinghometo Montreal
I am embitteredover theappealing [sic] condition ofthe buildingitselfits
equipment, the senseless waste and destruction of material, the
2.\ Memo,Max Braun-Wogau to Gordon Pushle, November II, 1954, File 3.08.171.
JRSCollection
l{) Ibid
21Ibid
.2lI lbid
29Letter. Dr. log Thonnohlen to Gordon Pushie,January5, 1955. File 3.08.177. JRS
Collection
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hopelessness of a native ever gettinga higherjob ,..'ith betterpay although
theirperformanceis in mostcasesbetter than the performance of thes{)-
calledexperts..JO
The politics and the managemera style UlSuperior might have beentolerable for the
govenuncnt had theplant produced the quality andquantityof rubbergoodsSmallwood
had predictedjust two yearsbefore. Butwithupto 4Q.-percent of its productionoflhc key
knee and thigh rubber production being sold as seconds. me company wason shaky
ground," It was not helpedeitherby reportslike theone relayed to NormnnShort.the
Deputy Minister of Supply, regarding rubber boots that hadbeen shippedto North
LabradorTrnding Posts.
These rubbers thigh andknee, are of very poorquality...The'Superior'
rubbers last the fishermen about two weeks..J have had num..TOUS
complaints...they areungluedat the soles. therubber is peelingoff and the
men must condemnthem...The children's rubbersare the same...We have
about threedozen pairson hand...the peopleknow the quality and won'l
buy.n
By thelatc winterof 1955, with thecompany still in a tailspin,Max Brcun-wogaumade
notes of a conversation inwhich he informed Gordon Pushiethatthe government ImU1
of$ l.4 million wouldsoon beexhausted. Bmun-Wogauwrote thatPushie "took noteof
this infonnation andsaid it was premature to discuss furthersteps..."Jl
Pushie appearedto be playingfortime. He began a search f~ another company to run
the plant, or jf thegovernment was especially lucky, a company to buy it outright. lie
contacted several large robber concerns, including Dunl.op Canada(April 19. 1955);
Greengate and lrwell RubberCompany Limited, London (May 16, 1955); andBritish
" Letter, Frank Pronold to Smallwood, February 20, 1955.File ] .08.171. JRS
Collection.
11 Memo, Braun-Wogsuto Pushie, February 23,1 955. File3.08.177.JRSCollection
" Letter, Deputy Minister ofSupply to Pushle, JanuaryII , 1955. File 3.08.177. JRS
Collection.
n Memo. Braun-Wogauof conversationwithGordon Pusbie, February 23, 1955. File
3.08.177. JRS Collection. [Braun-Wogaumade extensivenotes of conversations with
Pushie and sent them in memo form to Pushie, presumably as a record of their
conversations.]
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TyreandRobber Company(May20, 1955). Inlessthantwo months, all threecompanies
ruledout any possibility of their setting up in Newfoundland, Pushie thenapproached the
Londonplasticsand rubbermanufacturer- P.P. Cow andCompanyLimited- and asked
themto undert akea study of the Superior operation.
Cow's 20-pagereportshowedSuperior- with $1.4millionin government loans, a $120,000
bank overdraft, and $72,850owing in interest to the government. The mostdamning
evidencethoughwasthe sales figures for 1955. The company managedto goover$5000
in sales forjust two months, and in one month.salesplummetedto $203.:14 P.P. Cow
cited the "lack of commercial experience" of the general manager and emphatically
recommendedthe Works Managermust"...go at theearliestpossible moment "~ They
judged much of the plant to be second-hand and claimed the Germans used the
government loan to repay themselves for the machinery. The report said the Germans
"c.showed a complete lackof expertise or interestindeveloping the Company..." and it
stated the obvious, "the Newfoundland Government nowfmdthemselves witha large,
inadequatelyequipped factory, running at a 1055...,, )6
Theplant, which hadrun upa deficitof $622,337by late 1955, wason borrowed time.
~~~k=t~~~h~\~:o;:e~~~~·~:.~~tro~I;O=~u1i~::lrIUg.
301 Report on Superior Rubber Company by P.P. Cow and Company Limited,
November 30. 1955. File3.08.177. JRSCollection
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11IE ffi'1CE1'11O'/ BAYPlANlS
Nearly '1 ~ the newindustries turned out to becrisiswaiting to happen. The leather-based
industries in Harbour Graceand Carbonear were primeexamples of this. Intended to
manufacture products fromleatherproduced at the tannery in Carbonear, AtlanticGloves
Limited,Koch ShoesandGold Sail LeatherGoods Limited. wereseenascomplementary
to each other. It did not takelong however, forthis specialrelationship10deteriorate, and
seriously set back the veryreason the plants were established.
The earlydaysof the leather industriesthough,werecharacterized by goodrelations ull
around. A kind of "all for one and one forall" ethosprevailed This wasdemonstrated
whenGold Sailcaught wind of rumoursthat"adefinite possibilityexists thattheTannery
at Carbonear will ceaseoperations becauseof insufficient financialassistance...." Gold
Sail rushedto the rescueof its commercial cousin,underscoring several reasonsfor the
govenmentto continue financingthe nearby tannery. including the fact it could deliver
raw material in mere hours,that its priceswere lowerthancompetitorsand thai it was
supplying the exacttype of leather Gold Sail wanted."
"Thetannery isnow in apositionto fill major orders...", wrote the owner,WilhelmDom,
to Smalwoodin February1953, providingit received $25,000 in working capital." This
was the beginning of severalsuch requests. Threemonthslater, Dom reported two big
shoe companieswantedto placeordersfor leather, thereby necessitating "larger lotsof
hides, morechemicalsand perhapsmoreworkers." Healsorequiredanadditional$50,000
in workingcapilal. -IO In the summer of 1953, Dom wasagainbeating a wen-worn path
to the door of the Newfoundland Treasury, askingSmallwoodfor bridge financing of
$50,000until theTamer)'could beginsellinghidestoKochShoes."Thegovenunent was
not preparedto advance the moneyto Dom, and insteadmade a quiet proposalto Koch
at the shoe factory that it would lend "at once S3()",$40,OOO" to buy leatherfrom the
tannery. To sweeten the deal,the government was prepared to make the loaninterestfree
;l! Letter,Gold Sail Leather Goods Limitedto Pushie, March24, 1954. File 3.08.0&4.
JRS Collection
J9 Letter, ilhlem Dam to Smallwood, February 9, 1953. File 3.08.098. JRS
Collection
010Letter, Dam to Smallwood,May 9, 1953. 3.08.098. JRS Collection
41 Letter. Dom to Smallwood,August13, 1953. File 3.08.098. JRS Collection
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"until such Lime as your plant \\UI.J!dbe ready to buyleatherandgo into the jXOductioo.
of shocs.'..u
That fall. the government acceptedthe inevitable with respect to the new industries.
Knowing most, if no( all, were incapableof meetingthe interest or the principal on their
louns,the governmentannot.nXdthat interest payments due in the rust and secondyean
could be postpooeduntil the thirteenthandfourteenth years,andthat interestonly need
be paidin thethirdandfourthyears. Theprincipal coold be delayeduntil afttt the fowth
year.o
This generous treatmentdid not seem to help with production at the tannery. Dom was
getting complaints from his MontreaJagent who hadplaced a "substantial order" on
December 2, 1954 for sole leather.Fourweeks later, the panickedagent wrote thatif the
leather did notarrive in a few days, "I amafraidwe will get in trouble". Tendays after
that, andnearly six weeks after placing the order, theagent wroteDom"the customer
informedme todayhe can't wait and willbuy from another tannery." Word obviously
uavetled fast in the leather industry, as the same Montreal agent wrote nom in late
February1955, relating commentsfroma shoe manufacturer who"wouldn'tbelieve me"
on bearingthetannerycould promisetwo weeks delivery.
:::=.:~e,=::t.:n~I=~=~':.'.r;-::"om:.1:::
govanrnenI the only way to correct theproblemwas to buya modemy,arefKwJse in
MonIn:aI with itsown pcrsomdandofficeand to fili lhewardlousewith threemon1hs'
supply of learber. Domsald the cost wouldbe $100,000 andbe hoped to get that llI1lOOI1l
through a government loan guarantee..uThis request was set against a recordof JXXI'
performance - fo< thesix months leadingupto Man:h 31, 1954, the _ wasshowing
a lossof SI7,971.47 onsalesof I 14,728.47.
Smalwood's patiencewith Dom waswearing thin.Writing Pushie at the Royal York:
Hotel in Toronto. Smallwood reported Dam's request.He asked Pushieto investigatethe
oil Letter. Pushie 10 Horst Koch, undated File 3.08.090, JRSCollection.
.jJ Letter, Sma llwood to Dom. October 13, 1953. File 3.08.098. JRS Collection
~ Letter, Doen to Pushie, March29, 1954. File 3.08.098. JRS Collection
U Ibid
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possibility of renting warehouse space in Montreal and slatedemphatically. "I certainly
have no intention of advanclngany hundred thousanddollarsto him.".l6
Major ordersdid come into thetannery, some of which it filledandotherswhich were
tilledunsatisfactorily. One of theunsatisfactoryoneswasanorderforhockey shoeleather
from the Eagle Shoe Company Limited It was found that in the two week interval
between whenEagle cut the leatherfor the skate liningandthe skate's assembly, "...lhe
lining was two sizes smaller than the corresponding upper." The company claimed
independent studies had shown "the leather delivered was still wet and subject to
shrinkageat the timeof cutting." Eagledemanded $1,282.38 from the tannery if the
contract Wa1 renewed,anddouble that if it WdS not renewed.41
Not only did the tannery havea difficult timesecuring business on the mainland, but at
home, the early good relations withGoldSailhadcometoa crashingend. Lessthan nine
monthsafterits interventionto have thegovenunent protectthe taMery, Gold Sailwas
asked to respond to complaints about the handbags it was producing. GordonPushie
informed the company there were complaints the claspswerenot holding, "partscoming
unglued" and "handles cuttingaway fromthe bags." WrotePushie,
It should berealizedthatpromptactionshould betakenby the company
to settlesuchcomplaints.Nothingcoulddamageyouroperations morethan
to have raised around St. John's that your product wasn't standing up
well,"
Gold Sail responded to the complaints with unrestrained vigour and anger, all of it
directed at thetannery, the fumit hadso eagerlysupported lessthannine monthsbefore.
Of the problem with its handbags, Gold Sail wrote, "...they stem not from poor
workmnnsh.ip but frominferiorraw materialfromthe tanneryin Carboneer.""
GoldSail's letter continued,
46 Letter, Smallwood to Pushie, May 28, 1954. File 3.08.098. JRS Collection
47 Letter, Eagle ShoeCompany Limitedto Donald Dawe, lawyerforNewfoundland
Tannery(Wrn. Dom) Limited,January27, 1958. 3.08.099. IRS Collection.
48 Letter, Pushie to Gold Sail, December 16, 1954. File3.08.084. JRSCollection
49 Letter, Gold Sail to Pushie, December 23, 1954. File 3.08.084. JRS Collection
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Wehave tried...to workinclose co-operation with the tannery usingtheir
leather. The result hasbeenloss of prestige for ourproductanda shift in
purchasing from Carbonear to other suppliers...You have, we believe,
copiesof lettersfromourfinn to the tannery, presently in yourpossession
on this subjectof inferior leathers, andbelateddeliveries."
The balancesheets of both Gold Sail and thetannerywere taking a battering. Both
w mpanies lostmoneyin all theyears theyoperated. By thetime thetannerywasclosed
in 1957. it hadrun upa deficitof wellover $120,000,51 Gold Sail's deficit hadreached
morethan$203,000 by the timeit wentout of businessin 1960.52
TheConceprlon Bayplants, as they were referred to by Gordon Pushie,5J werepart of a
government strategyto industrialize theConception Bay Northarea.Thiswasmade clear
to theGennan interests behind the proposal for the shoe factory(which becameKoch
Shoesat Harbour Grace). Notifying theprincipals that government had approved a loan
for the shoefactory, the Assistant Director General of Economic Development, A L
Grnudins. underlinedthat theapproval was contingenton the factory beingconstructed
in Carbonear,"insteadof St. John's". Theletterstated it wasgovenunent's intentionfor
"the Harbour Grace-Cerbonear area to become a new centre of industries..."Sol The
government plannedto r- .mdout its programin the areawith a marineoil hardening
plant, a margarine andshortening plantanda soapfactory.55
None of thoseplants made it to fruition,but a knitting milldid figure in the plansforone
of Conception Bay North's longestestablished conununities. .
50 Ibid
51 File 3.08.100. JRS Collection. [The final figure is not available in the records.
$121,439.17representslosses for the period '0September 30, 1955.]
52 Annual Financial Statements. File 3.08.085.JRSCollection.Theexactamountwas
$203,867.3310 December 31,1960.
S3 Memo, Pushieto Executive Council, September 11, 19.1i7. File 2.08.008. JRS
Collection.
54 Letter, AL . Graudins to Mr. R. Rieher, Tuttlingen, Germany, Pebnery 9, 1952.
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Eckh.1rdt Knitting Mills \\ ;'1$ establishedat: Brigus in 1953 on the formerpremisesof
Riverside Knitting Mills.Startedwith a S387,400loan. fromthegovanment, the mill was
to produce fineknitwear. ThepIart was staned by Alfons Bernhard Eckhnrdt,a \lL'lO":ln
in theAustrianknitwearbusiness. The company's brochures boastedItalianstyling and
Austrianknow-how, a combinationthatthegovernment hopedwouldl:nn.::h thecompany
toward large profits.
Smallwooddeclared ",""Ioymauat the mill would reach 300to 400whenfullproducti",
wasreached. At first, it appeared the Eckhardt millweemen: forward·looking than lhe
industriesalreadyestablished, mostof which had~jumped intoproduction withoutpaying
too much attention10 marketpossibilitiesandoutlets .n~ Eckhardt proposedto overcome
that pitfallby establishingoutletsin the centralCanadian fashion centresofMontrettland
Toronto. Thelocalmarketwould beservicedfromanoutleton WaterStreet in St. John's.
Eckhardtchosethe nameIreneKnitwearLimited.
A year-and-a-half after the mill began operating. Eckhardt started looking to the
government for a substantial amountof workingcapital · $160,000. In rc:commending
cabinet approve the application, Pushie advised the government 10 attach stringent
conditions to theJoanandto insist on theappointment of a governmentdirectorto the
board. (These appoinlments became a patternfor most of the industries tharrequested and
weregivenadditionalfunds.) By eccepting the additionalassistance. Eckhardt lost some
of its independence, as lite govemmenl-appointed director(Gorden PuslUe) had "JXl"<'
to control expcnlitw'eS- andauthorityto ensure -that no salariesbepaid to non-residenls
ofNewfoundlllld" withouthis written approval.51
Govmunent was not pleasedwith the waythe mill was run. as wasevident in a letter
Pushie sent to a New Yak man who was scooting for potential buyas for the mill.
Calling it "oneof thebestindividual enterprises to be set up lUldc:r the Nc:wfoundland
Govemment's development program". Pushie said the pllWlt was nonetheless on the
market, as """ regard il [the present operators) as a p=ly~ setup unlil SL<h
time as the plant will be takOl over by an experienced company ~ich has the
organizal:ion tohandleboththedesignandthestyling of thegannentsas well as thesales
staffto handlethe output.MSI
~6 Financial Post. July 2. 1955. Vol. 49, p. 26.
" Memo, Pushieto Cyril Greene, AttorneyGeneralDepanment. December 28, 1954.
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Someof the problems with the mm ....ere explained to the boardof directorsin letters
fromthe managerof theSt. John's store. Whilesales for 1956hadimproved tOO-percent
over 1955($128,467.33 comparedto $61,517.66),the store managercomplained they
"could have sold $10,000moreif wehadnot beenhandicapped by not having the popular
wool colours.v" The manager notedthat for "two days alone in Christmas week", the
store lost sales for !OO jackets at $25 each.The Montreal officewas reporting similar
problems.
...wearcstill having insufficientsupply of a varietyof best-selling articles
whichwereorderedlong ago and on several occasions."
The shortage of products in the popularcolourscontinued through thelate 1950's. But
why? Someof thcanswerswere given in a 1957 analysis of EckhardtMills byArthurD.
Little, Inc., in its survey of thenew industries for the govenunent. Thesurveydealt a
blow to the credo of a company dedicatedto selling fashionable women's knitwear,
"...Eckhardt has not kept up withstyling" the reportcharged, noting"therehas beenno
change in the style of the Eckhardtlinessinceit [sic] wasfirstintroduced in 1955."61The
report presented an unflattering imageof the factory's general manager who "indicated
that production for inventory is made according to whatheconsiders willsell ratherthan
according to lineswhich have proventhemselvesin themarketplace."Q Sportswearbuyers
critiqued the company's line with unreserved bluntness, using phrasessuch as "too
germanic...VeryTeutonic...finish antiquated..old hat English".6J
Smallwood puthis interpretationof Eckhardt's problems in a memoto cabineton theday
the Little draftreport was presentedto the government. He explained how Eckhardt.
throughits retail c.utlet, IreneKnitwear, wasalso theselling agentfor the shoe, handbag
nndglove factories. This arrangement created a problem for Eckhardt, as the company
~ Letter, MaryAnn Shawto Boardof EckhardtKnitting Mills, January6, 1957. File
3.08.102. JRS Collection
60 Letter, IreneKnit-veer, f\.1ontreal to Pushie. January23, 1956. File3.08.102. JRS
Collection
~ I Draft Report to the Province of Newfoundland, "Analysis of Eckhardt Mills
Limited"by ArthurD. Little. Inc. September II , 1957. File3.08.104. JRS Collection
6llbid
/lJ Ibid
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was requiredto use its ovvn meagre working capital forprepayment of goods from the
other factories. Smallwood indicated the strategy was a necessaryone us only in this
fashion had it "been possible to meet emergencies in these other plants.,,1>1 He
acknowledgedthepressure thisplacedon Eckhardt's working capital. causingit problems
"meeting draftsforwool.tollSSmallwoodurgedthe cabinetto increasethe mill's working
capital with a $40,000loanguarantee," Eckhardt continued to operate. but with financial
difficulties, until it was forcedto closein the early 1960's.
TheConception Bay plantswere not alone in their failureto perform well. In the51.
John's area. severalindustries werealso battlinga sea of red ink.
1lIE MAC1IINffiY PlANT
The machinery plantat Topsailwasexpectedto put Newfoundlandon themapin heavy
industrialmanufacturing. Buttheplantthatwaslaunched withso muchfanfare just before
the 1951 generalelection, provedearly on to bea big money loser. Unable to altrnct the
largedefensecontracts contemplatedin the early days.CMIC wasreducedto becoming
"just a fairly large machine shop"."
CMlC gained fromthe government's decision in the fall of 1953 to postpone interest
payments on guaranteed loansfor all the newindustries, butthisclearly wasnot enough.
Writingto Smallwoodin theearlyspringof 1955, CMlCs vice-president, Dr. E. Rocthe,
disclosedfinancial statements so poorthat he felt it was"practically impossible for our
company to obtain any. short-term credits from a bafu;."68 Roethecomplained that
promisedpriceadvantages of 10-15%for Newfoundland firms competing withmainland
firmsfor defenseorders"didnot materialize." This, hewenton, combined with "a very
64 Memo, Smalwoodto Cabinet, September II , 1957. File2.08.008. JRSCollection
6S Ibid
66 Ibid
67 Horwood, p.181
.. Letter, Dr.E. Roethe,CMICto Smallwood, March 28, 1953.pp.5-6. File3.08.058.
JRSCollection
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limited amount of privateorders", resulted both in lower levels of employment than
expected and in the company's inability to earn interestanddepreciation?"
Citing an accumulateddebt of$460,38O.72, Roethetold Smallwoodthe only solution to
the company'sproblems wasa changein theexistingagreement thatwouldrelieveCMlC
frompayinginterest on its loanuntilit madea profit70 Sucha scenario however. seemed
an unlikely onefora heavy industrial plantthatwascoming10 relyprimarily on making
spare parts for equipment in the othernewindustries, a few construction jobs and the
occasional United StatesAir Forcecontract,
The government didnotyield10Rocthe's request,as doingso wouldunquestionably have
createda precedent otherindustries would askto haveextendedto theiroperations. Such
a movewouldalso haveadmitted tailure of theprogram, a stcp Smalwoodwasunwilling
to take in theearly t950'5. This reluctance to concedethepoorperformance of most of
the industries did littlethough to slow the momentum thatwasexerting overwhelming
pressure on the fmancialstatements of mostof thenew industries. The machinery plant
would eventually besold to theprivatesector,beforeclosingin the1980's. (By the early
1990's. the property had been convertedto a vinylwindow manufacturing plant.)
TIlE OIlIER INDUSIRIFS
Afterthe machinery, cement andhardwoods plants,United CottonMillscarriedthenext
largest public investment. The rhetoric surrounding theannouncement of this S1. John's-
basedplantconfirmed theportfact- portfantasy approach of Smalwoodtowardselling
his programtothepublic. He boastedof800 jobs at UnitedCottonMills,a figure in line
with what itsGetman principals wereestimating. What: Smallwood didnot say publicly,
but what theGermans clearly said in theirprivate proposals beforeconstruction started,
was that the plantwouldgetstarted withSONewfoundland workers, to be increased to
"250peopleandmorelater."71Theplantwasto include spinning. weavingandfabricating
mills. The impression giveninpublicwasthatwhile theentiremillwouldnot be upand
running at once. itwould beoperationalandthe800jobs in placein shortorder. It was
clearfrominformationtheGermans sentto Smallwood prior to thepublicannouncement,
that the future shape of theplant was far from finalized The Germans made the
~ IBID
~ IBID
11 Letter. Wilhelm Offento AL. 'Graudins,January 10, 1952. File 3.08.117. JRS
Collection
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information available to thegovernment inorderthat Smallwood mightanswer question.s
in the House "and in justifyingthe commitment of public fonds..." P. Insofar as the
weaving plant was concerned the Germans said it seemeda littleearly "10give 1."Xl1l.1
details about the proposed manufacturing progrnmandthis also refersto lhespinning.?"
The Germens predicteda profit of $322.375 fromtheoperation. They envisionedselling
men'sshirtsandpyjamas andwoman'spyjamas. apronsandhouse dresses throughtheir
ownsalesagentsin everybigtownin everyprovince. Transportationcosts, whichwould
cometo hauntmostof the newindustries, weredescribed by theGcnnans as "relatively
low", and while they foresaw competition from both Canadian and US firms, they
concluded therewas"plentyof roomforother textile mills in C lblaJa. ,,14
There were however, troubling signs in the NorthAmerican textileindustry, ones the
govenunentseemedunwilling or unableto appreciate. An Industrial Intelligence Bulletin
on the textile industry fromthe federal Department of TradeandCo~m1lt..'fCC noted lhat
since April 1950, "activity in theclothing industry slipped considerebly.v"A majorpart
. . Pcrcapita
increased from 12-percent in 1939to 21-pcrccnt
ommerceDepartment wrote that the trend to
synthetic clothing"...may achieve evengreatersignificance in the future."'"' A notation
on the bulletinby Smalwoodurgedhis then-Director of Economic Development, Alfred
v aldmanls,to readpartof thedocument that reported the"realpercapitaexpenditure on
clothingof disposable income has been below thelong-termtrendduring thepast three
years.""Smallwoodappeared to ignore the sectionthatwarned of thesignificant move
to synthetic fibrein theclothingindustry.
United Cotton Mills steadily lost money during the 1950's. By October 1961, its
accumulateddeficitstoodat morethan$569,000.During thatyear,thegovernment came
12 Letter,Graudins to Offen,December 18, 1951. File3.08.117.JRSCollection
1) Letter, Offento Graudins, January 10, 1952. File 3.08.117. JRSCollection
14 Ibid
l' Paper, "The Clothing and Textile Industries", Economics Division. Industrial
Intelligence Division #2, Departrncnt of TradeandCommerce, Ottawa. (Undated) p.6
'"'(bid, p. 9
11 Ibid, p. It
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to the mill's l\..."iCUC, and liquidatedabout two-thirdsof the deficit, madeup chiefly of
operating losses andunpaid interest on the government loan. The loan itself was still
outstanding.Thisplant too, wouldevennaliyclose.
[I became increasingly difficult for Smallwood to maintain thm the industries were
"breaking even andhaving their own workingcepital" (as he claimed in the case of
money-losing Eckhardt Mills, KochShoes, AtlanticGlovesand Newfoundland Tanneries
in 1956), when soon after. the government would be asking the legislature to approve
additional guarantees for those plants. By June 1957, the government hadseenenough.
Withabout $20millionoutstandingin loansto the industriesandnone oCtheaccwnulatcd
$2 million in interesthaving been paid back to theTreasury, Smallwood announced he
hadcnJistcd thehelpor ArthurD. Little, Inc.of theMassachusetts InstituteofTechnology
10 assess the new industries. "The time has come to take stock"was how Smallwood
explainedhisactions." Heattempted to prepare the public fortheverdict,by placingthe
industries in various categoriesof fmancial health. Some,hesaid,were"in a very good
healthy condition" while others "may need nothingmore than an improvement of
management" and still others"may proveto bediscouraging"."
Reporting on the appointment of Arthur D. Little, Inc., the Newfoundland Journal of
Commerce remarked that 1957was a "year of decision for the new industries." The
Journal appeared to have the insidetrackon what washappening, noting the program
"wil undoubtedly haveto be cut backbecause it [the government] can no longerpwnp
money, like blood, intotheveinsof industries..."!10Strikebound NewfowxllandTanneries,
theJournal wrote, wasnotpayingits way, and thepaperpredicted "the strike maybethe
excuse the government needsat thistimeto wipeout the industry."SI The era of plant
constructionwasat an end,with eventhe German technical help at mostof the plants
having left Newfoundland.
In the early fall of 1957, Smallwood began releasing the Little findings in dribs and
drubs. The reports prepared by the Little company gavedetailed accounts of how the
various industrieswerefaring. But Smallwood did notreleasetheactualaccounts. Instead,
he took carefully selected parts of the surveys and madethose public with his own
7Il Financial Post.June 29, 1957, Vol.5l, pp. 59-60
1'1 Ibid
1lO Newfoundland Journal of Commerce. "1957 - Year of Decision for 'New
Industries"'. VoI.XXIV. NO.8. August 1957. p.ll
81 Ibid
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commentary, Smalls...codreported thatoverall. thesurveypointed towardII"bright future
for some; others not so rosyandmay need morefinancial aid."Kl
It is instructiveto differentiate between Smallwood's accountafthe Little survey andthe
survey itself.On the Hanning Electric Company bertery plant on Topsail Road, the
Evening TelegramquotedSmallwood lIS sayingthe report gavethe plant "3 very good
reference".BJ The Financial Post wrote:
Economic production would be 20,0Ju batteries annually, which the
company has notyet reached. The financial success lies in reaching this
output. In the meantime, it may be necessary for the goVemrrtl.'tl.t to
advance a modest amount of working capital to keep theconcem going
until a morepennanentarrangement is made.Sol
The report itself was moreto the point: it urged that theplant be leased to a major
Canadianbatterymanufacturer "for a minimumof fiveyearsat a rentalthatcould beas
lowas $1 peryear if necessary..."" A draftreport to the govenuncnt six monthsearlier
(this predated Smallwood's announcement that the government hadengagedthe Little
fum) wasevenmore blunt:
Hanning Electric Companylimited is in default in its obligationto the
Newfoundland Govemment...Although the plant with minor equipment
modifications hasa productive capacity of 50,000 batteriesperyear, total
unit sales in 19S6were only 3,312. The low sales are due to the limited
replacement battery market in Newfoundland and the severecompetition
in that market.56
S2Financial Post,November 30, 1957, Vol.Sl. p.25
13 Evening Telegram, November 2, 1957. p.3
SolFinancialPost,November 30, 1957, Vol.51.p.25
e "Conclusions", ArthurD.Little,Inc.Surveyof Hanning ElectricCompany Limited,
1957. p.l
• DraftReport onHanning Electric, ArthurD. Little,Inc.March31, 1957
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"[be droll repo rt alsosaid the plantwasovermanned for its production levelandthat
productionbelow 20,000 batteriesa year "is not economicallyjustifiable"."
The samepattern of interpretation followed with little's assesment of other industries.
TheFinancial Post, relyingon Smallwood's comments aboutNorthStarCementinComer
Brook, wote ,
TechnicalexpertsfromtheUS\\he examined the plant report it is a fine
enterprise with an excellent future.88
TheLittlesurvey was morebrutal in its assessment, stating theplant"is not adequately
protected by known proven deposits of limestone the plantis too smal to produce
cementat costs competitive 10 those oflargerplants theplantisgeneraly overmanned..."
And the report carried a warningfor the government on the security of its overall
investment, noting "the currentlevelof profitability of NorthStarshouldpennit at least
part of the interestpayments due the province.v'"
Little recommended threeof the plantsbeclosed:NewfoundlandTanneries; GoldSail
LeatherGoods;andAtlanticGloves. In addition, it recommended thehardwoods division
of Newfoundland Hardwoods be closed and that Koch Shoes be closed unless the
government could finda company to leasethe operation. The survey recommended the
lWOtextile mills in St. John's be merged.
The surveywas especially hardon the Conception Bay leather industries. callingtheir
practices severely into question and in the process, threatening the government's goalof
establishing the area as an industrial centre. "The major product of the tanneryhasbeen
ungraded hockey bootleather" theLittle surveyreported, noting thattransportation costs
tor rowmaterials andfmished product represented the equivalentof a 25-40% penaltyin
sellingpricewhencompared to mainland tanneries." Thereportconcluded"out-of-pocket
losses" for t956 wereestimatedat morethan$100,000, notincludingdepreciation interest
or repayment of government loans.
H7 lbid, p.2
!Ill Financial Post, November30, 1957,p2
IN "Conclusions", LittleSwveyon NorthStarCement, 1957 p.l.
'KI "Conclusions", LittleSurveyon NewfoundlandTanneries, 1957 p.l
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The story\\IDSequally gloomyonAtlnnticGloves. In 1956. gloves\\\.TC sold forooc...third
of the manufacturing cost. the survey found. The company was "res tricted to the
production ofsportgloves". a small partof the glovemarket. Littlereported the trendwas
toward fabric gloves. andthat even if the company captured 1()O'l/o of the spot-glove
market in Canada(the report estimated the company "maysupply :IS muchas 180/0...''].
it would still operate at only half capacity, According to Little. lhrc factors would
preclude the company frombecomingprofitable or merely breaking 1."VCn. including the
highcostot'rawmaterials,management'sweakness in both productionandmarketing.und
"the inflexibility of an unecooomic tannery."?'
The surveywas no morekind to theglovefactory'scommercial neighbour. Gold Sail
leather Goods. Gold Sail produced an $8 handbag, but Little concludedthat with most
of the Neurfoundlandmarketdominatedbythe sale of imitation leathernndplastic bags
retailing for under $6, Gold Sail would be forced to market outsidethe province\\h~TC
it "cannotcompete effectively..." An additional handicap wasthe lackof originaldesigns,
a major shortcoming in the"lucrative, high-fashion, exclusive-shopbusines." According
to the survey, Gold Sail's inability to produce original designs would' relegate the
company to copyingotherdesignsfeatured inpopular magazines. Forecasting continuing
losses, Little recommended the plant be closedandthe equipment sold,"
Gold Sail wasoperatedby Erwin Koch,theoperatorof a second leather-based industry
in Harbour Grace. Koch Shoes. The shoe factory fared slightly better than the other
leather industries: ~ 1e surveyconcluded it could operate economically if it increased
productionto 70,Ou<J pairs, limited Itself'tc10differentstyles (the companyat onetime
featured67 differentstyles), and loweredits prices. Newlbundland, the surveyargued,
could only take a small portion of the company's productioo. Thecompany's survival
therefore. would depend on substantial exports. Thesurvey concluded however. sucha
strategy would imposea majorchallenge, as even in exportingto the low end of the
Maritimes shoe market, transportation costswouldmake it difficultfor KochShoes to
compete with low-priced English imports. Thesurvey recommended the plantbe leased
to a new operator andthatthe company's wholly-owned subsidiary in Toronto - a retail
outlet named AristonShoesLimited- be sold"
The surveycamedown hard on the construction divisionof Newfowxllund Hardwoods.
which it claimedwas losing $1000a day, equivalent to an annual lossof $2000lbr each
9 1 "Conclusions", LittleSurvey on Atlantic Gloves.1957 p. I.
9'2 "Conclusions", Little Surveyon ~ld Sail Leather GoOOs, 1957 p.1
93 "Conclusions", Little Surveyon KochShoes. 1957 pp.l-Z.
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worker.It saidneitherthedoor, plywood,norflooring plantshadanyprofitpotential. The
plyw ood plant forexample, manufacturedplywoodfromimportedmahogany. Littlenoted
the North Amer icanmills weremoving awayfromthiskind of product.That,combined
with stitf competition from foreign companies with access to cheaper raw materials,
precludedcontinued production." Thebright spots inNewfoundlandHardwoods were two
unrelatedconcerns - the asphaltand creosote divisions. Both divisionswould later show
substantial profits • the creosoting divisionowing muchto the heavydemandforwooden
poles as the electrification programgainedmomentum in the 1960's, andthe asphalt
divisionbecause of demand emanating from the pavingof the TransCanadaHighway.
The Littlereportsconcluded therewasnoneedfor twotextile mills in St. John's. It called
for the mills to be consolidated, with resulting "important savings," in overhead In
addition to highoverhead, Little determined bothTerraNovaTextiles andUnitedCotton
Millssuffered from low productivity andsmall salesvolume. The survey saidoverhead
expensesat United CottonMills"asa percentage ofdirect-labour costs areapproximately
twice thoseof profitable US fums."95
ArthurD. Little,Inc. wasnot askedto comment on orevaluatetheentire industrialization
program,but its report amountedto a stinging rebukefor the thrust of the program.The
industriestootSmallwoodclaimedwouldsell to"allpartsof Canada,in theUnitedStates,
and in all partsof the world" 'Here, accordingto the Littlesurvey, barely able to compete
in Newfoundland Smallwood hadto put on his bravest politicalfacejo proclaim in the
wake of the survey that someof the industries would have a "bright" future. Some of
them (North Star Cement, Atlantic Gypsum and Koch Shoes) went throughvarious
transformations and remain in business as privateconcerns. It would take an indepth
economicstudy however, to determine whetherthe publicinvestment in those concerns
resultedin gainsor lossesto theTreasury.
Smallwoodwas not anxiousto release theLittlesurveyto thepublic.Severalmonthsafter
he addressed theresults of the first surveys in public, a Conserverive l\1HA, Augustine
DuilYasked that the surveys be tabled in the legislature. Smalwood'sreply was an
emphaticno.
Does he thinksincerely that the fulland intimate detailsof all costsand
all otherbusiness secrets,contracts, prices,conunissions of the NorthStar
'U "Conclusions". Little Surveyon Newfoundlam Hardwoods, 1957 p.l
Q$"Conclusions", LittleSurveys of UnitedCottonMills andTerraNovaTextiles, 1957
p.l
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CementCorrpcny should be handed over 10 otherCement Companies
across Cmada....' '6'
DuffY hadhis ann suspicioos why Ihereportswerebeingkepi underwraps, accusing
Smallwood of pickingout "what he wants to rrake public". DullY ch:rgcdthat if the
reports weremadepublic.. "therewooldbe coosiderable nancning out of the e.'CtT.J.vo~
loans lha1 were going on -"I Indeed.Table I OUllines theseriously deficient position of
all the companies relativeto their 10l:l1. repayments.
Table I does not take intoaccount theinterest thatwas forgiven on loonsin thefirst two
yearsof the program Neitherdo thesefigurestake intoaccount interestwrittenoff by
thegovernment duringthis period, norinterestpaymentsdelayed Wltilthe thirteenth and
fourteenth years as a result of the October 1953 decision by the govenunent.
AsTable2 shows, by the early 1960's. mostof the plantshadbeenclosedor comeunder
new management. Newfoundland's post-Confederation experiment with government-
flnenced manufacturing finns had rome to an end. Smallwood was now focusing on
naturalresource development. Muchofthisattention wasdirectedtowardU1brndor where
huge deposits of iron ore would giverise to thetowns of 1...abralb' City andWabush.
Smallwood alsowent in search of capital to developl...ahrador's hydro potential. Around
!hecoastlineofNewfoundlandandLabrador,!he fIShery continuedtobe!he lifebloodthol
sustainedhWldreds of small andmediwn-sizedcommunities andtowns.
.. Proceedings,January24, 195~ p.65
~ Proceedings,January24, 1958. p.66
TABLE I
Principal andInterest Owingon NewfoundlandGovernment-Guaranteed Loans
on March 31, 1958
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alIlPANY Principll Owingon PrincipW'lnlertSt
Man:h31, 1958 Owing on Mlreh 31, 1958
A. Adlerof Canada Ltd. $ 820,000.00 $ 891,875.72
AtlanticFilmsand $ 200,000.00 $ 248,301.36
Electronics Ltd.
Atlantic Gloves l td. $ 845,352.00 $ %7,780.97
AtlanticGypswn Ltd $ 1,613,062.59 $ 1,613,062.59
Atlantic Hardboards Ltd. $ 1,545,600.00 $ 1,830,705.79
CanadianMachinery and $ 2,500,000.00 S 3,094,013.65
Industry Construction
Eckhardt KnittingMills s 987,600.00 $ 1,103,399.72
Gold Sail Leather Goods $ 220,000.00 $ 256,352.17
HanningElectricCo.Ltd. $ 645,000.00 $ 760,358.90
KochShoesLtd. $ 1,414,075.38 $ 1,613,401.61
NewfOundlandHardwoods $ 4,367,217.13 $ 4,367,217.13
Newfoundland Tanneries s 752,208.00 $ 879,618.39
North StarCement Ltd $ 4,740,000.00 s 5,508,156.26
Superior Rubber Co. Ltd. $ 1,600,000.00 s 1,931,393.73
TerraNovaTextiles $ 533,840.00 $ 595,379.62
United Cotton Mills $ 581,699.71 $ 681,415.59
$23,365,654.81 $26,442,433.20
SOURCE: Documents inFile 3.08.064. JRSCollection.
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TABLE 2
Companies Started UnderIndustrialization Planand Status
UlMPANY 0I'mID SfAlliS
A. Adler of Canada Ltd. 1956 Closed 1960
Atlantic Filmsand 1953 Closed 1980's
Electronics Ltd.
Atlantic GlovesLtd. 1954 Closed 1957
Atlantic Gypsum Ltd. 1952 Still in operation.
Privately owned,
Atlantic HardboardsLtd. 1952 Closed
Canadian Machinery and 1952 Closed 1980's after
Industry Construction Ltd. being operated for
severalyearsby
private company
Eckhardt Knitting Mills Ltd 1955 Closedearly 1960's
GoldSail Leather Goods 1957 Closed 1960
Hanning Electric Co. 1953 Closed 1958
Koch ShoesLtd 1953 Still in operation as
Terra NovaShoes.
Privately owned
Newfoundland Hardwoods 1952 Closed 198~s
Ltd
North StarCement Co. 1952 Still inoperation.
Privately owned
Superior Rubber Co. 1953 Closed 1956
Terra NovaTextiles 1954 Sold to private
interests inearly
1960's, Closed 1986
UnitedCotton Mills 1952 Same as Terra Nova
Textiles
NewfoundlandTanneries 1952 Closed1957
SOURCE:Royal CommissiononEmployment andUnemployment (1986) Chapter 2,p.8
andJRSCollection.
64
CONCUJSION
In its report to the Peckford Conservative govemment in the mid-1980's., the Royal
Commission on Employment and Unemployment likened the 1950's program to the
development driveof the late 19th century,with the samedisastrous results. It conceded
that while the 1950's program "succeeded to a limited degree", it demonstrated "the
mainland model with its urban-industrial thrust was adopted as the only desirable
development mode", leaving the traditional economy"neglectedv"
Political leadersof Smallwood's statureoften get the chanceto explain their actions in
their memoirs. Inhis account of'the progrnm,Smallwood appeared struck by the criticism
ofhis attempt at lndustr ializstion. "Weputa totalof about$50millionaltogether in those
plants..." he wrote in 1973, and while from "...a narrow, orthodox, private enterprise.
balance-sheet point of view,over halfof them havebeen losers...the fact is...theyhave,
taken asa whole,beena prof it-maker.':"Smalwoodclaimedthe industries put more than
$50 million backintothe economy in the fonn of wages and other disbursements, thus
sparing government the costof providing benefits to people who would otherwisehave
been unemployed.
HaroldHorwood concludedin~ "not all the money was wasted." He pointedto the
fourplants that "survived after a fashion. returning nothing to the government, butgiving
jobs to a few hundred people."loo Horwood referredto the program as "the Valdmanis
phase of economic development". Despite his thinly-veiled disdain for Valdmanis,
~d~=~S~~=:~~rsing a moratoriumon factory construction in 1952,
The real proof of the valueof such a massive investment insecondary manufacturing is
whether it changed the lot of Newfoundlends populationby openingup areasof new,
sustainedeconomicactivity. The Smallwood govemmenrs own economist, in a 1967
report inwhichSmalwoodwrotethe forward, concludednot muchhadchanged. ''There
can be little doubt that under-employment and unemployment have persisted with
'J8 Royal Commi:uiQo on Employment and! fnemployment Chapter2 - "In Searchof
Development:An HistoricalPerspective". S1.John's. 1985 p.7
qq Joseph R Smallwood. I ChoseCanada. Toronto:Macmillan. 1973. p.352
100 Horwood,p. 183
1111 Horwood, p. 184
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infuriating tenacity" hewrote. "despite heavypublicandprivateinvlSmcnts in industry
andinfrastructure."KC!
The popular legacyof the industrialiZ:Jlion drive of the1:1I:e 1950's is OIl: of failureand
ineptitude. What )'Olrl g Newfoundlanderor l...abrndcrian has noI beardwith 3pfXllpriatc
sarcasm,some variationof "that's another chocolate factory". (Tbc current versionof this
line is"that's arJOlher Sprung greenhouse". SJXUlg wasahydroponics gtl.'t:Mousclinanccd
underthePeckfordConservatives in 1987. But the timeit closedin 1989. the facilityhad
cost the NewfOl.l'Xiland govanment more than $20 million in loons and gr.mts. plus
interest.)
In the insular worldofNeo.vfoundland politics. it is oftensaidthat of all the peoplein the
world, Newtoundlanders alonewere imprudent enough to giveup self-governrncor (us
they did in 1933), or that Newfoundlandersalone weregullible CI10Ugh to go ulong with
Smallwood'splanfor industrialization, wastinga fortune in public fundsalong the way.
The reality though is that thereare many examples in Canadaandelsewhere , of small
political entities spendingmassive amounts of scarcepublic funds to try andsolve the
problemsof WKJerdevelopment
102 R l . McAllister. NewfQundland and [abmdor: The First Fifteen Yeaa of
l:.onfodmlion. St.JoIuis: Dicksand Company Limited, 1967. p.82
1l1C Case of NovaScotia's Illlustriai Estates
Umited
In September 1957, the newly elected Conservative government of NovaScotia under
Premier RobertStanfield.setout "...to encouragethe promotion,expansion,diversification
anddevelopmentof economic activity..." inthe province.I To achieve this goal, Stanfield
established IndustrialEstates Limited, a provincial crowncorporation modelledOIl the
British system of industrial estates.' Over the next fifteen years, IEL pursued
manufacturing firms around the world with the full backing of the Nova Scotia
gov ernm ent and the provincial treasury.
The early years of IEL's activity brought dozens of new industries to the province.
Protected from political barbsbyStanfieldandhis government, lEI..spent tensof millions
of'dollarsluringindustry to allregionsof the province. lEt' s firstPresident, FrnnkSobey
of supermarket fame, operated witha small staffandwithutmost secrecy. For 10years,
the public ofNova Scotiaseemedimpressed withthe resultsorIEL's work.Theyreturned
Stanfield witha 40-6seatmajority inthe 1967 general election. Butsoonafterthat,IEL's
massive investments in a high-fidelity stereo manufacturing company (Clairtone) and a
heavywaterplant (Deuteriwn) startedgoing bad. These investments resulted in a public
debate aboutIEL (onethe political opposition revelled in) thatwent to theheart of the
wayit did business.
The incentives NovaScotiaofferedbusiness weresubstantial. LikeNewfoundland, a high
levelof secrecysurroundedthe Nova Scotiaprogram. Andsimilarly, therewas little pre-
or post-projectassessment. Despite thosesimilarities, the NovaScotiaprogramdiffered
fromNe\vtbundland's in a couple of keyareas.IEL pursuedonly established companies
whereas Newfoundlandfunded new ones. The Stanfield government left it to the board
of IEL (comprised of the business elite of NovaScotia) to court business opportunities.
I Provinceof Nova Scotia."PrincipalAgreement Between Industrial Estates Limited
andthe Provincial Government", September 25, 1957. p.2
2 The NovaScotiaconcept involvedhavingIndustrial EstatesLimitedfinance and
build factories for industries locating to the province. The conceptallowedcompanies to
rent or enter into lease-purchase agreements. It also entailed financing equipment
purchases andarranging municipal tax concessions.
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This placed the government in the roleof banker whileStanlield OCCt.'P1cdthe "political
headaches".'
Overall however. despite failures that cost IEL millions of dollars. Nova Scotia
experienced a higherrateof successwith its industries thandid Newfoundland. JEL's
policy of dealing with alreadyestablished companies. provided at least a treasure of
protectionfor the Nova Scotiataxpayer. While tax concessions were extendedto all
companies and preferential rates of interestwere advanced to some, the programwas
operatedon a business-likebasisandcompanies wererequired to paybackwhattheyhad
borrowed. By contrast, the Newfoundland programadvanced millions of dollars to
enterprises that hadnocapital of their0\\11. With littleor none of their 0"," resources II
stake, the industrialistsattracted by the Newfoundland goverrunent appeared to bepoor
candidates for thejob of establishing and maintaining the industries that were financed.
This state of affairs alsocast seriousdoubton the Newfoundland government's goal of
recouping its investment by selling the companies to private investors. And unlike
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia extracted personal guarantees frominvestors, a move that
forcedbusinessto sharesome of therisk.Thatapproachwasdeemed to besuccessful,"
NovaScotia's approachto industrialdevelopment is not presented hereasa point-by-point
comparison to what happened in Newfoundland, A1 was stated above, it is similar in
some ways and different in others. The value in sketching the IEL programis that it
represents an attemptto deal withunderdevelopmentby a province that is similar to
Newfoundland in many ways.
By 1957, Nova Scotia wasa veteranof ninetyyearsinsidetheCanadian federation. Yet,
despitethesuggestionnearly a CCI1nuy beforethatthe Maritimes "would developintothe
workshop of the new dominion",s the promise was not realized. Indeed, the prevailing
sendmeu was that "Ontario and Quebec had been double-crossing them ever since
J James Bickerton. Nova Srotia. Qlawa and the Politics of Regional Deyelopment.
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press) 1990. p. 146
4 Roy E. George. The I ire andTimes or lndystrial Estates[ jmjted. (Halifax:Institute
of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University). PaperNo.93. 1974. p.4
S David Alexander. Atlantic Canada andConfedemtjon{Essays inCanadian Political
Economy]. CompiledbyEric W. Sager, LewisR.FischerandStuartO. Pierson. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press). Published in association with Memorial University of
Newfoundland. 1983. pp. 50-5\
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1~67...imposingtariff, trade. transportation, political and financial policiesto milk the
Maritimes and crush localindustry."~ Whenit came10coldeconomic statistics,Nova
Scotialaggedbehindthenation. Itspopulation wasin declinerelativeto thenation;it was
unableto close the gap on per capitapersonalincome (NovaScotia's was about three-
quartersof the Canadian average); and new investment in NovaScotiawas only half of
the nationalaverage," Theresultingpicturewasthat in the 11-year periodfrom 1940to
the inception of lEI.., NovaScotia'sGrossProvincial Product increased by 76 percent,
whileCanada'snational economy grewby 119 percent."
This was the set of circumstances that lay in wait for RobertLomeStanfieldwhen his
Conservative party cametopowerinNovaScotiain late 1956. Stanfield promisedduring
that campaignto do something to bringthe economy around. He spokeof settingupa
NovaScotiaDevelopment Corporation. although"hehadnopreciseideaofwhat it would
be or do..."'1 Theagencythateventually got launched wasIndustrial EstatesLimited,a
em"," companythatwasto be startedwithgovenunent-guarnnteed loansof $12·million.
It wasbelievedIELwouldeventually builda creditratingthatwouldallow it to borrow
itsown funds.'OIELneverdidborrowlong-term funds on itsown,although itsauthorized
borrowinglimiteventually reached $200-million in 1971.1L
Therearc manysimilaritiesbetween IELandearliereffortsbytheSmallwood government
to increaseindustrial activity. Fortheseandotherreasons,itis instructive to lookat what
happened in both provinces.
In an overall way, Newfoundland and Nova Scotiainterfered in their economies in a
majorway to II)' and increase the level of economic development
6 Harry Broce. Frank$oh:,v' The Mm and the Empire. (Toronto: Macmillanof
Canada)1985. p.242
7 Nova ScotiaVoluntary Planning Board.FirstPlan err FronomicDeyeloprnent 10
.l.26ll. February1966.pp.24-25
8 Bickerton, p,98
'J Bruce.p.245
LOGeorge, p.2S
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Theestablishment ofl lil, in Nova Scotia andthe policies pursuedby thegovernment in
Newfoundland were proofthat responsibility for the grunting ofbusiness incen tives was
beingtransferred fromthe municipal level of government to theprovinciallcvel. Prior to
1930. it was common formunicipalities 10 extend help in the formof "grants. loans.bond
guarantees, landgifts,W1d taxexemprions.v"Afterthe Depression. this kindof economic
inducementwas seenas the properroleof tileprovinces, as wasevidencedinthe growing
munberof provincial loanagencies dedicated to financingeconomic development,U
There were somekey differences betweenthe approach taken by lEL and that followed
by Newfoundland. Perhaps the two most important differences relate to the type of
industrytheypursuedandthe involvement of political leaders in thetwoprovincesin the
runningof their industrial programs.
fEL was interested in attracting established, secondary manufacturing firms, thereby
staying away from financing new companies. (Even this approach however, did not
preventthe loss of S7o-million in the spectacular collapseof Clairtcne andDcuteriwn.)
Thegoal was to assist existing industries that did not compete with firms already in
business,not to propup "ailing industries."!" Indeedthe first chairman oriEL's board-
supermarket magnate FrankSobey, openly said IEL "should neveraccept a client with
insufficient capitalto nul a business andrepay its debt,"! Quitethe oppositewastrue in
Newfoundland, whereSmallwoodandValdmanis appearedto besearchingoutknow-how.
ratherthanpeople with deeppockets andabundantbusiness acumen. Andalthough the
govenunent's policyin Newfoundland wasto lend moneyto theplants it started, these
became de facto grants, sinceonly a tiny percentage of the moneywaseverrepaid. By
contrast, Nova Scotia was more vigilantwith its "loans only" policy, and it was
committed to lending money solely to companies that demonstrated an acceptable
independent capitalbase.Buteventhis ironcladpolicywaschangeable if thepotential
catch was a major one. Consequently, the "loans only" policy was alteredon two
occasions in the mid-1960's to allow IELto invest directly in two big new clients -
Clairtone andDeuteriwn.
12 Atlantic ProvincesEconomic Council. The Atlantic Er.onomy- (Seventh Annual
Review)October 1973. p.19[This document willbereferredto as APEC in later citations
in thispaper.]
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Frank Sobey presided over IEL's boardduring "...the GoldenYears", a time "when
successfollowedsuccess"and "...whenit seemed everythingIELtouchedwasturning into
glitteringnew enterprises...,,16 IELcarried on itsrole with littlegovenunent interference.
"Wewouldhave nopolitical discussionswithany members of thegovernment, with the
exceptionof Mr. Manson", (a cabinet minister and thegovernment appointee on lEL's
boardof directors) Sabeysaidyearslater.11Justto makesure thegovenunent understood
its role, ground rules wereestablishedearly in IEL's mMdate about announcements
regarding new industries wheretheagency\\'<IS involved. Theagreement was that lEL,
not the government, wouldmakeall such announcements, andthen only after all the
paperwork WdS clone.18 This was very much different from y.{wt had happened in
Newfoundland, where Smallwoodwas front and centre of every effort to land new
industry. Mmy of the Newfoundlandindustries wereannounced far in advanceof their
beingestablished. In the caseof someindustries., such asthe machinery plant at Octagon
and the textile mill in SL John's, Smallwood's public pronouncements dramatically
overstatedboth thesize of'iheindustriesand thenwnberof peoplewhowould findwork.
TheNovaScotia strategy was basedon a package of incentives, including the provision
of land, custom-builtfactories and productionmachincty at attractive ratesof interest. A
company takingadvantage of lELassistance could receiveup to tOO percentof thecost
of landandbuildings, eitherthrougha lease-purchasearrangement or a loan.Firmscould
alsogetloans for60 percent to coverthecostof buyingmachinery (someloanswent as
highas 80 percent,") Interest wascharged at the rate the NovaScotiagovcnunent was
paying. plus a small percentage to cover the govenunent's borrowing costs.Thiswas
considered an attractivefeature, sincetheNovaScotiagovenuncnt couldborrow at lower
retes of interest thancouldprivatecompanies from thebanks.XI Somefirms,automobile
tiremanufacturerMichelin wasan example, got a discountratefromIEL.In Michelin's
case. IELloaned the firm$50million for twentyyearnat 3 1/2 percentbelow whatIEL
neededto cover itscost, a subsidythatwould cost NovaScotia$30 millionover thelife
16 Industrial Estates Limited.Annual Report. 1982. p.4
17 Broce,p.248
18 Ibid,p.248
19 APEC. p.44
M George, p.26
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of the agreement." As if this wasnot enough to entice firms, or perhaps as an example
of what was necessaryto get thejob done,municipalities werepermitted tooffer SICCP
discounts in their tax rates to businessesassisted by IEL. Manymunicipalities wereonly
100 eager to help out, proof that the evolution of business incentives from local to
provincial governments, wasonly partway complete. Takentogether, the Nova Scotia
packageconstitutedan ettractiveoffer forbusiness. havingthe effect of spreading tow
capitalcosts overmany years,therebysubstantiallyreducingthe costof doingbusiness.
The strategy raisedan imponantquestion- if somethingwas goodforIELand good 10..
busines, did that necessarily mean it wasgood for the NovaScotia taxpayer? The first
=~~m:f:r:~~~::~~~~l~:~~~i:~::=:t=~~~ ~
He referredto the package of inducements offeredby IELas "the bait", andwrotethat
of the Tl plants fmanced through to the early 1970's, 56 (73 percent) were still in
business.The 21 (27 percent) that failed however, represented41 percent of the 101111
investmentby lEt underthe program." Thehuge loses atOairtone andDcuteri.wn in the
late 1960'swouldleadto intensescrutinyofl EL, a majorchangefromthewaytEL was
perceivedand treated in its first decade. Inthoseyearn, critics were silenced bothby the
apparent accomplishments at tELand theagency's penchantfor secrecy.
Starting in 1960,IEL began to generate positiveheadlines !hatcontinued unabated for the
next several years. Thebusinesspress wasonto thestory of whatwashappening inNova
Scotia. IEL builtsix plantswithelevenmoreunderway, enoughfortheFinancial Postto
proclaim IEL hadbeen transformed "...from a fledglingaown corporation to a sturdy
agency for the promotionof secondary industryin Nova Scotia."24
The six plants tEL hadalready financed included an Italian knitwear firm at Pictou,a
boat andfurniturefactoryat Digby, an electronics company at Dartmouth, a ship repair
business at Lunenburg, and a woodproducts plant at Springhill.2S This was just the
"Ibid, p.l06
" Ibid, p.121
2J Ibid, p.76
24 Financial Post, January2, 1960. p.2
25 Ibid, p.2
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beginninghowever, as fEL's team literallybegan travelling theglobe,sellingbothNova
Scotiaand its industrial assistance program.
The chief salesman. was Robert Manuge,who earned the title "Nova Scotia's globe-
trottingsuper-salesman"," Manuge wasreputedtohavetravelled tw . millionmiles on
IELbusiness, making "as manycallsas hecould without collapsing. .."v
IELtypicallysent out lettersto firmsexplaining itsrole andthe assistance it could offer.
Therewasnothingextraordinary in that, for, as in mostbusinesses, salesmenfollowedup
thoseletters with personal calls. Four years after its inception however, lEI.. got some
"big-time" assistance when it namedan advisoryboard, "an imemotional network of
highly placedhluenose old boysto givethe agencyprestige, advice. infonnation, and
sometimes an t:nlree."uThese "old boys"were in some of thetop positions inCanadien
andUScorporations. It appearstheywere required asmuchfor their high-level contacts
and 'door-opening' skillsas theywere forbusinessadvice.
The whole Cannula - the flnanclal inducements, NovaScotia'sgrowing credibility with
business, thepeople IELsent calling>allseemed 10work. Theearly to mid-1960's was
a period of breath-takingexpansion, necessitating thegovenunent toexpand lEL's capital
baseonseveral occasions.'?It seemedtheprovince's "cracksales and promotionalteam"
wastrying to drumup a new image forNova Scotiaas well as new business. "We are
tiredof beingpictured lIS a provinceof fishermenandunemployedminers", the deputy
ministerof Finance andIndustry said. "Theonlytimepeoplehearofourprovince is when
~t~nks~;~:n:==~~~:f~~~~Oy~:~~ye. having
26 George,p.31
21 Bruce, p.266
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By 1% 3, IEL \VDS going into high gear. In that year, it reached agreemen t with the
Swedish carmnnufacturer Volvo.rocstablish anassembly plant atDartmouth. TheVolvo
opening by PrinceBerti!of Swedenwasseenbysome 3S more than the1I"k.'I'C WTival of
another firm. "It served as Q signaltoother internationalcorporate giants," l-liUl)'Bruce
wrote, "and they cameto NovaScotiathick andlast."n The carpetmanufacturerCrossley
Karnstan settled in Truro. the Reynoldscan factory cameto Dartmouth, CanadaCement
waslocatedat Brookfield, and Deuteriwn was tobuild a heavywater plantat GlaceBay.
The attraction of new industry earned accolades both for lEL and PremierRobert
Stanfield. Maclean's wrote that given certain machinations with John Diefeebaker's
leadership of the federal Conservative Party, "then the next leader of the federal
Conservatives will likely be the bony Premier of NovaScotia, Robert L. Stanfield."))
Inthe wake of such accomplislunents, lEt appeared untouchable, The Volvo arrival at
Dartmouth "had silenced allbutthe most partisanoraxe-grindingoftEL'scritics", ).I Still.
thosegoldendaysof 1963 sowedtheseedsforlaterscrutinyoftbe waylEt did business
andit wouldpavetheway forthe departure of its first President,FrankSobey.
Therewaselationin thewholeof Nova Scotiawhenthe province emerged the winner in
the 1963sweepstakes to builda heavy waterplantto meet the 11O..".ds ofAtomic Energy
of Canada's nuclearreactors in Canada and abroad Nova SCotia got theplantaftera
political battleagainstintereststhatsupportedasite in WesternCanada, and withthehelp
ofa risingCape Bretonstar in national politics, Allan MacEachen.
Theheavy water plant was to be built at Glace Bay in economically-depressed Cape
Breton, ata costof$30 million, andfinanced with$12million fiomIEL(its firstventure
intoequity financing), an amount thatrepresented about 40 percentof the cost. The
remaining capital would be raisedbyDeuteriumCorporation of NewYork. Us president,
JeromeSpevack, hadpioneeredtheconcept ofusing salt waterto produce heavyweer.
Salt waterfrom the Atlantic would wind its waythroughmilesof stainless steel piping
at the newplant, and through a process that involved mixingihe water wi th hydrogen
sulphide gas, andtakingthe water through several hot andcold stages,heavy waterwould
)2 Bruce,p.2n
33 Maclean's, November 16. 1963-
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be prodccd." Thatwasthe plan. But in reality. Deuterium washeadedfortrouble.The
snit watertechnologySpcvack had pioneered "corroded thepipesand otherequipment,
rendering the plantinoperable."J6 Spcvack deniedsaltwaterwac; thecauseoftheproblem.
but eventually, he wasoustedas president of Deuterium of CanadaLimited(DeL). lEL
put SIS·million more into theplant since OCr.. was unable to raise its share of the
capital. Costs keptmounting.andby thelime theplantproduced its firstdrum of heavy
water in 1976. the pricetag hadclimbed to $250 million.The NovaScotiagovernment
tookover fEL's investment in the plant andinvestedevenmoremoneyof itsO\\TI. Ther
investment amounted 10 $135millionby thetime the plant opened. In addition to that,
AtomicEnergy of Canada Limited (AECL) hadto spend$95 million to refurbish the
GlaceBay facility. in order to be sparedthe alternative >a 5135millionpricetag fora
new plant.
The Deuteriumdebacledemonstrated theshoncomingafthe policyof maintaininga smal
staffat lEI..andtheapparent absence of expertise within the provincial civilservice to
assessriskssuchas thoseinherent in investing tensof millionsofdollarsina heavywater
plant.
There is disagreement about whether IEL hadever wanted to become involved in the
heavy water project.JamesBickerton claimstheprojectwas "dumped" on IEL "because
theprovincialgovernment hadnoneof therequisite negotiatingor management expertise
\..ithin the ranks of its own bureaucracy.v" RoyGeorge claims however, thatwhilethe
Nova Scotia government played a prominent rolein bringing the projectto theprovince.
"influential IEl directorswereveryactivein setting upanddirectingthe projectandthe
IEL boardwasobviouslyeagerto be involved."ll
Management of the project\';35 anotherquestion. Howcould an originalS12 million
NovaScotia investment balloonto morethantentm ''l3tmuch? Georgeclaimed it was
100 simplistic to placeall the blameon design faults, since$100 million hadbeen spent
by the timethoseflawswerediscovered," morethan threetimes theoriginalestimateof
lS Philip Mathias.~ (Toronto: JamesLewisand Samuel, Publishers)
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the cost."IEL must shoulderthemajor responsibility" hewrote, "since IEL nominated its
own directors to till the majority of seats and therefoo: hadthepower to control 311
activities..:'''l
Unfortuoarelv for IEl endtheNo\-a Scotia 2O\"emrnent, Deaerium wac; not the only
industry cauSing problems. Clairtone- a highfidelil)' stereomanufacturing ccrrpeny- W:l<;
enticedto move from Ontario to Stel1arton with neerlv S8million in thefonnof an IEL
guarantee. Therroveto Nova Scotia brought600oo~ jobs."The mood everywhere was
jubilation". wrote G3nhHopkins in hisbookon Clalrtore ," E\'er)'\\bere.. it seemed. but
in Onlario. wherenewspapereditorialists wondered ifthatprovince wasbeginningto lose
its preeminent industrial stans to NovaScctia..u
Nova Scotia paid a steep price to get Clainone. Along with the loan guarantee. IEL
waivedinterestfor threeyearson theloanpayback. The agency alsobuilta newplant for
Clairtone and the company benefitted from a SI million "sealing-in" bonus. Federal
regional development incentives were also a part of the picture, including a three-year
federal taxholiday andaccelerated depreciation on Ciairtone'splant andbuildings:" And
there was more: Clairtonewould benefit from a 3(}.percmt frciglt subsidyunder the
MaritimeFreight Rate Act: it lookadvantage of federal grantsto train itsworkforce: Jnd
it receiveda reduced municipal tax rare for ten years..w
At first, thehugepublic investment in Clainonc: append to pay off.Theresultsfor 1966
weregood.asthecompan)-Jssales"roseby more thanfortypercentandprofitsmorethan
doubled.~~ But 1967 andsubsequent yearsprovedtobedisastrous. Lossesin 1967, 196&,
1969 and 1970 were S6.7 millioa, $9 million. 53 millicn, aOO S7million respectively..16
.I() [bid. 1'.84
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The losses in 1967 promptedClairtoneto go backto IELfor more capital to sustainits
operations. IEL, concerned both about the lossesand with Clairtone's move into the
colour television business, set a stringent condition - the $2 millionClairtone requested
would only be granted if the company's OWTIerssurrenderedcontrol. For Clairtone, it was
either that arrangement or bankruptcy. ln August 1967, control of the companywas
handedoverto IEL. HarryBroceconcluded "Ia hadbought a bummer"."Clairtonewas
closedin 1972. By thattime.theNovaScotiagovernment hadbought the companyfrom
IEL and alongwith it, $26 million in debt,"
The problemswith Clairtone broughtabouta periodof intensescrutiny of IEL and its
wayof doing business. Therewas the question of whether IEL forced Clairtooe into
manufacturing colourtelevisionsets. Orwas it theprovincial cabinet thatforcedCJairtone
intothe colourtelevision manufacturingbusiness, inorderto getthe company to abandon
plansto build an assembly plant for Japanese automobiles at the fonner Point Edward
naval base on Cape Breton Island? Whoever promotedthe scheme. the decision to
manufacture colourtelevisions wasa disaster. And it affected morethan Clairtone. The
moveto colourtelevisionbroadcasts in late 1965did not result in the expected massive
~u;~n:no:~=~~t~i;~tg~~~"h~~:~~~;~lp~~~~~~~=Z~I~:'~~
ended1966 with morethan$3 millionworthofcoloursetsthat nobodyseemedto want. so
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Whateverthe reasons forthe failure at Clairtone, andthehuge costoverrunsat theheavy
water plant. the episodesfocusedattentionon IEL's methodof operation. It wasbecoming
more fashionable to criticize tEL These criticismsseemed10carryextraweightnowthat
the agency had invested in a coupleof heavy-dutyfailures.
It was FrankSobeysjob to defendIEL in the faceof thegathering storm, Speaking to
a hearing of the IndustryCommitteeof the legislaturein March and April of 1969.Sobey
held firmthatdespite the"recent troubles" at Clairtcne, therewas no reason for lEL to
changethe way it did business.51But the political landscape hadchanged in Nova Scotia
with RobertStanfield's moveto Ottawato take on the federal Conservative leadership.
In Nova Scotia, the Liberals under Gerold Reganwere on the WdY to deposingthe
Conservatives. Sobeyhimselfwould leave IEL that fall.
lACK OF AN INDUSllUALS1RA1F.GY
One of the maincriticismslevelledat IELwas thatit lackedanindustrialization strategy.
The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC)claimedthispolicyvoid allowedIEL
to focuson attracting bigoutside firmsto thedetriment oflocal industry.55 AlthoughJEL
was empoweredto promote secondary industry, APEC claimed "no onehaseverrelined
the early guidelines to an industrial strategy". APEC felt that weakness resultedin a
failureto assessthe kindof industry "whichcouldmakethe most beneficial contribution
to the province's overall development'w ln the absenceof such a strategy, "the ideasof
successive managers, ministers and boardsof directors could determine its direction?"
IEL's objectiveswerevnriouslyexpressed in tennsof increasing employment or creating
jobs at minimum cost,and"only occasionally, havemorethoughtful and sophisticated
objectivesbeen stated.,,58
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Critics claim this weakness brought about an "ad hoc, promotion-oriented approach" to
attractingbusiness to NovaScotia." Theypoint to pressreportsofchancemeetingswith
industrialiststhat led to plants being establishedin the province. Muchwas made of one
such meetingaboard an airplanein December 1967between IELgeneral managerRobert
Manugc and the wife of a Frenchautomobilemanufacturing executive. The meeting
eventually led to a contactwith the tire makerMichelin. and the establishment of two
plants inNovaScotia," (Michelin has since added a third plant.)Another story wastold
uf a chance meeting on a JapanAirlinesflight from Tokyoto Hong Kong, where Manuge
was said to have "charmed Indian industrialist GovindJolly into establishing...a $30-
million hardboard manulhcturingplant..."61 APEC was unimpressed by these 'chance'
meetings and concluded, "the legends of chancemeetings on airplanes...are fascinating.
but they do not indicate a rational approach to industrialization."62
Similar criticism could have beenaimedat Smallwood's industrialization strategy.While
there wereno legends about chancemeetings withwealthyindustrialists inairplanes,there
was ncar total relianceon thecontactsAlfredValdmanismade inEurope.Thisprecluded
any kindof systematic identificationof industrythat wouldbesuitableforNewfoundland
Such an approach, in combination with the lackof follow-up on me various industries,
was a recipe for the disaster that it became.
Both the Newfotuldland program and IEL in Nova Scotia operated with a smail
bureaucratic staff. Georecwrotethat this was"attributable to a deliberatepolicy" in the
early daysat tEL The agency was of the viewthat"technical personnel...will beengaged
as necessary." By 1968,the corporation's staff consisted of twelve people, "of whom
about halfweresccreteries.v" Therewasa feelingthough,thatIELdid not utilizeenough
outside technicalhelp to work throughthe detailsof thevariousprojects it was financing.
APEC complainedthe lackof staff "limited IEL'sability to performdetailed evaluations
of the proposals it receives"and that this impairedits abilityto follow up applications it
S9 Bickerton. p.237
60 David E. Osborn. "Michelin Tires ManufacturingCo. of CanadaLtd" in M1rkC.
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accepted?' Theseweaknesses, according to APEC, put"01greatdeal of responsibility on
the board of IEL10 use itsbusiness acumento supplement staffnnalysis."1>!1 In the case
of'the heavy waterplant at Glace Bayand concernsaboutwhetherthe technologywould
work. IEL especially, WIlS considered to be in over its head, giventhat "...I~ewpeople
understood the process..." b/i Evenwhenexpertisewasavailable,IEL appeared reluctant
to utilize it since "departments of the Nova Scotia civil serviceand other gcvemmera
agencieswhich did have some capability were never utilized becauseof personality
clesbes.v"
The small staff allowedIEL to cart)' out its businesswithgreatsecrecy, at leastuntil the
agencywasreadyto trumpetthe nextnew industryfor Nova Scotia Thechief reason for
the insistenceon secrecywasFrankSobey, who"believedonlyfools babbledabouta deal
till it was in the bag."68 But the penchant for secrecy could exacta dear price in an
agencywhose enabling legislation alloweddirectorsandprovincialpoliticians an interest
in companies IEL did business with. so long as the directors abstainedfrom taking an
activepart in thosediscussions. In the late 1960's, therewererumours lEL directors used
agency funds for their own benefitfR Comingat thetime of the Clairtoneand Deuterium
f lascos, the rumours servedto undermine public confidence in IEL at a time whenthe
agencydearly needed public empathy. Havingtight-lippedbusinessmen in chargemight
have seemed a geed idea in the early 1960's when therewas lots of praise for IEL, but
it seemed to be at odds later that decade when the need arose for IEL to explain its
investments in Clairtoneand Deuterium. This difficulty was demonstrated in Fronk
Sobey'sanswer to a questionaboutClairtonein 1967. "...I'm not interested in talking to
any reporterswho are tryingto deter and hurtdevelopment inNovaScotia", he said, "we
can let the Torontopeople do that."'70
FrankSobeyleftIEL in September 1969. Toconfront the gatheringstormabout lEI.., and
no doubt to try andremovethe agencyas an issue in the comingelection. PremierOJ .
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Smith appointed television station ownerFinlayMacDonald to the top job at IEL. The
FinancialPost reponed "FinlayMacDonald'sappointment has beenseenas a victoryfor
the agency's critics.., " 71
MacDonald seemedto be saying the right things. HeacknowledgedIEL could do with
a moresystematic approach to development - including conducting studies"on the types
of industries that Nova Scotiacould sustain". AndMacDonald lamentedthat "becauseof
the absenceof research resources, IELhas beenobligedto usea shot-gunepprcech."?
lt mighthave beencnoughof a confession10allowIELto survivewhentheLiberalstook
over the government in October 1970. Under the Liberals. IEL's mandatewas even to
include "all industrial attraction activities inthe provoce.v"This enhanced role included
small business loansin theprovince,an areabothAPEC74 andGeorge" consideredto be
seriousoversights underIEL's original mandate.
IEL's last big projects werethe Michelin tire plantsat Bridgewater and Granton. The
plantsdid notcome cheapas IEL provideda $50 millionlow-interestloan" and later, a
$14.3 million loanat the"current" rate. TheNovaScotiagovernment granted moneyfor
capital worksandassistance for worker training.Inaddition, municipalitiesprovidedland
and slashed their tax rates. The federal goverrunent assistedtoo, with $l~million in
regionaldevelopment grunts, tariffconcessions on Michelin tiresimported into Canada
fromaboard for threeyearsand "quickwrite-offs were allowed on capital investment."
Georgesuggested that abouttwo-thirds of the$15Q-million costforthetwoplantswould
be public money." Duringthe late 1980's,Michelin expanded to three plants in Nova
11 Financial Post, May2, 1970. p.A-6
n Ibid, p. A-6
7J Financial Post,June 19, 1971.p.38
74 APEC, p.46
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George quoted fromMichelin documents claimingfEL "felt committed" to the loon in
1968when theaverageborrowing rate for theNovaScotia government was6.05percent]
17 Ibid, pp.91-92
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Scotia, again with help from provincial taxpayers. The new plant at Waterville was
assistedwith nearly $So.million inprovincial money. Michelinexpectedto have 4.000
employees in the province by thetime that plantwentinto production.73
By the 1980's, IEL hadbecomea provincialdevelopment agencymoreconcerned with
meeting the funding requirements of homegrown business than with landing large
industry. And supporting homegrownbusinessmeant fundingpeople whowere short of
capital, thedesignationof a lenderoflast resortStanfield and the originators ofiEL were
determined to avoid. fELts 1981annualreport underlined this newrole, concluding"the
financing providedto clientsis oftenin excessof theamounts which could beavailable
throughcommercial sources.?" IEL. still however, kept a vigilanteyefor newbusiness
"throughvarioussophisticated 'industrial intelligencetechniques"'.lllI ln the depthsof the
1983 recession,no one was beatinga path to IEl 's door. The agencyfundedjust 14
projectsfor a little over $7 million. Thereseemedto be little glamourthat year as its
efforts were mostly directed to "helping...companies stay in business, thus maintaining
existing jcbs.v"
IELloaned $250millionto businesses in its first 25years.The agencyclaimedthemoney
went to companies employing more than 11,000 people. Accordingto lEL in the early
19&0's, life had become quieter thenin the early days, as it "...drifted off the front pages
of the newspapers, no longera powerful magnet for accolades or a prime target lor
briekbats."1l2
Several of the similarities betweenIEL's style of operation and the Newfoundland
programhave beendealt withabove. Theobsession withsecrecyandthe unwillingness
in both provinces to carry out detailed assessments on projects, are obvious ones.
Similarly, bothIEL and the Newfoundland government wereunwilling to do My kindof
systematic follow-up of industries theyhad sponsored. This approach raises serious
questionswhen scarcepublic funds are used to finance projects thatare oftenhigh-risk.
n Winnipeg FreePress, August 4, 1988. p.8
79 Industrial EstatesLimited,Annual Report,March31, 19&1. p.l3
" Ibid, p.13
" IEL Annual Repurt, March31, 1983. pp.4-5
n IEL Annual Repurt,March 31, 1982.pp.4-5
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The industrial development thrust in bothNovaScotiaand Newfoundlandsufferedfrom
VU&'llC statements of the missionto be accomplished.The principal weakness in the case
of Nova Scotia is that it left unresolvedthe questionof responsibility for thepromotion
of local business. IEL funded somelocalbusinesses, but the assistance WM weighted
heavily in favour of outside firms by a two-to-one rrargin." In Newfoundland, the
objectives did not even seem 10 be as well defined as they were in Nova Scotia.
Newfoundland "mustdevelop or perish" was as detailed as the message became. The
result wasthata politician and his mysterious sidekick determined whatindustries they
would attract, and then.using the surplus built during the Conunission of Government
period, they doledout Ihemoney to cashless industrialists, wbopresumably, had been
playersin pre-warEW'Ope. principally Germany,
The preoccupation in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia with big industry and foreign
ownership may haveemanated from a belief that the long tradition of exploiting the
resourcesectormadefor a poor supplyof entrepreneurship andmanagerial talent.B4This
factor is alsoassumed tohavebeenanobstacle in thedevelopment of a Newfoundland
businessculturecapableof takingchargeof fisheries development in the firsttwo decades
of the twentiethcentury.Of that failure. David Alexanderwrote, "the answermust surely
rest in the weakness in entrepreneurship andcapitalsupply."&!
A question that must be put in assessing bothdevelopment strategies, is the relative
impact they had in their respective provinces. George determined that .....on ordinary
businesscriteria IELhas proveda fiasco•..." But he argued, the assessment of such a
programmustextendpast thebottom line. Hejudged"theprovince's material standard
of life is higher for IEL having beenborn". although "thereis...no indicationlEL has
succeededinreducingNovaScotia'slaginthedevelopment of itsmanufacturing sector."86
lIJ George,p.75. [Upto 1971.out ofa total investment of$158.6,1EL hadinvested.
$50.5million (32010) in NovaScotia-ownedplants;$3",' million(23%)inotherCanadian-
ownedplants; $22.8 million(14%)in American-owned firms; and$48.3million (30010)
in other foreign-owned companies.]
Sol Ibid, p.5
5S Alexander. p.15
86 George, p.l22
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An APEC study released in 1987 noted "only a slight narrowing of the gap" in
manuf3ClUring between Atl:lntic ClrlaWandthe nationalaveragesince1959.1'1 In Now
Scotia, there has been an irnproverrx:n: in value-addedc.."<JlO"S. Thesei~
accounted for II percentof all exports in 1986,a strongi~ over3 percent in
1970. lire productionat the Michelin plMtsrepreseraeda lerge partof the increa<>e.A For
NovaScotia as a ",hole then. did the$250 million00vanccd to firmsby lEI..(101982).
help transformit fromthe"province of flShennen andWlemployedminas" to a modem
andcompetitive manufacturing centre'! APECs opinionwasthat ",rule "there is a little
more diversity in Nova Scotia'smanufacturing. fish processing andpulp and JXlPCr
productsstill dominate...19
Another pertinent question centres on whether Newfoundland and Nova Scotia's
development priorities werethe rightones. Did the development dollarschaseallcr the
right industries to bringbothemploymentandeconomic WOwth?InNewfoundland's case,
with theexceptionof industries thathadtiesto local resources anda ready local market
(eg. cement andgypsum mills),the answer is an unqualified no. In thecaseof Nova
Scotia,the answer is not quite as simple. Certainly, the major1Cl;SSel in Claittone and
Deuteriwn raised important concerns about whether fEL usedall theinfluence it had, in
orderto resolvetheproblems inbothrums. Outsidethose losseshowever, IELhadmany
successes. Its philosophy of dealing with established firms removed many of the
uocetainties and risks thai.would be present if fEL was pimarily cmcancd with
fmancing new companies. Establishedfirmshavereputations to protect, bothwith their
customers andtheirshareholders. Newfoundland Wlfortunately, made little effoo to link
its industrial programwith established finns. ThepreoccuJXlIion with goingafterGerman
industrial expertisewith-no experience in the North American rrerketplece (a market
NMoond iand would increasingly do buscesswith after Coofalcralioo) I!'".~ nil the
industries a poor stall This, tOIIi:lincd with a loan guarantee programthai.gave the
govenunent a de factomajority equitypositionwithoutrontroIof thecorrp3I1y , allowed
thevariousownersto plOl theirown losingstrategies.
Of course, no one can guarantee the successof a business venture,~ publicly Of
pr ivately funded. Thebest thatcanbe doneis 10) assesstherisk that is about to betaken.
87 Atlantic ProvincesEconomicCouncil. Atlantic C!!O!U.la Todgy. (Halifax: Fonnac
Publishing Limited) 1987. p.102
g APEC, AtI;wtjc CpnadaToday p.180. [This statistic mayillustrate to someextent
George's reasoning that the bottom line cannotbe taken as the only indicator of the
success or failureofpubJicinvestment in a givenfirm]
• Ibid pp.l()()'lOl
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Clearly,in the caseof IEL,there weremanydeficiencies in thisrespect. Theinsistence
on a small ~QtT, whileadmirable as a goal, probablydid.the agencymuchharm,as the
APEC1\:1'011 suggested. Scbeyandothers withIELbelieved theagency's autonomy from
government andbureaucratic influence wouldcomfortthe private sector. Takentoo far
however, such autonomy can create an air of invincibility in an organization, as it
appeared to do at IEL. Thissituation,combined witha govenunent only too willing to
protectthe u/:,>eOCY frompublic andpoliticalprotest, deniedIEL the empathy it needed
when someof its invesnnents went bad.
IEL serveda substantial publicpolicypurposein NovaScotia Privateinvestors werenot
willing10come to the province in sufficient numbersunderordinary circumstances. Like
Newfoundland a few yearsbefore,Nova Scotia attempted to create more favourable
conditions. Couldthe moneyhave beenbetterspentdoingotherthings? Eveneconomists
lack a crystal ball. "It is possiblethat, if the moneyhad gone instead into tourism
development, publicworks.education, healthservicesandthe like, theresultswould have
beenbetterstill", RoyGeorge wrote,buthe confessed, "...thiswe do not knoW.'o9O
For peoplewho disapprove of usingpublicmoneyto promote economic development,
what is the answerfor smal economies at the marginsof large trading provinces? Is it
to let the areas die a slow, or maybe a rapid, economic death?Is it to deliberately
depopulate economically moribund areas in the hopethat peoplewill move 10 larger
centres(the grovvth centreconceptthatwaspracticedin the Newfoundland resettlement
program under theSmallwood government)? Or arethereothersolution'> to the puzzle of
economic development, with a mix of government intervention, greater use of the
resource base. and an emphasis on training to take advantage of the information
technologyera? As the lasthalf of the 1990'sapproaches, Newfoundlandfinds itself at
anothercrossroads of economic development, with manyof itsruralareasrapidly losing
population,91 and with its govenunent pursuing a combination of the old andnew
economies.
In thosecircumstances, underdevelopedprovinces suchasNewfoundlandandNovaScotia
willcontinueto tty andspureconomic developmentFora fewyears,it will bea program
like theone IELoffered. A newgovernment will comealongand try a different approach.
~ George,p.l21
91CQrnmllO jty Ma ttern' The New Reajonal Egmomj(; Deyelopment. [Report of the
Task Force on Conununity Economic Development in Newfoundland andLabrador] St.
John's, Newfoundland January 1995. ' pp.l20-1S7. [This report was financed by the
AtlanticCanadaOpportunities Agency andEnterpriseNewfoundland andLabrador]
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Governments will keep trying because trying rosters hope. andhope often decides
elections.
Societiesandpolitical unitsat themargins ofmajorcentresof economicdevelopment ere
constantly trying to conquer thebarriers to development posedby long uunsportetion
distances and small populetion, Unfortunately, NewfOWldland'srecordin anempting to
shakeoff those problemshasnotbeena good one.
Srmllwood andBeyond
TheHrstthreeindustries \'IeI'C intended to besoldto theprivatesector.Theproceeds from
thesales wouldbe usedto finance newindustries, andso on,ad infinitum, Butthis plan,
as pragmaticas it appeared, maskedII major problcmthat wouldcometo hauntall the
newindustr iesM whowouldwanttobuythem?The basicproblem stemmedfromthelack
of planningforthe industr ializationplan.Thegypsumplant,forexample,wasconstructed
accordingto European production ami market requirements. These requirementswere
belowwhatwasneededinthe UnitedStates. Eventually,this problemappearedto be the
mainobstaclein selling the plant to the National Gypsum Company of Buffalo, New
York. The question mustbeasked,of what use were European designstandards and
production requirements for a mill whose main market W$ Newfoundland, eastern
Canada(including Quebecand Ontario), andthe easternseaboardof tbeUnitedStates?
Similarly, poor planning added to the capital costs of another of the industries -
Newfoundland Hardboard. Failure to anticipate the high moisture content of the
Newfoundlandbirch to be usedin theoperation, promptedthecompanyto go backtothe
government for additional funds to set up wood dryers on the premises. One of the
industries thatcame later - the machinery plantat Octagon- also fell victim10lackof
planning, or perhaps, the mistaken value of a wink and a nod from some federal
politician.Al enyrare, management at the plant, and indeed, the government itself,
believedCMIC would benefitfromnationaldefenseorders. Whenthese orders did not
materialize. ....e plant became in Hon.vood's words, "just II fairlylargemachineshop."
Other plantsencountered a litanyof problems, fromtheir inabilityto understand market
forces(as was the case with Eckhardt KnittingMills, the chocolatefactory, the glove
factory, andthebatteryplant)to poorquality(the rubberplanthadthedubiousdistinction
of beingthe leader in this category). No matterwhat specificproblems the firmsfaced,
theyaII stemmed froma failureto plan.
In addition to the failure to plan, the industrialization program was hampered by
Smallwood's bias toward the standard North American development model, where
resources are brought to a centrallocation andmanufactured intoa saleableproduct. The
Royal Commission on Employment andUnemploymentreferredto this in themidMI980's
as "the mainland model with its urban-industrial thrust."2 Smallwood's biaswas inherent
in themistakenbeliefthat locationandothercomparative advantage factorscansomehow
beovercomeinthe competitivemarketplace. Such a bias meantscarcefinancial resources
1 Horwood, p.181
2 RoyAl CommissionReport,Chapter2, p46
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were wasted on industries with little chance of survival.while an indigenous industry -
the fishery > was largely ignored. This stare of affairs \VJS summarized by thc-ihcn
Conservative Premier, BrianPeckford in 1983.
There wasno mention whatsoever of the fishery. Oneindustry piledupon
top of another was somehow to bring prosperity. Thefishery survived in
spitecrus, not becauseorus.'
Smallwoodand his government failed to appreciate the new reality under federulsm.
Tariffwalls that had previously protected Ne\vtoWldland's manufacturing sectorandits
4,000jobs were removedat the instant of Confederation. This dramatically changedlhe
competitive position of all Newfoundland industries. Indeed. it causedmany to fail.In
suchanenvironment, it was foolhardy to finance economicdevelopment to compete wilh
alreadyestablished mainlandf irms without a propermarketassessment.
Federalism alsomeant freight subsidies that made it cheaper to bothexport and import
goods. This was something mainland finns wereable to take advantage of, anda'> a
result, lower the cost of exporting to theNewfoundland market.
Smallwood and Veldmanis could not be accused of of proceeding cautiously. They
personally invited industrialists to cometo Newfoundland andmadedealson the basis
of a handshake,mtherthanrigourousresearch andanalysis. It seemed that if bothmen
likedan ideaandwere persuaded thatthe industrialists behindit hadgood credentials,a
deal was signed. There is no evidence that market surveyswere required prior to the
signingof any deal, Of that there was a necessity for anything approaching a proper
business plan. Thebusinessconceptand the plant machinery were all that was required
to get the government money tlowing. Even in cases where industrialists lacked the
requiredmachinery to constitute their equity in a given project, the government was
prepared to recognize "know-how" as meeting theequityreqairerneras. Oncethe plant
wentintooperation, thegovenunent appeared to lacktither theexpertiseor theincentive
- perhaps both- tooverseeoperationsthat wouldeventually consume$26millionwithout
returning a centto the treasury. It is little wonderinthosecircumstances, thatmostof the
industries failed As a resultof those failures, NewfOlUldhmd lostout on severalcounts-
the loss of the major partof its pre-Confederation cash surplus; the lost time pursuing
industrywhilevirtually losing sightof itsmost importnnt renewable industry, the fishery;
andthe seriouslack of attention towardassistingan indigenous cropof ernrepreneurs.
NE\WOUNDlAND ANDDEVEWl'MFNT: 11IEBIGP1C11JRE
) Brian A Peckford. The Past jn the Pn:sent [A Personal Perspective on
Newfoundland, Future)(Sl.John's: Harry Culf Publications Limited) 1983 p.55
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Newfoundland is not alone in terms of the problems it has cncow aered in search of
economic development. There are examples from around the world, extending from
Canada itself tosub-SaharanAfricato Finland. A study on Finland fbr example, shows
the two northernmost provinces were the poorestand were the most reliant on primary
sector industries; they hadthe lowest birthrate, andtheir level of unemploymentgrew
most repldty.' The northern-most provincesalsohad thehighest out-migration rates.
Therehas alsobeena great deal of work done in the Caribbean, where majorchangesin
policies and institutions, along with u move towurd regional institutions have been
suggested as ways to help reducethe region's level of economic dependence.' Similarly,
the impoverished statesof sub-SaharanAfricahave beenurgedto co-operate moreon a
regional basis to foster economic development; the elite havebeen advisedto give up
their profligate lifestyles and spendmoreof their moneyat home; national leaders have
beentold to abandon theirnational airlinesandnational fertilizer plantsand"learnto
make do with regional airlines andregionalfertilizerplaots."
TIle problems of underdevelopment and unevendevelopment have beenthe subject of
much intense study. Two main theoretical frameworks have emerged to explain
developmentissues ~ a dependency perspective, whichexamines the relationships of
variousaspectsof production, including class, thcroleof elites,capitalaccumulation, and
exploitation; and the orthodox economic or marketanalysis approach, which viewsthe
marketas a self-regulating mechanism, to whichallother aspects of theeconomicsystem
must adhere.
Looked at through orthodox economic eyes, Newfoundland would certainlyhavebeen
seen to be lacking. The province is a long way frommajor marketsand it is sparsely
populated. It is a resource-dependent economy, showing fewof the signsof evolvingto
a more developed one. The dependency perspective, on the other hand, defines the
development problem as a relational one. Whocontrols development in a region? Is the
4 Britta Koshiaho. "Regional Development, the Case of Finland", pp.34g..354. in
Anton Kuklinski, omKultalahti and BrittaKoshiaho (eds.) Regional Qmamics jlDd
SQcioeconomic Change(Tempere, Finland: Finnpublishers)1979
S WilliamG. Demas. "Economic Independence: ConceptualandPolicyIssues in the
CommonwealthCeribbeen", pp. 202-204, in PercySelwyn(00..) Deyelopment PoIjc;y in
Small COllntries (London: CroomHelm Ud) 1975
6 RobertS. Browne, "Africa: Time for a New Development Strategy", ppA07-408,
in MichaelT. Martin andTerry R. Kandal,South:s of Deve1o.pmm! and Ch,'ln~ in the
MQd.eIn..WQilil (New York: Oxford University Press) 1989
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driving force imported capital. or indigenous capital? Are profits kept in the local
economy or exported? Outof this approach has developed theconceptof dependency
theory, which Ul.:cUSI.'S capital of beingbothcentralist and exploitive. Someof themajor
works on NcwJbundland political economyhave been from a dependencypoint of view.
Summers(1993),Antler (1979), Alexander (1973) andMatthews (1983) have studiedthe
Newfoundlandproblem through the critical lensof dependency theory. The term'critical
lens' is used because dependency theory implies a "turning upside down"of economic
analysis, in an effort to understand the underlying factors that affect economic
development. This approachdiffersfromorthodoxeconomic theory, suchas thatadvanced
by Courchcne. He argues regional disparitiesareexacerbated bygovernment interference
(transfers. unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws). Courchene sees an
entenchrncnt ofrcgional dispaririesunderthisscenario"whereprovincesandregionsalike
are mademoredependent on the system of transfers." Implicit in Courchene's thesis is
the belief that the market, left to its own devices,can equalizeeconomicgrowthand
benefits. Brewis, similarly,placedgreatfaithin the market. Although herecognizedthe
problemsof low- or slow-growth areas,he reconunended national government policies
as solutions, ratherthanchanges to the structureof the economicsystemitself.8 Suchan
approach however, may not take into account all the factors that contribute to
underdevelopment, and 3S a result. this can lead to sweeping generalizations about the
reasons for underdevelopment, and consequently, it can result in the wrong solutions
being applied.
Marly of the dependency theorists who have written about Newfoundland have a deep
understanding of its historyof economic development. Summers argues the roots of
underdevelopment reside in the early part of the nineteenth century.She argues local
development was stymied for several reasons- the absenceofcapitalfor investment; a
weak investment banking sector which impededeconomic diversification; and the
existence of the colonialstate which "was strongly representative of English mercantile
interests", and therebyopposed to diversification of Newfoundland's economyawayfrom
the fishery," Summers further claimsthatduring effortsto diversify theeconomyafterthe
1 Courchene,ThomasJ. "Analyticalperspectives on the Canadian economicunion".
in Trebilcock, MJ., et aI. Federnljsm and the Cpnadian Eoonornjc 1fnjon (Toronto:
Universityof TorontoPres) 1983. p.93
8 T.N. Brewis. Reejonal Economic Policje<> in Canada(Toronto: Macmillan) 1969
p.242
9 Valerie Summers. Regime ChaOee in a Rf'SOurce Economy' The poIitjcs of
J lnderdevelopment jn NewfQundland (J825~J993) Manuscript (St. John's) 1993 pAO
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tum of the rwentieih century, mining interests exploited the localdependence on the
industry, and exacted substantial concessions, with serious illl'lications for policy
modification andregime ChiUlgc.1O
Alexander addedgreatly to this lineofinquiry. However, rather thanoptingforthe classic
dependency approach WId Itsbiasagainst so-called 'exploitive' outsideinterests. Alexander
focused on thelocal mercnntileelite intheearlytwentieth century. Helamented thelack
of attentiongivento fisher ies development, ....hich hebelieved nmight have floatedthe
country over its railway, warend otherdcvelopmcnt-debt burdens. <lfld introduced a
dynamic into the well-being, self-confidenceWid initiative of theccuntry,"'! Alcxnndcr
pointedto the"inabilityor unwillingness of itselite to mobilize thecountryto manoeuvre
moreeffectively.v'! Heargued that Confederation,insteadof providingnewimpetusfor
Newfoundlandeconomic development,confinedthe province to the traditional roleof a
peripheral province,"
Doug House argued effectively that Newfoundland has beenhampered in the post.
Confederotion period by large, outside interests, beginning in the central Canadian
boardrooms of the majormining and pulp and paper companies., extending 10 the
Canadian banks and Wall Street fmanciers, and into the key federal government
departments of Fisheries andOceans andMinesandEnergy.14 Hoose appeared to udopt
Alexander's nrgumcnt that NC\'foundland's dependence isat least partially theresult "of
its own mistakes in the pest";" the rest he attributesto "the centralistlogicof the
international expansion of a market economy..."16
10 Summers, pp.61-71
II David Alexander. "Development and Dependence in NC\'ifoundland1880-1970",
in Acadiensis. VolA, No.1. Autumn 1974. p. 13
12 Ibid, p.6
13 Ibid,p.24
14 Doug House. "The Mouse thatRoars: New Directions in Canadian Political
Economy". p.ln, in Brym, Robert I. (00.) Regionalism in C,narla (Toronto: Irwin
Publishing Inc.) 1986
IS Ibid,pp. 177
16 Ibid,p.178
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TbcsILXy of Ncv.foundl<Uld underdevelopment is a COlT4'lex one. OO\ 'Cn intothefalrie
of its time as colony, country, and now, JXOViru of Canada. It is a story rife with
cxp!;>it llioo, fromitscnrIy days as a fishing slOltiooferEnglishmerchants, to its present
sI.'JlIl' ec exporterof minerals,paper, aOO fish,andas a tnIf-millionplus captive market
fer C:Jn3dinn lXlnSUmlT goods.
\):paldency Ihco<y is a goodstating point fer thestudyof theNewfoundland=nomy.
as it daes look beyond the traditionalquantifiable ecooomic indicators suchas gross
domesticproduct, income level,andthesectoral distribution of industry, to factorssuch
as the ownership of capital. The market approach to analyzing economic
underdevelopment also plays a key role, as it quantifies key aspects of economic
development, thereby allowing comparisons withother areasand regions.
Buttheoreticalapproachesfailtotake account of the impactof thepoliticalenvironment,
This is an especially important pointin discussing dte industrialization programthat
Smallwood undertook in theearly 1950's. Smallwood developed a ptOgJ<lJ11 without: well-
articulated goals. There wasnottansparency to theprocessas faras publicoversightwas
coocenedInduslri" wereregorleted,deals signed,andprodically open-coded finances
committed
POlInO; AND DEVIl.Ol\\IEl\. PlANS
Srmllwoods industri3limioo progrem isoneof five distinct deveI.~ stages in the
post-ConfedcrntionCl;L T"Oofthoseplans Wl:re C'o idcnt during Smallwood's 23 yen in
office,Theindustriali23tioo program wasthe fIrSt. and it hasbeendisccssed above.The
secood attemptlastedfromtheIDle 1950's to Smalwoods departure from powerin1m
Thefocusduring thisperiodwason rJl: g;JprOjects - bothintheraneal resaece fieldand
in brge-salle industrial devel_
The ironore mines'" LaiJrndor City [\962) and Wabush [1964J were""joe resource
developments, os was theChlBthili Fals JlO"'" devdopment [late \%0',]. Themines
became largeemployers, necessitating theconstruction of twolargetowns in thewestern
Labrador frontier. The Churchill Falls development became the largest construction
project in Newfoundland's history, providing employment forthousands ofpeople. There
weretwo othermajor powerdevelopments underSmallwood's tenure, theBay d'Espoir
projo:t [\967]and Holyrood 1\970]. Development of the min" in Labrador required
massiveamounts ofcapital. asdid theChurchill Fallspowerproject. Capital forthe mines
wasprovidedby the big steel producers, who were anxious to obtain ore for their
fi.rnaces in central Canada andthenortheastern United Stales. rmancingfor OuthiU
f alls camefroman international coosortiwn, and wassecured bya long-tern, llJw..rate
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contractwith Hydro Quebec. Newtoundlnnd got the construction jobs, but it is Quebec
that continues to enjoy the substantial financial benefits of the contract, estimated by
Brian Peckford in 1983 at $2 billionsincethe powerwas turnedon in 1972.17 Similarly.
with the mines, Newfoundlandbenefittedfrom the jobs, butthe mining companies paid
little ill taxes,$16.63 million from1970to 1975. Only with new legislationin 1975, did
royalties increaseto about $12 million a yecr."
The major industrial enterprises thatbeganunder this chapter of economic development
were inducednot by the kindof concessionsSmallwoodoffered themining companies,
nor the low guaranteedrate for Labrador power, but by substantial subsidies. Federal
subsidieson shipbuilding,and subsequent Newfoundlandcontributions to coverannual
deficits 'illowedthe Maeystown Shipyard [1966) to get started. The attractive point for
Smallwoodwas the 50-percent subsidy for Canadian-built, steel-hulled fishing vessels
over 33 metres.'?Faced with yearn of losses, the yardwas givena final chance with a
promiseof new leadership in late 1994.20 Smallwoodattractedthe UnitedKingdom gillllt,
AlbrightandWilson, to build a phosphorous reduction plant at long Harbour[1961]. At
one-thirdthe cost of powerin the United Kingdom. it wasan offerthe company could
not refuse." The rate was so attractive, concluded Brian Peckford in 1983, "that the
~~~:ll~~ t:e~ ~:~~~lgl~::=;~~:t=;;r~:et~~~r:
to a more "realistic" level. In the late 1980's., Albright and Wilson closed the plant.
Smallwoodgavea majorpush to thestartof the oil refineryat Comeby Chance. In the
year he announced thestartof the LongHarbour project, Smallwoodtold the legislature
the province would floata $30 million issue to beginconstructionof the refinery. The
refineryeventually became thebiggest bankruptcy in Canadian history.
17 Peckford,p. 58
" Ibid, pp.56-57
19 Brian Bursey. A Half Cent\llY Qf Pmgress'} (A Historyof Economic Growth and
Developmentin Newfoundland During the Modem Period, 193().1980]
2CStatement from Premier Clyde Wells, Executive Council, St. John's. October24,
1994
21 Bursey, p.421
22 Peckford, p.66
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Theestablishment or theseindustries happened as Smallwoodpromoted the resettlement
of people from rural areas into so-called "growth centres", He also directedsubstantial
resources toward lnfrasuucturc development - roads. schools, Memorial University,
hospitals - La make the province "conduciveto economic dcvelopmcnt.v"
The thirddistinctdevelopment periodbeganunderSmallwood's successor, Conservative
FrankMoores. Therewas11two-way emphasis on natural resources - renegotiatingverious
resourcedeals completed underSmallwood, including revisingthe royalty structurewith
mining companies and a decision to buy back ihe shares of British NC\Vfoundland
Corporation (BIUNCO). BRINCO had been given crown land and water rights
concessions in 1953, includingeventually, thewaterrightsof HamiltonRiverFalls, later
to berenamedby SmallwoodasChurchill Falls.The secondpartoCtheMoores approach
to natural resourceswas in planning foroffshoreoil and gasdevelopment andforgrowth
of fisheries Infrastructure, in orderto take advantage of the declarationof the 2QO-mile
limH in 1977. The 2ao-mile limit gave Canada an exclusive role in managing fish
resources within the neweconomic zone, and rightof firstaccessto majorfishresources
such as northern cod,
Lacking any constitutionalrole in the allocation and management of fish stocks, the
Mooresgovcmment entered an expansionist mode. A position papertitled "Fish is the
Future", published in late 1978, contemplated a half billion dollarsin spending by the
provincial govcmment end privatesector in the six years leading up to 1984.24 The
centrepiece of the planwas to bea superport at HarbourGrace, where76,000tonnesof
groundfish would be landed and "distributed to plants experiencing off-season fish
shortages.v" Theplan wasan ambitious one, aimedat renewing old infrastructureand
creating new facilities, suchas vesselsandplants.
Moores left political life a few months afterthe plan was announced. His Mines and
Energy Minister. BrianPeckford, won the party leadership in March 1979 and three
monthslater, obtaineda new mandate from the electorate, In manyways. Pockford's
approach to development wasa continuation of the approach that emerged during the
Moores years, However, Peckford's personal investment in an integrated resource
development policydemands that his tenureberegarded asa fowthdistinctdevelopment
approach.
.a Bl.II'3ey, p.397
24Notes forSpeechdelivered by theHonourableWalterCarter, Minister ofFisheries,
at a FisheriesSeminar,November 13, 1978. p.6
" Ibid, pp. 12-13
Peckford's approachwas summed up by the words "never again". a reference to thc
perceived giveawayof Churchill Falls hydroand the termsunderwhichother resources
wereallowedto be developed>The goal 'Y.'L'i not state ownership of natural resources,
but rathera channelling of effort to ensurethat R'SOllfCL'S would be developedin sucha
way as to "raise the rates of growth in investment. employment unci income to a Icvel
whichwillpermitNewfoundland to narrowthe gapthat nowexistsbetween theProvince
andother parts of Carada.v"
Pcckford's resourcedevelopment policies werecentred on fisheries, hydroandoffshore
oil and gas development.It was an extremely high-risk strategy,since it presumed a
major power shift in the Canadian state - including the eventual entrenchment of
provincial management rights in fisheries in the Constitution;" a favourableSupreme
Court decision giving ownership of offshore oil and gas to Newfoundland; and
intervention Som the federal government to facilitateconstruction of a hydro power
throughQuebec. The government sawcorrective actionon all three frontsas imperative
precursors to improving the provincial economy. It stated,"the relatively.undeveloped
state of the goods producing sectorcan be attributedto the lackof manufactwing
industries linked to the Province's resource base.?"
The pursuit of these issues led to a tumultuous period in the relationship between
Newfoundland and Ottawa In the end, Newfoun dland got no say over fisheries
management and no powercorridorthroughQuebec. Peckford was however, able to
persuade the Mulroney Conservative government to agree to an administrative
arrangement (theAtlanticAccord) on offshoreoil and gas. therebyallowing the province
some say over the pace of development and allowing it to choose the mode of
development, a right that contributed significantly to the decision by the Hibernia
consortium to construct a labour-intensive concrete production systemfor thatoil field
Peckford regardedoffshoredevelopment as "Newfoundlands last chance to becomea
viable society"," sincesubstantial revenues from it would relieve "our d~ load and
26 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. MlOjlginV All O lt ResQurces (A
DevelopmentPlan forNewfoundland andLabrador) St. John's. October1980. p.2
27 Ibid, p.27
28 Ibid, p.57
" Ibid, p.l l
~ Peckford, p.95
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heavy taxation borden so !hatwe canhave a chanccto build a longtern economy based
un fishing and rmsry."JI
1\.-ckfooJ lcfl o ffice just as major groundflSh resources wen: entering a period of serious
decline, before theHiberniadevelopmenthadbegun.andwithnoresolution to discussions
on joint Lalndor hydro dcvclopmcnlwith Quebec (the strotcgythat replaced a frontal
attack on the Upper Churchill 'giveaway' deal after NewfOtniIand's Water Rights
Reversion Act wasdeclaredurcoestinnional in 1984.)
Federal transfer payments,both10 individualsandto thegovernment, have beena major
contributor to the province in the post-Confederation period. With the federal debt
increasing substantially year over year however, Ottawa began to cut back on its
expenditures in the late 1980's and into the 1990's, This approach to control federal
finances impacted negatively on Newfoundland's position, with the result that provincial
budgetshave been under serious pressuredwing this IX-iod. This general situation was
exacerbated by the ncar-total groundfish failure in the early 1990's and the retrenchment
of other importantnatural resourceindustries such as miningand forestry.
Peckfbrdsdepanure frompolitics signaled theendof thirty yearsof increase inboththe
size endscope of provincial govenunent activity in Newfoundland TheWells' Liberal
b'OVCl1llTlCllt thatsucceeded the Peckford administra1iondistanceditself fromthe previous
interventionist approoc:h to economic policy-making The liberals were philosphicaJly
inclined toward privatizalion of mony segmentsof govemmcnt activity (albeit, w'ith
limited success to mid-I99S). Theysaw their role as setting thestage for peivere sector
investment. This wasevidencedin theproduction of theStrategicEconomic Plan.which
identified obstecles to business development in Newfoundland. The Plan was also
prescriptive; one of its majorimmediate cooscqu:=nces was a packageof tax incentives
10 atlrad new business to theprovince.A further move was thedecision to consolidate
a plethorn of governmentregulatoryregimesinto a single"one-stop shew ing" agencyfor
permits, licenses.fees, andapprovals. Govenunent itselfwasdownsized undertheWells'
Liberals, although likely more as a response to budget shortfalls. ralher than any
philosophical inclination 10 reducepublicsectoremployment.
The Liberalgovernment of Clyde Wells waselected in May 1989. partly on a promise
to help diversify the resource-dominated Newfoundland economy, This approach
represented the fifth and most recent attempt to solve an old riddle - cracking the
underdevelopment problem in NewfoWldland The Liberals' tax incentive and tax
forg iveness law was enactedin December 1994. Thegovernment paysa $2000 grantto
companies foreachpermanent job created in lncusries that donot compete with rums
Jl lbid, p.l 04
%alreadyestablished in Ne\~1i:llU1dl3Jld:'l.Thegovcnmcnr referred to itsinitiative as"bold".
and stated "we must attract new investmentcephal nnd innovativeindustrial activity
through an aggressive world-wide businessprospecting andpromotional inltiative.?"
CONCUJSIQN
Newfoundland is nearing a half-century of life inside Cane-a, yet thevexing problems
of high unemploymentand low economic growth remain. Out-migration has been a
constant fact of life. Theonlyvariable is thedestination - inthe 1950's and1960's. it was
Ontario. Fromlhcmid-1970's 10the present, thedestinationof choicehasbeenAlberta
andBritish Columbia. The resolution of NewfOlmd\rulcfs serious economic problems
preoccupies the present cropof political leadership as it didpreviousgovernments.
It couldbeargued that Smallwood'sindustrialization program. while unquestionably an
overall, expensive failure,did less harmto the provincethan his subsequent resource
development effortswiththe heavyemphasis onconcessions. Indeed, muchof theeffort
in the post-Smallwood era,especiallyby Moores ond Peckford, represented an attempt
to undosomeofSmallwood's resource deals. [The mtionalizatlcn of Brinco; revisionof
themineraltaxregime; renegotiationofthe powersubsidy forERCO; andthe futiledfort
to geta morefavourabledealon theUpperChurchill powercontract areall examplcs.]
Themostglaring gap intheprovince's abilityto chartits owneconomie courseis in the
areaof fisheries jurisdiction. Fisheries management lx..came a federal responsibilityat
Confederation, andwhile it is notpossible toprove Newfoundland couldhavedonebetter
at managing thefishery, it is clearOtta.....a jealouslyguarded itsexclusiveconstitutional
rolein this areato the virtualexclusion of a meaningfuladvisory roleforNewfoundland.
Perhaps thiswasinevitable, givenNovaScotia's largestake in Atlantic fisheries, and its
influence in regionalpolitics. This state of affairshowever, ignored theeconomicreality
n Government of NewfoundlandandLabrador. Allmeljni NewRllSiOCiS Inve>tment
(AWhite Paper on Proposed NewLegislation to Promote Economic Diversificationand
GrowthEnterprises in theProvince)June1994. p.iii [ThewhitePaper waspassed into
lawin December 1994. Thetax incentives andloxforgiveness aspects of thev...hite Paper
remained intact, The minimum investment andsales levels required 10 qualify forthe
program werelowered after complaints that the legislation would preclude~y local
investors from Inking part in the program As well, a controversial section that
contemplated imposing collective agreements whcretrade unions andemployers were
unable to reachagreement, wasremoved]
J3 Ibid, p.iii
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in Newfoundland. wherehundreds ofsmall communitiesanda sizeable partof thelabour
force \ \Il'I'C entirely dependent on the fishery. Ottawa rebuffed successive attempts by
Pcckford, und later, by Wells, lor the province to playa mcaningfuJ role in fisheries
managemen t. By the early 1990's, the valuable groundfishery was devastated, and the
hundredsof dependent Newfoundlandcommunities faced an uncertain future.
Perhapsthe question of Newfoundland development needs to beredefined, not interms
of whatthe province cando to spurdevelopment, but rather, giventheconstraints that
impact development in Newfoundland, are the often-stated goalsof reaching various
indicators of economic growth evenpossible? This, admittedly, is anothertopic, but it
raises significant questionsaboutthe expectationsof people who belongto a first-world
country, but whoseprovincial economy performs onlymarginally betterthana thirdworld
one.
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